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Despite the prominence of the issue across time, scholarly accounts of population rhetoric remain 
limited. Those analyses that do respond to this current of public argument focus overwhelmingly 
on actors such as Paul Ehrlich and R. Thomas Malthus, and on extreme instantiations of 
population rhetoric and policy, such as eugenics and China’s one-child policy. Missing in this 
body of scholarship is a sustained treatment of population rhetoric on a global stage, as it has 
occurred at United Nations conferences for over 30 years. This under-appreciated body of texts 
yields a global vision of population. Beyond the reductionist approaches to population that draw 
scorn from scholars, activists, and policymakers alike, the consensus documents produced at 
Bucharest (1974), Mexico City (1984), Cairo (1994), and the follow-ups to Cairo (1999 and 
2004) take into consideration the complex web of factors that feed into population and that are 
fed by population. By employing a model of rhetorical criticism that focuses on a “close reading” 
of the final consensus documents produced by each conference, this study charts both the 
transformations of public argument across time while also paying special attention to the 
continuities in these texts. This project aims to benefit multiple scholarly communities, including 
environmental studies, international relations, public argument, and rhetorical theory and 
criticism, as well as to policymakers, NGOs, and activists focused on population issues. I 
consider whether it is meaningful to continue to talk about “population” as an issue separate 
from a web of interconnected factors, and whether we are in fact beyond discussions of 
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 v 
overpopulation to the point where we have moved past and are thus over population. Alongside 
this topical question, this project opens the conversation as to whether UN conference 
documents, and related documents, constitute a unique rhetorical genre, and if so, what some 
characteristics of this genre might be.  
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1.0  POPULATION AS PUBLIC ARGUMENT 
I wish I could offer you some sugarcoated solutions, but I'm afraid the time for them is long gone. A cancer is an 
uncontrolled multiplication of cells; the population explosion is an uncontrolled multiplication of people. Treating only the 
symptoms of cancer may make the victim more comfortable at first, but eventually he dies—often horribly. A similar fate 
awaits our world with a population explosion if only the symptoms are treated. We must shift our efforts from treatment of 
the symptoms to the cutting out of the cancer. The operation will demand many apparently brutal and heartless decisions. 
The pain may be intense. But the disease is so far advanced that only with radical surgery does the patient have a chance of 
survival.1 
 -Dr. Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (1968) 
 
The Cairo Programme of Action helped governments to move away from a narrow focus on family planning to a 
new concept of sexual and reproductive health throughout the life cycle. The Cairo agenda changed the international 
debate about population from human numbers to human beings. It put the focus squarely where it should be—on 
improving human lives. Investing in individuals, broadening their opportunities and enabling them to realize their potential 
as human beings is the key to sustained economic growth and sustainable human development.2 
 
 - Thoraya Obaid, Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2004) 
                                                 
1 Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 166-67. After much 
deliberation, I decided not to insert (sic) or place problematic terminology under erasure, including gendered 
language, as well as language describing developing countries that is not universally accepted. As a rhetorician, I 
cannot dismiss these concerns as being “just words.” Instead, I trust in the reader to engage the text actively on these 
questions, knowing that I do not personally endorse such language myself, but have no interest to “scar” (or, in the 
words of Kenneth Burke, “inflict symbolic wounds” on) the original text to prove it beyond the shadow of a doubt. 
2 Thoraya Obaid, “Opening Statement at the European Population Forum,” ICPD at Ten: The World 
Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review (New York: UNFPA, 2005), 31. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Thomas Robert Malthus' famous 1798 publication, An Essay on the Principle of 
Population, human population growth has been an enduring topic of political controversy, yet its 
political framing has varied considerably.3 Particularly (though not exclusively) in the United 
States (US) and other developed countries, Paul Ehrlich's 1968 The Population Bomb generated 
significant anxiety and concern about the growth of human population worldwide and 
accompanying questions relating to consumption patterns.4 However, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
population lost steam in public arguments about environmental quality and international 
relations. As one body of population experts noted in the early 1990s: "Over the past two 
decades, a mix of national and international complacency in regard to the urgency of population 
issues had resulted in millions of unwanted births in many developing countries, threatening to 
                                                 
3 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of 
Society. With Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers (London: printed for J. 
Johnson, 1798).  
4 I focus primarily on Paul Ehrlich in this section. However, this choice raises two problems. First, while I 
suspect that Ehrlich had an international influence (rather than merely in the US or in the “developed West,”) there 
are not definitive bodies of literature that attest to such influence. Second, any attempt to draw an overarching 
history of population rhetoric in the Twentieth Century is somewhat arbitrary, as the web of influencing texts makes 
defining a particular “starting” or “defining” moment incredibly difficult. In an attempt to combine both of these 
issues, I do point to another text, published in the 1940s, that both predicts and prefigures many of Ehrlich’s claims, 
and is also documented as an “international bestseller”:  
William Vogt, director of the conservation section of the Pan American Union and later research director at 
Planned Parenthood of America, articulated this relationship between overpopulation and environmental 
disaster in his influential Road to Survival, published in 1948. Vogt framed his neo-Malthusian argument 
around the environmental consequences of global overpopulation. He warned that without addressing the 
problem of overpopulation, international peace was impossible and that the world would face 
environmental disaster on an unprecedented scale. Translated into nine languages, Road to Survival became 
an international best seller. 
Donald T. Critchlow, “Editor’s Note,” Journal of Policy History 12, no. 1 (2000): v. For a feminist critique of the 
classic “Environmental Impact=Population x Affluence (Consumption) x Technology,” utilized by Ehrlich and 
many other demographers and population writers, see H. Patricia Hynes, “Taking Population out of the Equation: 
Reformulating I=PAT,” in Dangerous Intersections: Feminist Perspectives on Population, Environment, and 
Development, ed. Jael Silliman and Ynestra King (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), 39-73. 
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overtake their hope of achieving sustainable development and alleviating poverty."5 While a 
number of explanations for complacency could be furnished, a few in particular stand out. First, 
and in particular with regard to developed countries such as the US, the apocalyptic scenarios 
envisioned by Malthus and Ehrlich seemed to have been proven false, draining urgency from the 
policy issue.6 Second, the ways in which (over)population rhetoric had typically been framed 
made it easily susceptible to misanthropic and patriarchal agendas.7  Third, and especially 
(though not exclusively) in developing countries, the interplay among the Catholic Church, third 
                                                 
5 United Nations Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes, "Recommendations of the Expert 
Group Meeting on Population Policies and Programmes," United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/recommendations/expert/5.html (accessed September 7, 2008). Rhetorically, the 
notion of “unwanted births” may create additional fodder for those skeptical or critical of a pro-family planning 
worldview. In the debates leading up to the 2008 presidential election in the United States, then presidential 
candidate Barack Obama chose the term “unintended” rather than “unwanted,” but it is unclear whether that shift did 
more to satisfy those holding a conservative outlook on population issues.  
6 For an analysis of Paul Ehrlich’s rhetorical strategy, see Craig Waddell, “Perils of a Modern Cassandra: 
Rhetorical Aspects of Public Indifference to the Population Explosion,” Social Epistemology 8, no. 3 (July 1994): 
221-237.  For Ehrlich’s response to Waddell’s essay, see Paul Ehrlich, “Perils of a Modern Cassandra: Some 
Personal Comments,” Social Epistemology 8, no. 3 (July 1994): 239-240. Waddell traces a problem with Ehrlich’s 
rhetoric in The Population Bomb that is separate from the apocalyptic quality as well as its potentially misanthropic 
implications. He argues that one reason for Ehrlich’s rhetorical failure is that, from the outset, he attacks, rather than 
endears himself to, his audience, suggesting that his entire point might end up falling on deaf ears. Ehrlich, in his 
response, concedes the “ambivalence” in the reception to his book, noting that we still have far to go on the 
population issue, but also suggests reasons why his book was likely helpful in moving in the right direction. Ehrlich, 
“Personal Comments,” 239. 
7 For historical work that traces the longer trajectory of issues of reproduction and how it has been 
configured as problem, see Betsy Hartmann, Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population 
Control & Contraceptive Choice (New York: Harper & Row, 1987); Adele Clarke, Disciplining Reproduction: 
Modernity, American Life Sciences, and "The Problems of Sex" (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998); Lisa Forman Cody, Birthing the Nation: Sex, Science, and the Conception of Eighteenth-Century Britons 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mary Elizabeth Fissell, Vernacular Bodies: The Politics of 
Reproduction in Early Modern England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Rebecca Kukla, Mass 
Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers' Bodies (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). I use the term 
“(over)population” for two primary reasons: following the dissertation title, I use this neologism to open space for 
the multiple meanings of over in relation to population, and second, in the public argument regarding population, the 
question of whether we are, or will become overpopulated represents a central point of stasis. Also, unfortunately, in 
many ways, "misanthropy" is an incomplete identifier for this aspect of my account. Misanthropy suggests being 
against all humans, when in fact, much of the historical argument on population is directed against particular groups 
of humans—for instance, women, people in developing countries, the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
"others"—rather than the entirety of the human race. 
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world nationalism, and religious conservatism combined to exert a powerful strain of 
pronatalism, thus crowding out space for rhetoric that would seek to manage population growth.  
In my dissertation, I analyze thirty years (1974-2004) of international, United Nations 
(UN)-sponsored public argument on population. While scholars have treated Cold War-era 
population discourses, in both the US and the international arena, Cairo was proclaimed to be a 
watershed rhetorical event in the post-Cold War context. Building on the 1992 Rio Conference 
(known formally as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) that 
popularized the phrase "sustainable development" to describe a newly articulated synergy 
between environmental protection and economic development, scholars, activists, and 
participants alike have claimed that Cairo substantially redefined the issue of population. They 
argue that, rather than focusing primarily on quantitative projections and apocalyptic predictions, 
Cairo focused instead on qualitative, social criteria for understanding the contours of the policy 
arguments surrounding population. If "sustainable development" had been the lasting mark left 
by Rio, these advocates proclaim "reproductive health" and "reproductive rights" to be the 
legacies of Cairo.8 
This introductory chapter frames my study of public argument on population growth in 
the following steps. First, I review extant scholarly work on the population issue. Second, I 
establish the mode of investigation by which I perform my study. Finally, I preview the artifacts 
                                                 
8 As indicated later this chapter, in the discussion of the texts that I analyze in this project, as well as in 
chapter five, in the discussion of future research trajectories, my goal in this project is not to perform a close textual 
analysis on the claims of these pundits alongside my close read of each conference text. Instead, I focus my energy 
in this dissertation on the latter, which is in and of itself a formidable task. I believe that the claims that I do cite 
from pundits are sufficient for identifying the goal posts- whether or not these texts actually indicate a radical shift 
from the 1974 and 1984 texts during the 1994 conference. As future research, however, I believe that a more 
sustained treatment of the rhetoric of these critics, activists, and pundits would be valuable, especially in providing 
more text from which we may discern motives for why they are so keen on drawing such a sharp distinction. 
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and case studies that support this project, providing research questions and the organizing 
structure that frames the inquiry in the following pages. 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1 Population as a Policy Issue 
As previewed previously, three primary sets of factors haunted the issue of (over)population in 
the period leading up to Cairo, especially though certainly not exclusively in the US.9 First, the 
early advocates of overpopulation theory, including Ehrlich and even Malthus, made such dire 
predictions that, when such prophecies proved to be (at least in some senses) incorrect, many 
audiences began to discount the population issue's general policy relevance. Paul Ehrlich's The 
Population Bomb is a rhetorical exemplar of the potential pitfalls associated with making 
specific, short-term, alarmist predictions that do not stand up in the court of history.10 In that 
work, Ehrlich predicted that the 1970s would be the pivotal decade wherein millions of people 
would die and countless others would suffer because of the world's rapidly growing population. 
When the '70s came and went without the apocalyptic results he had suggested, many people felt 
as though he had "cried wolf" and were reluctant to believe him or others that there was a 
                                                 
9 The disappearance of population rhetoric in the US has been particularly vivid: “The years surrounding 
1970 marked the coming of age of the modern environmental movement. As that movement enters its fourth decade, 
perhaps the most striking change is the virtual abandonment by national environmental groups of U.S. population 
stabilization as an actively pursued goal.” Roy Howard Beck and Leon J. Kolankiewicz, "The Environmental 
Movement's Retreat from Advocating U.S. Population Stabilization (1970-1998): A First Draft of History," Journal 
of Policy History 12, no. 1 (2000): 123, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_policy_history/v012/12.1beck.html 
(Accessed September 5, 2008). 
10 Ehrlich, The Population Bomb. To be fair, Ehrlich and others have advanced the claim that it was 
precisely because he and others sounded the alarm that the worst-case scenarios did not occur. 
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population problem. In fact, pointing to the declining fertility rates in Western Europe (for 
instance, in France), commentators now argue that we are at risk of not even achieving 
replacement fertility rates. For them, if there is a “population” problem, it is that we need to 
stimulate reproduction levels (at least in key countries), and certainly not that we are spiraling 
upward in numbers.11 Garrett Hardin, author of the famous essay on the “tragedy of the 
commons,” marshals a rhetorical critique of Ehrlich’s choice to adopt Hugh Moore’s phrase “the 
population bomb” that helps us to see what one of the main issues might in fact have been. While 
Hardin shares Ehrlich's views of the serious problems generated by human overpopulation, he 
explains, “the title of Ehrlich’s book does get one’s attention, but the image of a bomb is 
arguably too vivid. It suggests a sudden, critical, explosive event—an event that is (for better or 
worse) soon over. But the growth of population is chronic, slow (by the standards of news 
media), and (apparently) never-stopping. Population growth is not a crisis but a crunch.”12 
Therefore, the early framing of (over)population as apocalyptic crisis left many people, 
especially in the US and other developed countries, skeptical as to whether any problem existed 
at all.13 
                                                 
11 These differential accounts of the nature of a “population” problem, with many countries sensing 
overpopulation, while a number of others expressing concern about underpopulation, suggest that even defining 
“population” or “(over)population” requires a geographic and geopolitical awareness that can address the nuances 
between the situations, for instance, in Western Europe on the one hand and Africa on the other.  
12 Garrett Hardin, Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 248. Despite Hardin’s concerns with Ehrlich’s metaphor of the bomb, Hardin represents a 
modern day Malthusian in his insistence of the problems of overpopulation, and his insistence that the population 
agenda be addressed, even if it appears misanthropic (for instance, in arguments that advocate restricting 
immigration as a means of addressing population issues). 
13 While many voices outside the disciplinary domain of demography have arisen against the most heavily 
quantitative of approaches to understanding “population” and “populations,” some elements of the demographic 
community, especially in interdisciplinary forums, have begun to recognize, explicitly, the status of such 
quantitative discourse, and to begin to challenge it. See, for instance, Simon Szreter, Hania Sholkamy, and A. 
Dharmalingam, eds., Categories and Contexts: Anthropological and Historical Studies in Critical Demography 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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The second overarching reason for the "stalling out" of the population issue prior to Cairo 
is that traditional (over)population arguments have raised uncomfortable questions that could 
quickly become misanthropic and even anti-anthropic in nature. Even in the days of Malthus, the 
poor were configured as a "problem." Since then, developing countries, racial and ethnic 
minorities, and women have all been cast as "problems" or "objects" to be manipulated in order 
to fix global population growth.14 Synthesizing the combined implications of all of these 
moments of misanthropy, Ronald Walter Greene notes: 
Malthus continues to haunt our future as the principle of population continues to 
define who we are in the present. The governing of procreation through the 
building of the population apparatus functions as an “othering machine” that 
differentiates each one of us around the norms and social categories of modern, 
healthy, and white. While contributing to the differentiation of populations by 
allowing the act of reproduction to function as a form of cultural distinction, the 
population apparatus also territorializes us into a geography of scarcity. In order 
                                                 
14 For instance, in 1996 a conflict broke out within the ranks of the Sierra Club over whether or not to take 
a stance on (im)migration policy as a component of its concern about population issues. A number of Sierra Club 
activists wanted to include statements to the effect that a lack of control over (im)migration risks amplifying 
environmental degradation generally and population growth specifically. However, dissent emerged around the issue 
of whether the Sierra Club wanted to join the philosophical ranks with a largely xenophobic anti-immigration 
movement in the United States. Ultimately, the Sierra Club decided not to include statements about (im)migration in 
its policy positions. See John A. Baden and Douglas S. Noonan, "Migrating Species," National Review 49, no. 11 
(June 16, 1997): 40-42, EBSCOhost Database (accessed September 5, 2008). Similarly, Garrett Hardin argues 
forcefully that emphasizing global solutions to the issue of (over)population cannot come at the expense of refusing 
to take a stand on vexing social questions like immigration policy. See his Living within Limits. I use the phrasing 
“(im)migration,” rather than “immigration,” to reflect Kent Ono and John Sloop’s critique of the term:  
Throughout this book, we use migration to refer to migration generally and use “immigration” and 
“emigration” only to register their appearance in the discourse we examined.  We prefer “migration” 
because “immigration” and “emigration” tend to imply the narcissistic view of the already-landed citizen.  
These terms make sense in a logic system that privileges the perspective of the destination to which one is 
coming and from which one is leaving. 
Kent Ono and John Sloop, Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California’s Proposition 187 (Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 2002), 185.  
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to generate forms of mobility that promise an escape from this geography of 
scarcity, the population apparatus offers the government of our reproductive 
behaviors. The danger made possible by the population apparatus is that this very 
promise of mobility works to reproduce the “satanic geography” of a Malthusian 
world by coding some populations as worthy of prosperity while pushing others 
into ever more brutal forms of scarcity with nothing more than a contraceptive.15  
Third, the Catholic Church, third world nationalism, and religious conservatism have 
combined to form a strong pronatalist sentiment that makes any public argument over population 
difficult if not impossible. Uniting these factors is a strong negative reaction and opposition to 
condoms and birth control and family planning techniques and technologies, and a related, 
strongly pronatalist worldview. Generally, such a position also draws upon a conservative 
understanding of gender roles that would seek to confine, rather than expand, rights and 
opportunities for girls and women. One area of overlap between the US and international factors 
in this area can be found in what is popularly referred to as the "gag rule," first instituted during 
Ronald Reagan's presidency. This policy appeased the Catholic Church and religious 
conservatives, particularly in the US, by refusing to provide any US monetary assistance to 
organizations that provided information about or abortion services. 
The history of public argument on (over)population, in terms of the false doomsaying and 
the accompanying misanthropy and logics of otherization, as well as the united coalitions 
opposing birth control and women's rights internationally, produces a number of possible 
                                                 
15 Ronald Walter Greene, Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 243.  
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trajectories.16 One is to dismiss the issue altogether, both as a fraud and as a dangerous tool for 
subjugating particular populations. In Kenneth Burke's terms, this approach would represent the 
expression of a deeply tragic frame. As he explains, we can understand the difference in 
emphasis by whether the other person is labeled as a villain or as merely mistaken:  
Hence, it is an act for you to attempt changing your attitudes, or the attitudes of 
others. Our philosophers, poets, and scientists act in the code of names by which 
they simplify or interpret reality. These names shape our relations with our 
fellows. They prepare us for some functions and against others, for or against the 
persons representing these functions. The names go further: they suggest how you 
shall be for or against. Call a man a villain, and you have the choice of either 
attacking or cringing. Call him mistaken, and you invite yourself to attempt 
setting him right. Contemporary exasperations make us prefer the tragic 
(sometimes melodramatic) names of “villain” and “hero” to the comic names of 
“tricked” and “intelligent.” The choice must be weighed with reference to the 
results we would obtain, and to the resistances involved.17 
                                                 
16 While Microsoft Word does not recognize the term “otherization,” it has become a term of art, not only 
in academic circles, but for international relations practitioners as well:  
"We’ve really started to knock down that sense of otherization," said Rashad Hussain, a White House 
lawyer who also serves as liaison to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Hussain defined the rather 
esoteric term "otherization" as a sense that many Muslims had during the Bush years that their value or 
danger to society was viewed solely through the prism of terrorism. 
Josh Gerstein, “Aide: Obama Fighting Muslims' 'Otherization',” Politico (April 28, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0410/Aide_Obama_fighting_Muslims_otherization.html (accessed July 
24, 2010).  
17 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 
4-5. 
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Following Tarla Rai Peterson, I prefer to think about comic perspectives that might enable 
(over)population rhetoric to be something other than it has been in the past.18 This view recasts 
Ehrlich and Malthus' ill-fated predictions of doom, along with the coalition of international 
opposition to family planning and birth control, as constraints contributing to the "rhetorical 
situation" that invited response by the international community, and more specifically, the UN.19 
Such a frame enables a rhetorical appreciation of the set of public arguments surrounding 
population, one that foregrounds the contingent nature of rhetorical action—its potential to 
change that which may seem static or ossified from a tragic perspective.   
If one takes the path of contingency, aware of Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric as the 
realm of that which could be otherwise, it becomes appropriate to evaluate the rhetorical action 
taken at Cairo, in order to analyze whether it was, in the words of Lloyd Bitzer, a "fitting 
response" to the rhetorical exigence.20 Catherine S. Pierce, in writing on the significance of the 
Cairo conference, argues, "one of the key features of the United Nations International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), which was held September 1994 in Cairo, 
                                                 
18 Tarla Rai Peterson, Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1997). In particular, she argues for a comic, rather than tragic, framing/reading 
of the history of "sustainable development" as a concept. I contextualize her effort as part of a larger critical 
approach that attempts to transcend a strand of critical practice that might be described as "debunking" or the 
"hermeneutics of suspicion." See Paul Schiff Berman, "Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes toward a Non-
Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 13 (2001): 95-139, 
Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 6, 2008); Timothy Bewes, Cynicism and Postmodernity (London: Verso, 
1997); Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968): vii-viii; ———, 
Attitudes toward History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984): 166-175; ———, The Philosophy of 
Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973): 168-190.  
19 Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy & Rhetoric 1, no. 1 (1968): 1-14. While I have 
some reservations about Bitzer's framework, I believe that the vocabulary he introduces with regard to the rhetorical 
situation is useful in understanding the challenge faced at these conferences. 
20 Aristotle's Rhetoric, I. 1357a12. This framing of the realm of rhetoric is also consistent with John 
Poulakos' sophistic definition of rhetoric: "Rhetoric is the art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that 
which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which is possible." John Poulakos, "Toward a Sophistic Definition 
of Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 16, no. 1 (1983): 36. While in this passage I consider the rhetorical 
situation in specific relation to the Cairo conference, my analysis in chapters 3 and 4 indicates that each of those 
conferences had their own rhetorical situations that, while similar, deserve independent analysis.  
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was its inclusiveness. It brought together diverse groups; it expanded the dialogue on population 
concerns; and it sought, and indeed, identified, 'common ground.'"21  In this passage, Pierce 
identifies a number of reasons why Cairo could be claimed as a turning point in the history of the 
public arguments relating to (over)population. First, Pierce argues for the inclusiveness of the 
conference. For instance, she and other commentators on Cairo argue that an unprecedented 
range of actors were invited and chose to participate in the entire ICPD process, including many 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Second, Pierce suggests that the dialogue was 
"expanded," not only in the number and range of participants, but also in the number and range 
of issues brought to the table. Instead of confining the discussion to instrumental calculations of 
fertility rates and contraceptive use and availability, she and other Cairo advocates postulate that, 
in 1994, for the first time, a broader range of issues were introduced and debated. The resulting 
Programme of Action included three primary pillars: "universal education," "reducing infant, 
child and maternal mortality," and "ensuring universal access by 2015 to reproductive health 
care, including family planning, assisted childbirth and prevention of sexually transmitted 
infections including HIV."22 Notice too that the way these issues are framed does not depend on 
any type of apocalyptic predictions in order to justify action. For these issues, the impetus is 
more systemic and ongoing rather than globe-threatening and directed toward fears of future 
                                                 
21 Catherine S. Pierce, "The United Nations International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) and Research on Population and the Environment," in Human Population, Biodiversity and Protected Areas: 
Science and Policy Issues: Report of a Workshop, April 20-21, 1995, Washington, D.C., ed. Victoria Dompka 
(Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1996), 
http://www.aaas.org/international/ehn/biod/pierce.htm (accessed September 5, 2008).  
22 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "ICPD & the MDGs: Master Plans for Development," 
http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/  (accessed September 7, 2008). As I discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, this parsing down of 
the main arguments in the Programme of Action, is misleading, as ultimately many more threads are interwoven into 
the document, such that it is much more complex than merely the interaction of these three vectors. Moreover, these 
three pillars are not usually among the most referenced and/or celebrated components of the Programme of Action. 
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consequences.23 Finally, Pierce notes the interest in pursuing "common ground," which allowed 
less finger-pointing (such as North vs. South or continent vs. continent) and produced a more 
holistic vision that was amenable to reception by wider audiences.24 Other analysts point to 
similar aspects of the Cairo conference. For instance, Carmen Barroso argues that the Cairo 
Programme of Action is significant in that it "defined a new paradigm for programs and policies 
on population and development in which respect for people's dignity and rights is of tantamount 
importance."25 As a rhetorical scholar, I am interested in these attempts at memorializing the 
conference and its resulting Programme of Action as topoi and rhetorical claims, rather than 
givens. From this perspective, after looking at predecessors to Cairo and follow-ups to Cairo, I 
will be in a better position to judge the accuracy of such claims to novelty. 
In any case, rather than emerging from whole cloth, Cairo deliberations were stitched 
together by conferees pulling together multiple contextual threads. Thus, some of the concerns 
that had caused the rhetoric of (over)population to recede and even disappear, such as 
misanthropy and false apocalypticism, and the influence of an international pronatalist ideology, 
arguably generated some of these threads, rather than merely existing as random scenic elements. 
In regard to misanthropy, many have suggested that Cairo was groundbreaking in its attempts to 
separate itself from a patriarchal history of (over)population framing. As the Sierra Club claims 
in its analysis of the Cairo conference, the long-standing controversy over population growth—
                                                 
23 Similarly, Chris J. Cuomo argues that there is an important difference between declared war and 
undeclared, ongoing war, which is similar to the systemic vs. possible distinction I draw here. Chris J. Cuomo, “War 
is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” Hypatia 11(4), 1996, 30-45. 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/3810390.  
24 Which audiences are meant to receive the Programme of Action, as opposed to those whose interaction 
with the arguments with the text is at least once removed, is a broader question that I engage in Chapter 2.  
25 Carmen Barroso, "A Decade of Action: International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 
1994)," Women's Health Journal 2004, no. 1 (Jan-March 2004): 3-6, Contemporary Women’s Issues Database 
(accessed July 24, 2011). 
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"pitting women's rights advocates against environmental advances"—was substantially 
reconfigured in Cairo, as conference participants worked "to re-define how we address both the 
problems and solutions to population growth."26 Discussing some of the overarching problems 
with (over)population rhetoric, Meredith Marshall argues that Cairo's primary significance lay in 
its shift from quantitative to qualitative criteria for policy success. As a result, "The Cairo 
Programme of Action sets aside the traditional focus of creating numerical demographic quotas 
in favor of goals which will improve the overall quality of life, especially for women and 
children," which "allowed the document to enshrine and respect international human rights."27 
Marshall contextualizes the changes in emphasis in Cairo in relation to a longer history of 
(over)population arguments. Such a diachronic understanding of the conference's alleged 
significance, both in terms of its de-emphasis of traditional quantitative pursuits (in the spirit of 
Malthus and Ehrlich) and in its (purportedly) new focus on qualitative, social criteria for 
improving the population situation, helps to frame the Cairo conference in relation to previous 
articulations of (over)population concerns. I approach the texts in which these claims to novelty 
are advanced as artifacts worthy of rhetorical analysis in their own right. Such analysis includes 
both the descriptive component of attempting to understand how these claims operate in relation 
to the conference texts and to the broader context of both these claims and of the conference 
documents, as well as a normative entailment as to whether these claims pass muster as 
historically accurate and whether they are useful in advancing the public argument on 
population. The critical space afforded by this approach enables an appreciation of the 
                                                 
26 Sierra Club, "The Cairo Consensus," http://www.sierraclub.org/population/conference/ (accessed 
September 7, 2008).  
27 Meredith Marshall, "United Nations Conference on Population and Development: The Road to a New 
Reality for Reproductive Health," Emory International Law Review 10 (1996): 441-492, Lexis/Nexis Database 
(accessed September 6, 2008).  
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intertextual dynamics between the approved consensus documents and the threads of contextual 
artifacts that seek to make sense of and contextualize these documents in a larger scene.28 Just as 
the claims about the texts as well as the conference documents themselves occur in a broader 
historical scene, so too is the present study embedded in a broader scene of scholarly efforts to 
understand public arguments about population.  
One of the most extensive attempts to trace public arguments over population can be 
found in Ron Greene's Malthusian Worlds. As he notes, the question of population has been 
articulated in terms of a number of agendas, and hence framed in very different ways.29 In the 
early Twentieth Century, population discussions were deployed within an economic 
development frame, suggesting that developing countries (and less affluent populations 
domestically) would improve their chances of achieving economic growth by restraining 
population growth.30 As the Cold War intensified, the framing shifted to a question of security, 
as restless poor populations were seen as ripe for conversion to the Communist cause, and 
therefore population control was seen as a method of stabilizing the political peace in countries 
and improving the lot of the democratic "West" as against the communist "East." Finally, starting 
with Paul Ehrlich's Population Bomb, and intensifying particularly at the end of the Cold War, 
                                                 
28 Again, as indicated earlier this chapter, I see these claims as part of the context, rather than as 
constituting another set of texts for analysis, though again, I see such an undertaking as a valuable future project. 
29 Though Greene positions these frames historically and sequentially, I think they tend to function in less 
time-restrictive ways. Just as Burke recognized that magic, religion, and science were not necessarily frames in a 
linear, temporal structure, but rather always potentially put forth as topoi, available at any given point in time, so too 
is such a corrective necessary for Greene’s formulation. “Rather than thinking of magic, religion, and science as 
three distinctly successive stages in the world’s history, the author would now use a mode of analysis that dealt with 
all three as aspects of motivation ‘forever born anew’ in the resources of language as such.” Kenneth Burke, 
Permanence and Change, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), lix. Thus, even in 
contemporary contexts, a reader might find a compilation of security, economic, and environmental rhetoric,co-
existing rather than charted as a history. 
30 Greene maps out how, for each international framing, there was a related shift in US domestic discourse. 
Since my focus in this project is on the international argument, rather than the domestic US argument, I limit my 
summary of these arguments to the international frame, despite the excellent work he has done to show the 
interconnections between domestic and international population arguments.  
 15 
the next major framing strategy located population as a question bearing on the integrity of the 
biosphere.31 In this context, population growth risks the viability of the planet's limited 
resources. Though each of these frames has its own set of defining characteristics, they all share 
the legacy of Malthus insofar as each of these frames grounds the problem of population in 
quantitative terms. In this overriding meta-frame, the primary objective is to reduce the number 
of people on the planet.32 
In addition to the work of Ron Greene, which is primarily focused on the long trajectory 
of population arguments but makes some preliminary observations about the implications of the 
Cairo meeting, there are a handful of other analyses that have focused extensively on the 
importance of the Cairo conference.33 For instance, Jyoti Shankar Singh, ICPD Executive 
                                                 
31 While global warming is increasingly being linked with population, helping to mark the resurgence of 
“population” rhetoric (such as Thomas Friedman’s Hot, Flat, and Crowded), Al Gore’s book An Inconvenient Truth 
(the counterpart to the popular documentary) only mentions “population” a total of 9 times, and 2 of those references 
are not regarding the situation of human population growth/”overpopulation.” Albert Gore and Melcher Media, An 
Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergence of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It (Illustrated Ed.) 
(Rodale: 2006).In order to find the number of references, I utilized the search feature of Google Books (on July 24, 
2010), which offers scholars another way to enter the difficult terrain of cluster-agon analysis on lengthy texts. 
Interestingly, Gore makes repeated reference to the “population explosion,” which both harkens back to Ehrlich and 
retains the same rhetorical pitfalls that Hardin pointed out about Ehrlich’s metaphor (as described earlier this 
chapter). Perhaps it also suggests that the frustration over Ehrlich’s false doomsaying has faded significantly in the 
intervening decades. Of course, once again, I do not want to frame resources like those of Gore as speaking to a 
universal, unmarked public. Instead, while his global warming work has had international influence, his first and 
primary set of audiences hail from the United States and other developed countries.  
32 Greene, Malthusian Worlds. To be fair, particularly in the “Green Malthusians,” there is a recognition 
that over-consumption plays a fundamental role, in addition to raw numbers of people.  
33 Greene, Malthusian Worlds. Though I only discuss Singh and Salfon extensively here, there are a 
number of other scholars who have examined and interpreted the Cairo conference. See John F. Kantner and 
Andrew Kantner, The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and Development (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006); Catholic Voices, Catholics and Cairo: A Common Language (Washington, DC: Catholic Voices, 
1999); Paula Abrams, "Population Control and Sustainability: It's the Same Old Song but with a Different 
Meaning," Environmental Law 27 (Winter, 1997): 1111-1135, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); 
R.L. Cliquet and Kristiaan Thienpont, Population and Development: A Message from the Cairo Conference 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995); Rishona Fleishman, "The Battle against Reproductive Rights: The 
Impact of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas," Emory International 
Law Review 14 (Spring, 2000): 277-314, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); Robert M. Hardaway, 
"Environmental Malthusianism: Integrating Population and Environmental Policy," Environmental Law 27 (Winter, 
1997), 1209-1242, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); Kimberly A. Johns, "Reproductive Rights 
of Women: Construction and Reality in International and United States Law," Cardozo Women's Law Journal 5 
 16 
Coordinator, wrote an analysis that detailed the main issues of the conference and its 
importance.34 This work is remarkably valuable, as it lays out the specifics of the conference in a 
way that only a conference organizer could. Singh combines a scenic/historical approach that 
foregrounds discussion of decisive contextual moments alongside analysis that closely traces the 
specific textual gains and conflicts at each conference and across the series of conferences. 
Beyond description, Singh is frank about major points of conflict that occurred at each 
conference and between conferences, and he is also willing to make predictive and normative 
claims about how the population vision might and should develop as we move ahead.  
The other significant scholarship that attempts to interpret the meaning of the Cairo 
conference is a recent book by Saul Halfon.35 Halfon is primarily interested in understanding two 
elements of Cairo: first, the notion of the "Cairo consensus" and on what terms such a consensus 
was formed, and second, the role of technical planning and argumentation as part of the 
conference's interests. While Halfon's analysis is critical to understanding the importance of 
Cairo, he is interested in a set of questions similar to but with a differing focus from my own. As 
he explains in his preface: 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1998), 1-32, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); Stanley Johnson and International Conference on 
Population and Development, The Politics of Population: The International Conference on Population and 
Development, Cairo 1994 (London: Earthscan, 1995); Kristi Uhrinek, "Mending Broken Promises: Analyzing the 
Legality of U.S. Withdrawal of United Nations Population Fund Appropriations and the Need for Binding UN 
Commitments," The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 32 (Summer, 2004), 861-889, 
Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); United Nations Population Fund, Coming Up Short: Struggling 
to Implement the Cairo Programme of Action (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 1997). Also, for 
scholarship that interprets Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo together, see United Nations, Population Consensus at 
Cairo, Mexico City and Bucharest: An Analytical Comparison, New York, 1995. 
34 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The International Conference on 
Population and Development (London: Earthscan, 1998).  
35 Saul E. Halfon, The Cairo Consensus: Demographic Surveys, Women's Empowerment, and Regime 
Change in Population Policy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). Halfon’s background is in Science and 
Technology Studies. 
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Thus, alongside the very public debate on "the population problem" I began to 
discover another arena of conflict, that of "population policy." This parallel world 
of population thought and action refocused my attention, though never 
completely, from public discourse to bureaucratic, professional, and institutional 
practice. It is here that rhetoric becomes action and where broad fears and 
concerns must be translated into the specific  programs of organizations and 
nations. It is an arena where conflict and debate must become agreement and 
consensus.36 
Halfon openly indicates a desire to move away from “public discourse” and “rhetoric,” 
suggesting an important demarcation from the focus of my own study. Nonetheless, his focus on 
argument, deliberation, and the role of the technical sphere, as well as his interest in how efforts 
toward consensus and agreement provide particular rhetorical constraints all point toward an 
analysis that veers in a separate direction from my own without ever completely separating.  
Having now reviewed relevant literature that has engaged the history of population as 
public argument and the Cairo conference in particular, I next consult relevant scholarship in the 
field of international relations. This should bring into sharper relief the distinctiveness and 
heuristic value of a critical approach that foregrounds rhetoric and argument as main features of 
analysis. 
                                                 
36 Halfon, Cairo Consensus, xvi.  
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1.2.2 Argument, Rhetoric, and International Relations  
Traditional theories of international relations (IR), predominantly realist or neo-realist in 
orientation, understand the international arena to be driven largely by the actions of nation-states, 
which are guided primarily by national and material interests. Part of this paradigm entails a 
rejection of the importance of communication and argument as central factors in international 
relations. In fact, "realists" tend to view communication as "cheap talk"—at the very least 
insincere, at most, dangerously deceptive.37 As Rodger Payne notes, "realists have long 
expressed very cynical views about the form and function of political communication and public 
debate."38   
A number of theorists have produced challenges to this realist framework, pointing out 
the socially constructed and therefore malleable/contingent nature of interests while also 
expanding the range of notable actors. While perhaps the most famous is constructivism, another 
notable such set of theories comprise the "communicative turn" in IR.39 Drawing upon the 
resources of communication and argumentation (and, to a lesser extent, those of rhetoric), such 
work has broadened our understanding of the international arena, in a number of directions. First, 
it has pushed the concept of actor from primarily nation-state to include social movements, 
                                                 
37 For more on the relationship between international relations studies and rhetorically and argumentation-
driven scholarship, see Gordon R. Mitchell, "Rhetoric in International Relations: More than 'Cheap Talk,'" in The 
Sage Handbook of Rhetoric , ed. Andrea A. Lunsford et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008): 247-263.  
38 Rodger A. Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy Debate," 
Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (2007): 505.  
39 Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists." For additional IR theorists whose work could be termed either 
part of the "communicative turn" or part of the "social constructivist" movement in IR theory, see David Campbell, 
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998); R. Charli Carpenter, Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of 
Civilians (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, 
Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Margaret E. Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998).  
 19 
NGOs, and international institutions.  Second, it has provided an alternate set of explanations 
that shed light on the contingent, constructed nature of foreign policy stances, and thus their 
ability to be challenged and changed. Third, it has provided much more nuance to our 
understanding of the mechanisms of change in international affairs, moving beyond weapons and 
money to include diplomacy, communicative networks, and other strategies. Indeed, some of 
these scholars have even pushed the "hard cases" as they relate to international relations. Payne 
has pointed to the way in which the most ardent defenders of (neo) realism, in their attempts to 
change the terms of foreign policy debates, betray their own assumptions about the irrelevance of 
communication and argument in IR, while Marc Lynch argues for the possibility for meaningful 
interaction between the West and Islam in a post-9/11 international atmosphere.40 
There have been significant studies relating to the communicative turn and international 
argumentation by IR theorists and political scientists, and, much less frequently, by 
communication scholars studying argument and rhetoric.41  Most notably, Thomas Risse 
broadens the conversation between realists and social constructivists by arguing for a third logic 
of international actions, "the logic of arguing," thereby bridging traditional IR analysis with 
public argument scholarship.42 Similarly, Gordon Mitchell's review essay on public argument-
                                                 
40 Marc Lynch, "Transnational Dialogue in an Age of Terror," Global Society 19 (2005): 5-28; Payne, 
"Neorealists as Critical Theorists." See also Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International 
Politics of Jordan’s Identity (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1999).  
41 This is not, however, to suggest a complete absence of such work. For instance, see Francis A. Beer and 
Robert Hariman, Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State 
University Press, 1996); Francis A. Beer and Christ'l de Landtsheer, Metaphorical World Politics (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 2004); Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser, Diplomatic Discourse: 
International Conflict at the United Nations—Addresses and Analysis (Greenwich, CT: Ablex Pub. Corp., 1997); 
Alexander Ostrower, Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International 
Relations and International Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965); Michael H. Prosser, Sow 
the Wind, Reap the Whirlwind: Heads of State Address the United Nations (New York: Morrow, 1970).  
42 Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics," International Organization 54, 
no. 1 (2000): 1-39.  
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driven security studies charts a number of promising works that attempt to give nuance and depth 
to the study of international relations with the tools offered by public argument analysis.43 
One of the most notable drawbacks of this current scholarship, however, is the way in 
which it conceptually distinguishes the work of argument and rhetoric. By relying closely on 
Jürgen Habermas, many communication and argument-friendly IR scholars, such as Risse, 
inherit Habermas' characterization of rhetoric as strategic action. From this category mistake 
follows the false argument-rhetoric dichotomy that privileges the former and demonizes the 
latter.44 How is this distinction typically couched, and what might be a more productive 
relationship between argument and rhetoric?  
The double helix of DNA represents a useful metaphor for considering the relationship 
between argumentation theory and rhetorical analysis. Each has a different tendency and 
particular corresponding features, but it is misleading to consider them as ever being wholly 
separate. Attempts to create brick walls in place of porous borders typically end up caricaturing 
one or both the process. With that being said, I turn first to some preliminary distinctions 
between studies of argument and rhetoric, and then turn to an example particularly relevant to the 
current project, Thomas Risse’s division of rhetoric and argument in his essay “Let’s Argue!” 
Examining his explanations both helps to show some tendencies of argumentation while also 
highlighting the dangers of over-selling or caricaturing one school in relation to the other.   
What are some of the points of comparison and contrast between studies of rhetoric on 
one hand and of argumentation on the other? Predominantly, analysis of rhetoric has historically 
focused on speeches or other finished texts. In contrast, argumentation scholars have tended to be 
                                                 
43 Gordon R. Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies," Argumentation & Advocacy 39, no. 1 
(2002): 57-71.  
44 Risse, "'Let's Argue!'"  
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focused more on argumentative exchanges, a form of dialectic captured representatively by the 
idea of Socratic dialogues, or on arguments as products, meant to be considered for their 
propositional logic, reasoning, and evidence. Rhetoric, following the vision of Cicero, studies the 
use of the five canons: arrangement, invention, style, delivery, and memory. In contrast, many 
studies of argument focus more narrowly on invention, as that is where arguments (narrowly 
considered) are produced, worked, and re-worked. For many argumentation theorists, questions 
such as style and delivery are, if not irrelevant, very unimportant in relation to the content of the 
arguments themselves. Similarly, while most rhetorical analysis seeks to understand how all 
three types of artistic proofs operate, including ethos, pathos, and logos, the descriptive and 
normative focus of argumentation theory is on logos. In traditional argumentation theory, the 
focus is on the “force of the better argument,” and factors outside of logos are, at a minimum, 
distractions, and, at worst, distortions of the quest for shared truth.  
Aside from tendencies of scholarship, rhetorical analysis and argumentation theory as 
traditions draw from different major thinkers and carve out niches in distinctive parts of the 
academy. Rhetoricians draw heavily on the classics, including the work of the Sophists, 
Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. In the Twentieth Century, they place Kenneth 
Burke, among others, centrally in relation to the contemporary rhetorical scene. Argumentation 
theorists, on the other hand, draw from different sources. For instance, some of the main 
Twentieth Century influences include Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, and Habermas. One 
representative anecdote of these similar but divergent threads relates to the role of Burke and 
Perelman in each scholarly community. Kenneth Burke, who offers many tools to think through 
both rhetoric and argumentation, is taken up and utilized frequently by rhetoricians while 
remaining largely (or at a minimum relatively) absent in argumentation scholarship, while Chaim 
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Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric, despite its title, is received 
prominently by argumentation theorists while significantly under-utilized by rhetoricians. 
Similarly, these differences in emphasis also create different academic spaces for each approach. 
Rhetoricians tend to be housed in departments of speech communication/communication studies 
and in English/rhetoric and composition programs, while argumentation theorists tend to be 
located in philosophy and informal logic programs, as well as, in some cases, in departments of 
speech communication/communication studies. Contemporary rhetorical scholarship tends to be 
produced overwhelmingly in the United States, while argumentation theory has a much broader 
home, including in Canada and Europe. While both argumentation theorists and critics and 
rhetorical scholars have created similar taxonomies of product, procedure, and process, 
argumentation theory tends to focus more on product (particular arguments that need to be 
analyzed for their propositional logic) and procedure (creating ideal situations for argumentative 
exchanges to occur), while rhetorical analysis tends, in addition to those two types of concerns, 
to focus more on process, looking, for instance, at political campaigns across time, or the rhetoric 
of particular presidents or of the presidency as a whole. Also, while both are focused on scene 
and text, rhetoricians are more likely to focus on audience, situation, and the elements of Bitzer’s 
“rhetorical situation” (such as exigence), while argumentation theorists are likely to be interested 
in the logic and reasoning involved in particular acts of communication (“arguments”) and in 
creating procedures (such as those involved in the Pragma-dialectical school) that maximize the 
opportunity to reach consensus by moving progressively from disorder and disagreement to a 
state of consensus and harmony among actors. Having charted some general trajectories of each 
approach, I turn now to one particular case, that sheds light on how this argumentation-rhetoric 
relationship implicates scholarship in other disciplines, in this case, international relations.  
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Thomas Risse’s “Let’s Argue!” combines a foundation of IR with a well-developed 
theory of argumentation. From the outset, Risse encodes a theory of argumentation, as a process 
whereby “human actors engage in truth seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understand-
ing based on a reasoned consensus (versta ̈ndigungsorientiertes Handeln), challeng- ing the 
validity claims involved in any communication.”45 Citing Habermas, a reader quickly notes the 
primary features of his vision of argument: “reasoned consensus,” “argumentative rationality,” 
“truth-seeking,” in pursuit of a “logic of arguing” that has the potential to “tackle empirical 
questions in world politics.”46 While the elements of this particular rationality carve out a unique 
space in IR theory from other predominant paradigms, this theory indicates a clear preference for 
reason (logic, logos, in contrast to pathos and ethos), for viewing argument, following Wenzel, 
primarily as “product” and “procedure,” and, following Aristotle, an approach to knowledge and 
communication that can be more properly characterized as dialectic rather than rhetoric. The 
choice of texts is also telling, as the work of Habermas indicates a particular theory of 
communication that is, at best, highly skeptical of rhetoric. For instance, Risse’s primary 
argument about the problematic nature of rhetoric is as follows:  
[A]ctors engaging in rhetoric are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be 
persuaded themselves by the ‘‘better argument.’’ If everybody in a 
communicative situation engages in rhetoric— the speaker, the target, and the 
audience—they can argue strategically until they are all blue in the face and still 
not change anyone’s mind.47  
                                                 
45 Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 1-2. 
46 Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 1-2. 
47 Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 8. 
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This distinction is puzzling. Both argumentation theory as well as rhetorical theory 
contain a theory of self-risk, and both normatively suggest that, at least most of the time, an 
individual should enter into a situation, whether it be communicative, argumentative, or 
rhetorical, with the idea that, as a result of listening and engaging others, that she/he might 
change her/his mind.48 
Positions such as those expressed by Risse, regarding the troublesome nature of rhetoric, 
ultimately reduce the effectiveness and usefulness of public argument studies, as the field of 
rhetoric offers a powerful conceptual apparatus for both scholars and practitioners alike. In 
particular, the utility of rhetorical tools in analyzing texts closely, providing a sophisticated 
understanding of audience, thinking through different types of appeal, and considering the 
expectations and functions of different genres of public address, just to name a few, are all 
critical vocabularies that get lost or at the very least under-appreciated when rhetoric becomes 
the devil term alongside argument.49 Without wishing to isolate argumentation studies with a 
                                                 
48 Wayne Brockriede, "Arguers as Lovers," Philosophy & Rhetoric 5, no. 1 (1972): 1-11; Douglas Ehninger 
and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963); Douglas Ehninger, "Argument 
as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and Its Uses," Speech Monographs 37, no. 2 (1970): 101-110; Jim W. Corder, 
“Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love,” Rhetoric Review 4, No. 1 (1985): 16-32. For more on the 
relationship(s) between argumentation theory and rhetoric, see, for instance, Erik W. Doxtader, “The Entwinement 
of Argument and Rhetoric: A Dialectical Reading of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action,” Argumentation 
& Advocacy 27 (1991): 51-63; Christian Kock, “Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical 
Argumentation,” Argumentation 23, no. 1 (2009): 61-80; Scott Jacobs, “Nonfallacious Rhetorical Strategies: 
Lyndon Johnson’s Daisy Ad,” Argumentation 20, no. 4 (2006): 421-442; David W. Shepard, “Rhetoric and Formal 
Argument,” Western Speech 30, no. 4 (1966): 241-247. 
49 When I indicate the notion of rhetorical genres, I consider two levels at which genre operates. First, 
Aristotle sets up three basic genres that he considers to be exhaustive of types of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic, and 
epideictic. Thus, in one sense, understanding genre at this foundational level enables a critic to understand features 
of a text that might otherwise go unnoticed or remain a mystery. However, I also believe that genre analysis can be 
more particular. Scholars have examined, for instance, the genre considerations for inaugural addresses, public 
apologies, and declarations of war, to name just a few. Rhetorical artifacts in IR also contain important generic 
features. As Matt Gerber notes, public diplomacy itself can be considered as a genre. Matthew G. Gerber, “On the 
Consideration of ‘Public Diplomacy’ as a Rhetorical Genre,” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate 29,(2008): 
118-133. In this dissertation, I draw heavily on Kenneth Burke’s “dialectic of constitutions” to consider the 
similarities and contrasts between constitutions on the one hand and UN conference texts on the other. Kenneth 
Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969). I believe that such a 
 25 
straw person, many argumentation theorists follow what Wenzel calls the “logical,” “argument 
as product” model to such a degree that they forget, following Brockriede and Ehninger, that 
arguers are making the arguments. Such an over-emphasis on the product and situation (act and 
scene), without any comparable focus on agent or audience, can be corrected with an emphasis 
on the traditional tools of rhetoric.50 Fortunately, some scholars who regularly combine such 
analyses have pointed to this shortcoming.51 
                                                                                                                                                             
comparative analysis enables us to better understand some of the features that characterize the genre of international 
conference texts.  
50 In this dissertation, there are a number of terms that I deploy in similar but ultimately distinct ways. 
While my interest in restoring rhetoric to public argument analysis, especially in IR, leads to the numerous 
distinctions in this section regarding rhetoric and argument. Nevertheless, I see many similarities between and 
among terms including, for instance, rhetoric, argument (and “public argument”), debate, persuasion, and 
deliberation. While I think that there are conceptual differences between and among these terms, I am less interested 
in proving the existence of clear distinctions than in showing the salience of these terms in relation to population. 
Numerous rhetoricians and argumentation theorists have devoted entire articles and books to these questions, so it is 
clearly a weighty project in and of itself. As defaults, I will primarily refer to rhetoric, as it is my own area of 
expertise, public argument, as controversies in publics (of various scales) generate the texts for my rhetorical 
analysis, and communication, as it is the broad umbrella term covering my discipline. Since I observe some 
important differences between rhetoric and deliberation, I often keep these as a phrase, “rhetoric and deliberation,” 
recognizing that, even with their different tendencies, they are still highly similar. If at times I do go beyond 
rhetoric, public argument, communication, and deliberation to deploy different terms, it is because I find that those 
cousins are more appropriate for a particular context. 
51 Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies." Mitchell also provides a well-developed 
distinction between rhetoric and argument, especially in light of their utility for IR:  
Risse’s distinction between rhetoric and argument does not find much support in rhetorical theory, 
where reductive approaches that treat rhetoric as strategic manipulation are criticized roundly for 
their conceptual thinness. Thicker descriptions position rhetoric as a practical art of using dialogue 
to coordinate action when interlocutors at loggerheads are forced to act in situations marked by 
uncertainty, or when collective decisions must be made before all the relevant facts are in. Public 
argument-driven security studies might fruitfully explore how these insights could help 
differentiate bargaining (purely strategic communication undertaken for instrumental purposes); 
arguing (dialogue oriented toward mutual understanding); and rhetoric (the communicative search 
for joint agreement on necessary actions in light of imperfect conditions). Such differentiation 
could enhance the descriptive power of IR theories by adding texture to the argument/rhetoric 
binary some approaches use to explain communicative action in international politics. 
Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies," 62. In putting forth the pentad as a critical tool to understand 
motives, Burke argues, “any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five 
questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and 
why (purpose). . . . Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), xv. 
He goes on throughout the Grammar to suggest that particular texts establish ratios among those five components, 
such that one might feature primarily the scene as opposed to the audience. I utilize the pentad in order to consider 
the ways in which these texts are constructed.  
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In addition to the valuable critical tools offered by rhetoric and argument for the study of 
international relations, the realm of international relations also provides a rich set of artifacts and 
case studies that, to date, have remained understudied and under-theorized by rhetoric and 
argument scholars. Before discussing my specific artifacts and case studies in depth, I turn next 
to the possibilities offered by examining international institutions, international conferences, and 
other, non-Western case studies as a shift in perspective for rhetoricians and argumentation 
theorists. 
Although the range of objects of study in the international arena is potentially limitless, 
this study focuses in part on artifacts relating to international institutions, and more narrowly, the 
UN. Transnational social movements, NGOs, and inter-state relations have all received 
substantial attention from analysts deploying a communication perspective. Yet the 
communicative dimensions of international institutions, and particularly the UN, remain 
understudied, save for a few, including and especially communication scholars Patricia Riley, 
Thomas Hollihan, and James F. Klumpp.52 This group has contributed some of the most 
extensive analyses to date on the role of argumentation in the work of the UN. In particular, their 
most recent work creates a significant agenda for those who study argument. Drawing heavily on 
the work of Habermas, they argue, "the UN might serve to provide a common lifeworld for 
international deliberations."53 To establish the importance of the UN as site of argument, they 
make three important claims: first, that this "lifeworld" can "help the arguers to identify their 
                                                 
52 Patricia Riley, Thomas Hollihan and James F. Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously as a Site for Public 
Arguments: Does the UN Have a Role in the 21st Century?" in Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the 
International Society for the Study of Argumentation, ed. Frans H. van Eemeren, et al. (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007): 
1165-1172; Patricia Riley, James F. Klumpp, and Thomas A. Hollihan, "Democratizing the Lifeworld of the 21st 
Century: Evaluating New Democratic Sites for Argument," in Argumentation and Values: Proceedings of the Ninth 
SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. Sally Jackson : 254-260. Also, see Patricia Riley and Peter R. Monge, 
"Communication in the Global Community," Communication Research 25, no. 4 (1998): 355-358.  
53 Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously," 1167.  
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shared interests, common concerns, and points of divergent interests," even when results are not 
readily forthcoming; second, UN debates help shape the public agenda and give life to arguments 
in other public spheres; and finally, "the UN offers at least the promise or potential for collective 
action."54 
In addition to these positive arguments on behalf of studying the UN as site of debate and 
argument, other factors suggest important "negative" reasons for engaging in such inquiry. Not 
only are significant international issues of the day debated and decided at the UN, but it is also a 
venue often decried as ineffectual or irrelevant by IR neo(realists). For (neo)realists, the UN 
represents the height of naïveté among those who subscribe to a communicative, as opposed to 
materialist, militaristic, and/or interest-based understanding of IR. They point to the UN’s near 
irrelevance in major international crises, as well as its susceptibility to be taken over by the 
already powerful nation-states. In fact, Timothy Luke (not a realist, but a scholar of realist 
discourses) goes so far as to argue that the public image of the UN as perpetually ineffectual 
fuels the legitimacy of the nation-state as the primary agent in international affairs.55 
Despite the alleged and real shortcomings of the UN as agent in international affairs, 
there are many important reasons for studying this institution, in addition to those offered by 
Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp. First, analyzing the UN, as opposed to the US or other major 
nation-states, can help to denaturalize and internationalize our assumptions about argument and 
international relations. Currently, to the extent that foreign policy, for instance, is read 
rhetorically, the overwhelming object of study is that of US foreign policy. As Kelly A. Clancy 
                                                 
54 Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously," 1167.  
55 Timothy W. Luke, "Discourses of Disintegration/Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the 
New World Order," Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy XVIII (1993): 229-253.  Notably, as Benedict 
Anderson explains, the nation-state is also a fiction, but like a dead metaphor, its status as fiction is less readily 
apparent. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Ed. 
(London:Verso, 2006).  
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(2007) notes in a review of Metaphorical World Politics, scholarship "would be enhanced by 
inclusion of . . . studies of rhetoric that occurs in non-American foreign policy discourse, as well 
as in international venues such as the United Nations."56 Such a claim, coupled with Clancy's 
observation of the departure from "the norm" in the two chapters that focus on non-US foreign 
policy, sets an important research agenda for scholars studying the intersection(s) of argument 
and rhetoric, foreign policy, and IR.57 Second, as Riley, Hollihan, Klumpp note, in an era of 
globalization, the nation-state is wavering in importance, while the salience of international 
deliberation moves to the forefront.58 
For those who have taken such justifications seriously and invested in scholarship of the 
UN, there tend to be certain tendencies that over-represent portions of UN business to the 
exclusion of other, highly relevant work that it performs. To the extent that the UN is studied, 
there are two specific sub-topics that occupy the majority of this literature: security issues (most 
notably those relating to the Security Council), and human rights violations (such as the 
discussion in the work of Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp).59 
Instead of continuing to over-represent those twin strands, I believe that the topic of UN 
conferences is both under-represented in the literature and ripe for the types of issues it raises.  
                                                 
56 Kelly A. Clancy, "Metaphorical World Politics," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10, no. 1 (2007): 144. This 
sentiment is echoed in relation to similar scholarly projects.  For instance, see Mohammed Auwal's review of Post-
Realism: "[T]he major problem with the book relates to its coverage.  All cases and writers examined are Anglo-
American.  This in essence makes the volume's post-realist critique unrealistic, which is contradictory to its claims.  
The post-realists' critique of realism remains imprisoned within the Eurocentric tunnel vision of world history and 
politics—a myopia that goes without questioning." Mohammed Auwal, "Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in 
International Relations (Book)," Discourse & Society 9, no. 3 (1998): 430.  
57 Importantly, while I attempt to move beyond US-centered scholarship in the current project, there are 
still many residual traces in my writing in this project that reveal the deeply ingrained "norming" suggested by these 
authors. However, while not a clean break, my sense is that, to depart from the American study as the unmarked 
norm, we have to start somewhere, as imperfect as any such beginning may be. 
58 Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously."  
59 For example, see David Zarefsky, “Making the Case for War: Colin Powell at the United Nations,” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 10(2), 2007, 275-302. Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously."  
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Especially on the part of public argument and rhetoric scholars, this topic has been severely 
under-studied. In Sharing the Earth, Tarla Rai Peterson notes the potential for grandstanding at 
such conferences (as a part of her discussion of the Rio conference).60 Beyond Peterson, very 
few rhetoricians or public argument scholars have studied UN conferences. Interestingly, Riley, 
Hollihan, and Klumpp's vision for a more effective UN—one that occurs more in the public 
spotlight and can draw in participation by non-governmental representatives—becomes a 
possibility in the world of these conferences.61 Also, while critics can relatively easily assess 
whether a rhetorical campaign for military involvement or to address human rights violations 
was a success or failure (to the degree that causality can ever be asserted), the rhetorical work 
achieved in international institutions requires more nuance on the part of the critic. Instead of 
producing easy claims to “success” or “failure,” the critic must, as Schechter notes, consider the 
role of UN conferences in terms of their ability to give presence to certain issues while also 
reframing, redefining, or reinterpreting such issues.62 These are quintessentially communicative 
issues, warranting rhetorical study of UN conferences.   
In terms of the topic of (over)population in particular, UN-sponsored conferences are not 
notable primarily for their instrumental effectiveness (any basic research reveals that population 
and development goals, and the financing to implement them, consistently fall short, despite 
these conferences), but rather because of the way in which they highlight certain features of the 
issue and define and/or interpret it in a particular way. In this sense, the Cairo conference, in 
                                                 
60 Peterson, Sharing the Earth.  
61 Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously."  
62 Michael G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences (London: Routledge, 2005). Also, for work 
that references the role of the UN in agenda setting, see Jutta M. Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and NGOs: 
Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007). And, the 
concept of “presence” is pivotal in rhetorical theory. See, for instance, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 115-120. 
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particular, was memorialized, rightly or wrongly, as critical for its redefinition of the 
argumentative context surrounding the population issue. According to such advocates, no longer 
were the primary issues those of environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich, such as "carrying capacity" 
and the biosphere. Instead, advocates claim that the argument became reinvented as dealing 
generally with the newfound mission of sustainable development and specifically with 
reproductive health/rights—thus fusing human social concerns with environmental ones.63 
Recent scholarship in international relations and communication illustrates how a focus 
on the UN as a deliberative forum has potential to elucidate aspects of international politics that 
may not be apparent from traditional realist perspectives. In the next section, I preview the 
artifacts to be examined in the subsequent chapters. 
1.3 ARTIFACTS/OBJECTS OF STUDY 
For as long as rhetoric has been practiced, analyzed, and studied, the proper scope of rhetoric has 
been debated. Aristotle, ever the classifier, circumscribed the scope or realm of rhetoric by 
noting that rhetoric dealt with doxa, or those matters of public concern that were contingent and 
thus “could be otherwise.” As rhetoric consolidated into “rhetorical criticism”—a more formal 
critical method in the Twentieth Century, the scope question again jumped to the forefront. Early 
on, many of the artifacts for analysis were great moments in public address, such as presidential 
speeches. When Edwin Black published Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, he opened the 
                                                 
63 This coupling of environmental and social justice claims is becoming increasingly important. For 
instance, see Phaedra C. Pezzullo, Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Pollution, Travel, and Environmental Justice 
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2007).  
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door for an opening of method and also, at least potentially, of artifacts to be examined using this 
method.64 However, relatively recently, in a wholesale critique of the rhetoric of science, Dilip 
Gaonkar challenged the ongoing expansion of artifact domains, especially for an enterprise that 
was, according to him, first and foremost, productive, rather than interpretive/critical, and thus 
had too “thin” of a vocabulary to be particularly enlightening (especially outside the domain of 
traditional public oratory).65  
 Despite Gaonkar’s claims, less traditional texts, ranging from those in the domain of “the 
rhetoric of science,” to those driven by media considerations (ushered in long ago with Benson 
and Medhurst’s Rhetorical Dimensions in Media), all of these objects have increasingly been 
recognized as falling within the legitimate scope of inquiry for rhetorical criticism, thanks in 
large part to the efforts of Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black with their Prospects of Rhetoric.66 This 
scope expansion paves the way for the present study, which explores artifacts with characteristics 
that differ from sole-orator public addresses that served as the focus for many early studies in 
rhetorical criticism.  
There are a number of documents that I will use to situate my analysis. First, I examine 
the 1994 Cairo Conference, with its resulting official document, the Programme of Action. 67 
Second, I examine the 1974 Bucharest Conference and the 1984 Mexico City Conference. For 
                                                 
64 Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1978).  
65 Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” in Southern 
Communication Journal 58 (Summer 1993): 258-295. For commentaries on and challenges to Gaonkar’s article, see, 
for instance, Alan G. Gross and William M. Keith, eds., Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in 
the Age of Science (State University of New York Press, 1996). 
66 Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, eds., The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental 
Project, Sponsored by Speech Communication Association (Prentice-Hall, 1971). 
67 United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Report of the ICPD (94/10/18)," 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html (accessed September 7, 2008).   
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these conferences, each has an accompanying official conference document. Finally, in order to 
chart the ongoing continuities and transformations in public argument regarding population, I 
examine the publications produced for the ICPD+5 follow-up (in 1999) and the ICPD+10 
follow-up (in 2004). 68 For each artifact, my approach is as a rhetorical critic engaging in a “close 
reading” strategy, as described below. 
Given the long history of population rhetoric, and in particular international population 
rhetoric, why do these five texts earn inclusion while other texts remain excluded? In some ways, 
developing a precise set of criteria of inclusion/exclusion in this regard can be tricky. Thomas 
Malthus sounded the first modern siren call on population at the end of the 18th Century. As 
Matthew Connelly notes in Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population, the 
19th Century witnessed numerous formulations of population as an issue of international, rather 
than national or local, concern. In the Twentieth Century, prior to the formation of the UN in 
1945, international conferences had already occurred on the topic of population, such as the 
World Population Conference of 1927 and the World Population Congress of 1931.69 
In order both to avoid merely repeating the excellent work already done by Matthew 
Connelly, among others, and in order to limit scope to provide adequate depth for my project, I 
focus on international conferences sponsored by the UN on the topic of human population 
                                                 
68 For each official document analyzed (1974, 1984, 1994, 1999, 2004), I used the online Wordle service  
(www.wordle.net), which visually displays selections of text, with the largest words representing the most 
frequently used terms. One can also specify number of words in order to discover the top terms. It was rather rare 
when the top 20 or top 10 corresponded closely with my key terms, clusters, or agons, but it helped to provide 
another context for understanding the internal dimensions of the text. All of the Wordle results are included in the 
Appendix section of this document. 
69 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2008).  
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growth.70 Other than routine follow-up efforts, there have been five major UN-Sponsored 
conferences on population: Rome (1954), Belgrade (1965), Bucharest (1974), Mexico City 
(1984), and Cairo (1994). However, there is an important difference between Rome/Belgrade 
and the rest. As Ronald Walter Greene notes:  
One of the key differences between the Bucharest Conference and the two 
previous population conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations 
was that it was the first population conference attended by official representatives 
of the member states. The first two conferences served to legitimate the 
production of demographic and family planning knowledges and were primarily 
attended by experts in those fields. A second difference between Bucharest and 
the Rome and Belgrade Conferences was that the United Nations had committed 
itself to the production of a World Population Plan of Action.71 
This passage is pertinent to the selection of texts in a number of ways. First, it 
differentiates conferences based on participants. While Rome and Belgrade were both UN-
sponsored conferences, they were there primarily for experts to gather and discuss family 
planning and demography. Starting with Bucharest, and continuing with Mexico City and Cairo, 
state officials (and, later, NGOs and other parties as well) were also part of the conferences.72 
                                                 
70 While ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 do not meet these criteria in a narrow sense, see chapter 4 for an 
explanation and justification of their inclusion in this project. 
71 Ronald Walter Greene, Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis 
(Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1999), 81. 
72 Greene is not alone in this distinction of population conferences. Michael G. Schechter also explains his 
reason for limiting the scope of population conferences, following a similar parsing strategy as Greene:  
It should also be noted that names of conferences can be a bit deceiving. For example, while the first World 
Population Conference was organized by the UN in 1954, its purpose was to exchange scientific 
information and it was viewed as an "eminently academic conference." The second World Population 
Conference was organized in 1965 by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population 
(IUSSP) and the UN; most of its participants were experts in the field. It was only the third World 
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Second, this passage distinguishes the goals of these conferences. Whereas Rome and Belgrade 
were primarily interested in "legitimat[ing] the production of demographic and family planning 
knowledges," Bucharest began the trend of focusing on "formulating an international population 
policy." In various forms, this quest for a coherent international population policy has been the 
norm ever since Bucharest, including at Mexico City, Cairo, and its relevant follow-ups. 
These selection criteria necessarily limit out other important artifacts that provide context 
for Cairo. For instance, while Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb was incredibly important, 
particularly though not exclusively for audiences in the US, it does not qualify here as a 
conference text. Furthermore, the texts produced by international and non-governmental 
organizations (other than conferences), such as the Population Council, established in 1952 and 
acting as a powerful rhetorical resource for population advocacy efforts, would similarly be 
limited out by this set of criteria.73 Similarly, examining the intersection between decolonization 
and population rhetoric, while vital, strays afield from the limits that I impose to guide the study, 
though it is significant in the role it plays as context and scene.  
Guided by this scope criterion, I critique texts that meet the following selection criteria: 
eligible texts are those final approved documents from UN-sponsored intergovernmental 
conferences, attended by representatives of member states (the conferences may include other 
participants as well, but they must, at a minimum, be attended by member states in order to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Population Conference, held in 1974, that was intergovernmental in nature, i.e., where the representatives 
from different countries were representatives of those countries' governments. All the UN global 
conferences discussed in depth in this volume are intergovernmental in nature, although non-governmental 
ones were often convened at almost the same time in nearby venues.  
Michael G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences (London: Routledge, 2005), 5-6. 
73 Population Council, "About the Council," http://www.popcouncil.org/about/index.html (Accessed July 1, 
2009). While these external texts are not the focus of my study, they remain important elements of the context, or 
following Kenneth Burke, the “scene” that informs the terrain of public argument over population.  
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qualify), for the purposes of creating, modifying, or otherwise revising international population 
policies or goals for such policies. This would include Bucharest, Mexico City, Cairo, ICPD+5, 
and ICPD+10.74 
1.4 RHETORICAL CRITICISM AS MODE OF INVESTIGATION AND 
WORLDVIEW 
Much like the city of Pittsburgh is shaped by the confluence of its famous rivers, my approach to 
the rhetorical analysis of public argument utilizes what Rueckert, speaking of Burke’s method, 
once called “all that there is to use.” This particular confluence conjoins rhetorical criticism, 
close reading, approaching rhetoric dialectically through time, and an adaptation of cluster-agon 
analysis. Throughout, I incorporate the insights of Kenneth Burke, including, for instance, those 
relating to the pentad and motives/motivation.  
1.4.1 The Art of Rhetorical Criticism 
First and foremost, I approach the artifacts in this study as a rhetorical critic analyzing public 
arguments.75 In one of the foundational essays for rhetorical criticism, Herbert Wichelns argues, 
                                                 
74 Again, see chapter 4 for an explanation of the inclusion of ICPD+5 and ICPD+10. 
75 Though I do not specifically elaborate here on what I mean by public argument analysis, I understand at 
least one version of it to be closely tied to public deliberation theory. For instance, see John Gastil and Peter Levine, 
eds., The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the 21st Century (San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). For some exemplars of public argument analysis, see 
William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell, Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy (Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006); Gordon R. Mitchell, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics 
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"rhetorical criticism . . . is not concerned with permanence, nor yet with beauty. It is concerned 
with effect. It regards a speech as a communication to a specific audience, and holds its business 
to be the analysis and appreciation of the orator's method of imparting . . . ideas to . . . hearers."76 
Elsewhere, he notes, "rhetorical criticism lies at the boundary of politics (in the broadest sense) 
and literature; its atmosphere is that of the public life, its tools are those of literature, its concern 
is with the idea of the people as influenced by their leaders."77 Correctives have been made to 
this basic account, including a restoration of the aesthetic dimension to rhetoric, understanding 
rhetoric more expansively than just as speeches, and moving beyond a narrow standard of effects 
as the criterion of rhetorical effectiveness.78 Nevertheless, Wichelns helped to carve out a role 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Missile Defense Advocacy (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2000); Gordon R. Mitchell, 
"Public Argument-Driven Security Studies"; Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic.'"  
76 Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl 
R. Burgchardt (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc., 2000), 23.  
77 Wichelns, "Literary Criticism of Oratory," 27.  
78 For one of the primary works that supplied these correctives, under the banner of attacking "Neo-
Aristotlean criticism," see Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1978). Also, David Zarefsky points to the dangers involved in misunderstanding what Wichelns 
meant by "effects":  
It was easy to misunderstand this advice. 'Effect' suggests an empirical phenomenon, so the task of the 
rhetorical critic might be thought to be determining what the effects of a speech were. This was a usually 
futile quest that often produced bad scholarship. Single speeches rarely have discernible effects; they work 
together with many other causal forces and as part of the broad social and cultural frame in which they are 
embedded. Moreover, the science of measuring effects of messages on audience attitudes and behavior is 
inexact at best... It seems unlikely that this is what Wichelns was trying to encourage. His concern, after all, 
was with criticism, not empirical measurement. Focusing criticism on effects meant that the questions 
critics were to ask were about the relationship between the text and its possible effects. What does the text 
reveal about the effects its author might have been seeking? How does the construction of the text invite 
certain reactions and discourage others? What frame of reference does the text assume and how does this 
compare with the frame attributed to the audience? What role might this specific text play in a more 
comprehensive campaign to modify attitudes or behavior? Who are the various possible audiences for the 
speech? These are examples of critical questions that relate to effects. They involve interpretation and 
judgment, not measurement. They are answerable not by empirical observation but by reasoned argument. 
The critic’s task is to make claims on a reader’s judgment and to support those claims by argument, and 
this is as true of rhetorical criticism as of any other kind (Brockriede).  
David Zarefsky, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism: Reflections on Rhetorical Criticism," in 
Rhetoric Review 25, no. 4 (2006): 384.  
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for rhetorical criticism that stood apart from other, already well-established disciplines such as 
literature, history, and political science.   
Looking back at the development of rhetorical criticism in the Twentieth Century, 
Richard Leo Enos argues, "work in rhetorical criticism has helped us to better understand the 
nature of discourse, assess the merits of expressed views, and, in a very real sense, situate 
discourse within its social contexts. I believe that this last area—understanding discourse within 
its situational and cultural contexts—may indeed be the single greatest contribution of rhetorical 
criticism."79 Expanding on this notion of understanding discourse in context, and arguing 
forcefully for the significance of rhetorical criticism, not as method, but as a "mode of 
investigation," Martin J. Medhurst explains: 
I now consider rhetorical criticism to be a mode of investigation rather than a 
method of analysis. I try to think about public affairs from a rhetorical point of 
view, to use the resources of rhetoric to reveal matters sometimes far beyond the 
realm of rhetoric proper. Rhetoric is a mode of analytical thinking that helps the 
critic ask important questions and explore significant dimensions of public 
culture—dimensions that our friends in history, political science, and sociology 
often miss. Rhetoric is a way of teaching that approaches knowledge not as a set 
of theoretical principles to be understood but as a set of problems, grounded in a 
historical context, to be analyzed, interpreted, and judged with respect to the kind 
                                                 
79 Richard Leo Enos, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism. Introduction: The 
Inclusiveness of Rhetorical Criticism," Rhetoric Review 25, no. 4 (2006): 357.  
 38 
of action required. Rhetoric is both a strategic and a productive art directly related 
to leadership in public contexts.80 
How best does one approach a set of problems in order to see their historical context and 
analyze, interpret, and judge them? In the next section, I argue that the school of rhetorical 
criticism that offers the best approach, in general, but also specifically with regard to the set of 
artifacts I explore, is “close reading.” 
1.4.2 Approaching Artifacts Through “Close Reading”  
As a school or approach to rhetorical criticism, “close reading” (also sometimes referred to as 
“textual analysis” or “close textual analysis”) has earned a prominent status, and has seen among 
its adherents such luminaries as G. P. Mohrmann, Michael Leff, and Martin J. Medhurst, to name 
just a few. In an article assessing the legacy of Mohrmann, Leff explains the essential core of 
close textual criticism:  
The motive for textual criticism . . . is to divert attention away from theoretical 
constructions and to focus on the rhetorical action embodied in particular 
discourses. Consequently, the enterprise begins with a severely empirical 
orientation; the critic must attend to the elements contained within the text itself. 
The empirical contents of a text, however, are in no way equivalent to the 
symbolic action that marks a work as a rhetorical discourse. Texts simply do not 
yield up their own rhetorical interpretation. Critics must move from what is given 
in the text to something that they themselves produce—an account of the 
                                                 
80 Martin J. Medhurst, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism. Thirty Years Later: A 
Critic's Tale," Rhetoric Review 25, no. 4 (2006): 381.  
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rhetorical dynamics implicit within it. At minimum, this act of interpretation 
requires a means to justify the identification of significant features in the text and 
to explain the interactions among those features. Since this process necessarily 
entails principles or categories “not native to the original,” it requires an exercise 
of judgment at some level of abstraction, and it eventuates in something we might 
call theoretical understanding of the particular case.81  
Leff explains three significant attributes of this model of criticism: first, it eschews theory in 
favor of an intensive engagement with the text; second, it starts as a strongly empirical search but 
transcends the particulars to provide a “rhetorical interpretation” of “the symbolic action that 
marks a work as a rhetorical discourse”; and third, such an interpretive strategy is capable of 
theorization, but only as it emerges organically from the close read of the text. Similarly, Stephen 
E. Lucas, in his analysis of the Declaration of Independence, reflects the attitude of a close 
reader: “This essay seeks to illuminate that artistry by probing the discourse microscopically—at 
the level of the sentence, phrase, word, and syllable.”82 
One specific critical upshot in utilizing a close reading strategy is that it makes points of 
“stasis” more easily recognizable as they operate in a text. Raymond Nadeau defines stasis as a 
"main issue" in a dispute, and more specifically as "a point in controversy which acts as a focus 
or center for opposing contentions" that helps to sort primary from secondary sites of 
disagreement."83 Beyond its utility for the critic analyzing controversy, stasis theory also helps 
                                                 
81 Michael Leff, “Textual Criticism: The Legacy of G.P. Mohrmann,” in Carl R. Burgchardt, ed., Readings 
in Rhetorical Criticism, 2nd. Ed. (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc.), 547.  
82 Stephen E. Lucas, “The Stylistic Artistry of the Declaration of Indepdendence,” in Carl R. Burgchardt, 
ed., Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, 2nd. Ed. (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc.), 564. 
83 Raymond E. Nadeau, "Hermogenes on 'Stock Issues' in Deliberative Speaking," in Readings in 
Argumentation, ed. Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J.Dovre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 142.  
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the rhetor. Hanns Hohmann argues that stasis theory holds "a central place in the rhetorical 
theory of invention," as it helps the rhetor in "identifying the central issues in given 
controversies, and in finding the appropriate argumentative topics useful in addressing these 
issues."84 In other words, using the tools of stasis theory helps to sort out "pivot points" in any 
given public controversy from other, relatively minor arguments.85  
 Rhetorical scholar Lawrence Prelli provides additional structure to stasis theory by 
adopting Cicero's fourfold typology: "In Topica, he [Cicero] explained that the general stasis 
questions—'Is it?' 'What is it?' 'Of what sort is it' and 'Is action required?'—constituted methods 
of invention and judgment in philosophical and other disputes."86 Beyond its largely 
                                                 
84 Hanns Hohmann, "Stasis," in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 741.  
85 Though stasis theory largely became identified with forensic and judicial rhetoric (as Hohmann and 
others have noted), it has continued to be a source of scholarly investigation for rhetoricians, including for its 
possible applications to other genres (such as deliberative). See James G. Backes, "Aristotle's Theory of Stasis in 
Forensic and Deliberative Speech in the Rhetoric," Central States Speech Journal 12 (1960): 6-8; Jeffrey Carroll, 
"Essence, Stasis, and Dialectic: Ways That Key Terms Can Mean," Rhetoric Review 23, no. 2 (2004): 156-170; Otto 
Alvin Loeb Dieter, "Stasis," Speech Monographs 17, no. 4 (1950): 345-369; Jeanne R. Fahnestock and Marie J. 
Secor, "Grounds for Argument: Stasis Theory and the Topoi," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third 
Summer Conference on Argumentation, edited by David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes 
(Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983) : 135-142; Alan G. Gross, "Why Hermagoras Still 
Matters: The Fourth Stasis and Interdisciplinarity," Rhetoric Review 23, no. 2 (2004): 141-155; Susan L. Kline, 
"Toward a Contemporary Linguistic Interpretation of the Concept of Stasis," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association 16 (1979): 95-103; Thomas F. Mader, "The Inherent Need to Analyze Stasis," Journal of the American 
Forensic Association 4 (1967): 13-20; Ray Nadeau, "Some Aristotlean and Stoic Influences on the Theory of 
Stases," Speech Monographs 26, no. 4 (1959): 248-254; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: A Manual for 
Declamation," Speech Monographs 31, no. 4 (1964): 366-369; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The Theory of 
Stases," Speech Monographs 26, no. 4 (1964): 369-373; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The History of 
Stases: Hermagoras to Minucian," Speech Monographs 31, no. 4 (1964): 373-381; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on 
Stases: The Theory," Speech Monographs 31, no. 4 (1964): 382-386; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The 
Text," Speech Monographs 31, no. 4 (1964): 387-388; Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues—a Study of 
Doctrine," in Readings in Argumentation, ed. Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J. Dovre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 
1968), 166-181; George L. Pullman, "Deliberate Rhetoric and Forensic Stasis: Reconsidering the Scope and 
Function of an Ancient Rhetorical Heuristic in the Aftermath of the Thomas/Hill Controversy," Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 25 (1995): 223-230; K.A. Raign, "Teaching Stones to Talk: Using Stasis Theory to Teach Students the 
Art of Dialectic," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 24, no. 3/4 (1994): 88-95; Wayne N. Thompson, "Stasis in Aristotle's 
Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58, no. 2 (1979): 134-141; Liu Yameng, "Aristotle and the Stasis Theory: A 
Reexamination," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1991): 53-59.  
86 Lawrence Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication: The Case of Spousal 
Violence Research," in Rhetoric and Incommensurability, ed. Randy Allen Harris (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 
2005), 300. For other applications of stasis theory to particular controversies, see Vivian I. Dicks, "Courtroom 
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unproblematic role in judicial rhetoric, Prelli argues for the relevance and utility of stasis theory 
in the deliberative arena as well. Extending that insight, I use close reading in this study to 
uncover, in reference to points of stasis, the ways in which population became (re)defined and 
(re)interpreted through three decades of UN-sponsored efforts on population.87 Given the history 
of population as public argument, all of these stasis questions (including is it and what is it) were 
in play at these conferences, and I hope to understand their significance in remolding and 
remaking the issue along these lines.  
As I read these texts, I differentiate between two different senses of "stasis." On the one 
hand, I identify formal/procedural points of stasis. Following the analysis by Lawrence Prelli and 
others, these points of stasis recur in every controversy, including such key points/questions as is 
there a problem, what is the problem, of what kind is the problem, and what action should be 
taken to address the problem.88 Following the work of Robert Newman and others, these 
formal/procedural points are particularly apt for the generic designation of "stock issues" in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Controversy: A Stasis/Stock Issues Analysis of the Angela Davis Trial," Journal of the American Forensic 
Association 13 (1976): 77-83; R. Pepper Dill, "An Analysis of Stasis in James H. Thornwell's Sermon, 'The Rights 
and Duties of Masters'," Journal of Communication & Religion 11, no. 2 (1988): 19-24; Andrew C. Hansen, "The 
Stasis in Counter-Statement: 'Applications of the Terminology' as Attempted Reconciliation of the Formal and the 
Rhetorical," Rhetoric Review 20, no. 3/4 (2001): 293-313; Edward A. Hinck and Andrew J. Rist, "Stasis and the 
Development of Hierarchies for the Resolution of Topicality," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third 
Summer Conference on Argumentation, edited by David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes 
(Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983): 800-811; Michael R. Kramer and Kathryn M. Olson, 
"The Strategic Potential of Sequencing Apologia Stases: President Clinton's Self-Defense in the Monica Lewinsky 
Scandal," Western Journal of Communication 66, no. 3 (2002): 347-368; Charles Marsh, "The Syllogism of 
Apologia: Rhetorical Stasis Theory and Crisis Communication," Public Relations Review 32, no. 1 (2006): 41-46; 
James F. Stratman, "A Reflection On 'Risk Communication, Metacommunication, and Rhetorical Stases in the 
Aspen-EPA Superfund Controversy,’" Journal of Business & Technical Communication  21, no. 1 (2007): 23-26; 
James F. Stratman and Carolyn Boykin, "Risk Communication, Metacommunication, and Rhetorical Stases in the 
Aspen-EPA Superfund Controversy," Journal of Business & Technical Communication 9, no. 1 (1995): 37-41.  
87 Indeed, the notion of stasis helps to center a discussion of the role of definition and framing in public 
policy argument. See Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2003); Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the 
Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies (New York: BasicBooks, 1994).  
88 Lawrence Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication.“ 
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controversy.89 Beyond such formally designated points of stasis, however, there are more 
specific, content-specific/substantive points of stasis that are particular to individual 
controversies. For instance, a critical point of stasis in the debate about abortion rests on the 
question of when life begins, while the debate over gun control often involves a contested 
reading of the Second Amendment. While each content-specific/substantive point of stasis can 
be categorized into formal/procedural categories, the critic better understands the "pivot points" 
of a rhetorical text by enumerating both formal and content-specific points of stasis. In addition 
to utilizing rhetorical criticism and close reading, including a deciphering of relevant points of 
stasis, my approach also suggests the importance of interpreting rhetoric across time. I engage 
this part of my mode of investigation in the next section.  
1.4.3 Dialectical Approach to Rhetoric in Time 
The concept pair of synchronism/diachronism comes from the field of linguistics, 
particularly the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Reacting to the dominant trend in linguistics that 
examined the development of language patterns from a chronological/historical (diachronic) 
perspective, Saussure advocated the alternative of structuralism, an approach to the study of 
language that positions components of language as a structure existing at one point in time (in 
other words, from a synchronic point of view).90     
                                                 
89 Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues—a Study of Doctrine."  
90 For an analysis that both traces these concepts in the work of Saussure, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Jean Piaget, with a set of applications to the practice of rhetorical 
criticism, see Barbara Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology: Implications for Rhetorical Criticism," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 65, no. 3 (1979): 250-261.  
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Structuralism's influence has extended outward beyond linguistics, into debates regarding 
biblical exegesis, and for our purposes, into rhetorical criticism and theory.91 Barbara Warnick 
argues that synchronic approaches, as opposed to diachronic ones, produce very different types 
of rhetorical criticism.92 Perhaps the most sustained discussion of the synchronic/diachronic pair, 
however, comes from Michael Calvin McGee's landmark essay on ideographic analysis.93 
McGee argues that one can best understand ideology by surveying the ideographs of a political 
culture. An ideograph, according to McGee, is "an ordinary language term found in political 
discourse . . . a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but 
equivocal and ill-defined normative goal."94  
McGee claims that we can study ideographs in two distinct yet interrelated ways: 
diachronic and synchronic examination. A diachronic survey would chart the historical 
transformations of a given ideograph, such as "freedom of speech," in order to understand the 
different ways it has been used across time. McGee argues that such an approach allows the 
critic to develop a grammar of the ideograph. To understand the rhetoric(al force) of an 
ideograph, however, one must concentrate on its synchronic dimensions, understanding any 
particular ideograph in relation to other related ideographs at a given point in time.95  
McGee's synchronic critical approach continues to play out in the work of his intellectual 
lineage, including Celeste Condit and John Lucaites, Kevin DeLuca, Marouf Hasian, and most 
                                                 
91 For instance, see Johannes Cornelis de Moor, Synchronic or Diachronic? A Debate on Method in Old 
Testament Exegesis (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995).  
92 Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology."  
93 Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 66, no. 1 (1980): 1-16. I want to make clear that I do not envision my project as being an ideographic 
analysis.  Though not opposed to McGee's framework, the other conceptual tools developed in this section are more 
appropriate for analysis of these conferences. 
94 McGee, "The 'Ideograph'": 15.  
95 McGee, "The 'Ideograph'": 12.  
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recently, Davi Johnson.96 In another vein, Thomas Farrell discusses Ernest Bormann's fantasy 
theme analysis that traces "the diachronic development of issues and 'story-line' frames in 
contemporary political controversy."97 Speaking more generally, in tracing the scholarly trend to 
sharpen focus on context and history (which he situates as being a response to McGee's call for 
more synchronic and diachronic studies), John Murphy notes, "Regardless of the theoretical 
assumptions that might separate scholars, the importance of the past as a source of invention for 
political rhetoric infuses current criticism."98 
Ultimately, this distinction (synchronic versus diachronic) is rather artificial, as high 
quality scholarship tends both toward synchronic and diachronic analysis. Therefore, while it is 
useful to understand the tendency of any particular scholarship, and whether it is primarily 
diachronic or primarily synchronic, we must remember that this functions more as a both/and 
than as an either/or.99 As Warnick notes, "A rigid separation of the diachronic and synchronic 
perspectives would fail to account for the development of the system, and the two methods must 
be used together if developmental influences are to be considered at all."100 Extending this 
concept to the work of rhetorical criticism, Warnick, citing Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, explains, the 
dialectical perspective" in criticism is "a style of criticism that focuses on the rhetorical work as 
                                                 
96 Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, Crafting Equality: America's Anglo-African Word 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Kevin Michael DeLuca, Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of 
Environmental Activism (New York: Guilford Press, 1999); Kevin DeLuca, "Articulation Theory: A Discursive 
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97 Thomas B. Farrell, "Critical Models in the Analysis of Discourse," Western Journal of Speech 
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98 John M. Murphy, "History, Culture, and Political Rhetoric," Rhetoric Review 20, no. 1/2 (2001): 47.  
99 I draw my understanding of “tendencies” in a text from Kenneth Burke. Counter-Statement.  
100 Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology": 258.  
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it emerges from the complex of historical events which brought it into existence and views 
discourse as a joint venture in meaning shared by rhetor and audience and directed toward some 
future project."101 
My study of these UN-sponsored population conferences can be understood through the 
lens of this "dialectical perspective." I look at the particular structure and web of relevant 
concepts for each framing of the argument at each point in time (1974, 1984, 1994, 1999, 2004), 
but also across time, to chart both temporal transformations and continuities in the rhetoric of 
population.102 
 My dialectical approach, with its focus on diachronic tracing, delivers two significant 
critical returns. First, Ron Greene's work suggests that the issue of (over)population in particular 
has been significantly reframed at multiple points throughout its history (for instance, in terms of 
development, security, and green politics).103 My approach zeroes in on these inflection points 
while also analyzing some of the (purportedly) newest iterations, including reproductive health 
and reproductive rights. Second, my study investigates the ways in which meaning moved and/or 
remained stable across time, from Bucharest to the ICPD follow-up conferences. While Risse 
suggests that argumentative exchanges drive change, his approach focuses on the ways that 
individual opinions shift as argumentative exchanges unfold.104 My mode of investigation 
combines the strengths of rhetorical criticism with public argument analysis, using the attendant 
                                                 
101 Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology": 258.  
102 Furthermore, my decision to break up the linear time unfolding by starting with Cairo aids in this critical 
endeavor by exposing temporal dimensions that otherwise might be taken for granted. For instance, creating one 
linear, chronological ordering suggests a strong possibility for an evolutionary, progressive understanding of history 
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back to prior points, jumping ahead to something new without taking the steps in between, and other temporal 
disruptions. 
103 Greene, Malthusian Worlds.  
104 Risse, "'Let's Argue!'"  
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three-fold sense, argument as product, argument as process, and argument as method, to 
elucidate transformations in the argumentative terrain through time.105 In order to shape these 
acts of rhetorical criticism, I deploy a Burkean approach,, including and particularly with his 
focus on cluster-agon analysis, as a concrete reading strategy for engaging and unpacking these 
rather dense documents (or, in the language of Leff, the means to start the encounter with the 
empirical dimensions of the text).  
1.4.4 Cluster-Agon Analysis 
Kenneth Burke developed numerous critical tools for deciphering what is "going on" in a 
text. Early on, these tools were geared primarily toward literary analysis (such as his work in 
Counter-Statement), but as he continued to observe similarities between the world of literature 
and the world of rhetoric, his focus widened.106 While most famous for the concept of the 
pentad, another critical part of Burke's analysis is the cluster-agon method of analysis. John 
Lynch explains that a statistical spirit drives such inquiry: 
According to Burke, any given literary or rhetorical work "contains a set of 
implicit equations. He [the rhetor, male or female] uses 'associated clusters.' And 
you may, by examining his [or her] work, find 'what goes with what' in these 
                                                 
105 See, for instance, Wayne Brockriede, "Arguers as Lovers," Philosophy & Rhetoric 5, no. 1 (1972): 1-11; 
Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and Its Uses," Speech Monographs 37, no. 2 
(1970): 101-110. Also, see Joseph W. Wenzel, "Three Perspectives on Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic," in 
Perspectives in Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede, ed. Janice Schuetz and Robert Trapp 
(Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1990), 9-26. Wenzel discusses argument as product, as process, and as 
procedure. 
106 Burke, Counter-Statement.  
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clusters—what kinds of acts and images and personalities and situations go with 
his notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc."107  
Lynch points out that it is a mistake to view cluster-agon analysis as being primarily a 
tool to understand the rhetor's private "symbolic autobiography" (as has been the prominent 
tendency in Rueckert and others), since this "overly restricts the use of the method." Instead, 
Lynch argues that we can understand the public content of rhetoric via the cluster-agon method, 
since "all symbolic action has a public component."108 Beyond generally deciphering "what is 
going on" in a text, Sonja K. Foss explains that cluster-agon helps to uncover meaning, as "the 
critic is able to locate the conflict or opposition in the principles and images of the discourse.”109 
In a sense, cluster-agon analysis resembles content analysis, as it undertakes a hybrid 
quantitative-qualitative excavation of texts in order to understand, in a broad sense, "how the 
symbols function for the rhetor."110 William Rueckert and Carol Berthold were among the first to 
try to systematically lay out the analytical moves entailed in the cluster-agon technique.111 
Building on their work and more recent attempts to utilize the method, Lynch explains the four-
step analysis involved in cluster-agon criticism (see Table 1). 112  
 
 
                                                 
107 John A. Lynch, "Race and Radical Renamings: Using Cluster Agon Method to Assess the Radical 
Potential of 'European American' as a Substitute for 'White,'" The KB Journal 2 (2006), 
http://www.kbjournal.org/lynch (accessed September 7, 2008).  
108 Lynch, "Race and Radical Renamings."  
109 Sonja K. Foss, "Women Priests in the Episcopal Church: A Cluster Analysis of Establishment Rhetoric," 
Religious Communication Today 7 (1984): 3.  
110 Foss, “Women Priests,” 3. 
111 Carol A. Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method: Its Development and an Application," 
Central States Speech Journal 27 (1976): 302-309; William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human 
Relations (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1963).  
112 Lynch, "Race and Radical Renamings."  
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Table 1. Cluster-Agon Analysis 
Steps Details 
1. "identify the important 
or key terms of the 
study" 
Select these "either a priori or through an organic reading of the text" 
2. "identif[y] terms that 
appear in the same 
context as the key 
term(s)" 
After identifying, the critic "ranks them according to frequency of appearance and the 
intensity or power of the term." 
3. "identif[y] clusters, 
'the verbal combinations 
and equations in which 
the speaker tends to 
associate a key term with 
other terms." 
Can locate such associations by "conjunction, the attribution of cause-effect 
relationships between terms, the consistent use of imagery associated with the key term, 
proximity, and an indirect relationship through a third term." 
4. "identif[y] agons, 
those terms in opposition 
to the key term that 
provide symbolic 
conflict." 
Can locate these in "some form of 'contraposition,' which includes direct opposition and 
negation, description of a potential competition between terms, imagery portraying 
opposition or struggle, indirect opposition vis a vis a third term, and enumeration. 
Enumeration refers to times when terms are placed side-by-side, and either through 
explicit identification or through the context of the comments, the speaker identifies the 
terms as distinct and potentially opposing." 
 
Cluster-agon analysis provides a concrete reading strategy to unpack UN population 
conference documents.113 However, a few adaptations are needed to tailor the analytical tool to 
the artifacts examined in my case studies. Rather than viewing these changes as shortcomings, 
either of the method or of its fit to the texts, these modifications offer insights that might prove 
useful for other rhetorical critics as well. The first major difference between Burke's sense of 
                                                 
113 Significantly, R. Charli Carpenter's work suggests that IR scholarship is already realizing the value of 
scholarship that engages in such quantitative-qualitative hybrid reading strategies in order to produce high-quality 
interpretive analysis. In addition to the movement in IR scholarship to embrace such approaches, academic 
approaches to the international issue of human population growth, and even more particularly, to UN conferences on 
population growth, have also experimented with such strategies. Matthew Connelly’s Fatal Misconception engages 
in some very informal textual analysis, in something resembling my own cluster-agon work: 
Because of the failed push for population control, the WPPA did not give strong backing for family 
planning services. The principle of national sovereignty was explicitly recognized no fewer than five times. 
The "international community," on the other hand, was given just two priority assignments: reducing 
mortality and boosting food production. As for nongovernmental organizations, many delegates displayed 
open hostility. NGOs, mentioned only once in the final document, were directed to work "within the 
framework of national laws, policies, and regulations." (315) 
While this helps to model a way of meaningfully engaging these texts and while it illustrates the value of 
international conference documents on population as sites for close textual analysis, Connelly's narrative focus 
differs from the textually-driven approach taken by this study. 
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cluster-agon and my own is that Burke is very focused on the individual rhetor and, beyond that, 
the psychology of the rhetor. Berthold notes that this method is valuable because it allows us to 
analyze "the motives and characters of speakers," and that it can "enable one to gain an objective 
picture of the rhetoric of a given speaker."114 While this is a valuable framework for analyzing 
the rhetoric of individual agents, it is less useful when it comes to analyzing group-produced 
documents where the personality and the character of the author(s) are deemphasized.115 Instead, 
as Lynch notes, we can and should use cluster-agon in ways that understand public content rather 
than biography. In this sense, adapting cluster-agon outward from individual agent-based 
actually offers critics another tool for a broad range of texts in which there are many and/or 
unnamed authors. The second major difference relates to the search for agons in a text. As 
consensus documents, largely devoid of explicit controversy, the “agons” in these conference 
documents are much less clear than would be found in standard, adversarial political discourse. 
The “enemy” is not clear and, given the precariousness of support (financial and otherwise) for 
implementing the vision of the documents, these texts seem hesitant about engaging in kategoria, 
or accusations against any specific actors. Therefore, searching for agons in this case is 
necessarily indirect, and with rare exceptions, requires reading by implication rather than more 
directly. At points during the analysis, I suggest where an agon is being expressed, but just as 
powerfully, the question of what agons are implied but absent and why opens another venue for 
valuable scholarship. The third major difference relates to critical objective. As noted above, 
Burke's framework has been used to try to discern the character/psychology of the author (such 
                                                 
114 Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method": 302, 309.  
115 In this vein, Foss' piece on the "establishment rhetoric" of the Episcopal Church is a valuable tool, as it 
shows that cluster-agon analysis does not rely on the personality of the rhetors but can instead elucidate an array of 
rhetoric organized by topic/theme rather than by agent. This possibility is also anticipated by Berthold's “Kenneth 
Burke’s Cluster-Agon Method,” which claims, "the method provides a way of comparing the rhetoric of several 
speakers," indicating the possibility of transcending the individual rhetor in cluster-agon analysis. 
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as his analysis of Coleridge). Many population conference documents are group-authored 
reports, each reflecting the work of many contributors, making it difficult to discern sole-author-
centric qualities such as "the motives and characters of speakers." In many ways, as suggested 
above, this move is a productive one insofar as it pushes cluster-agon analysis beyond individual 
rhetors. For my study, I adapt in light of this by deploying cluster-agon reading to assist in my 
acts of rhetorical criticism that ultimately help to interpret, understand, and judge the rhetoric of 
these documents. By assessing the changing (and stable) cluster-agon emphases across time, my 
reading strategy highlights shifts away from and continuities with previous iterations of public 
argument over population.116 Featuring both shifts and continuities yields critical returns, as I am 
able to both observe the malleability of population rhetoric across time, thus discrediting the idea 
that population rhetoric can only ever be one way, while also pushing back on the idea that 
population rhetoric, or really, any rhetoric, is always in flux. The latter tendency over-estimates 
the amount of novelty in each instantiation, while the former approach lends a fixed ontological 
status to something that, as Aristotle notes, is capable of being otherwise.  
1.5 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION AND PREVIEW 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to working through these conferences, on first look, 
is to arrange them chronologically: Bucharest (1974), Mexico City (1984), Cairo (1994), 
                                                 
116 In offering alternative directions for cluster-agon analysis, Berthold notes, "Cluster-agon analysis might 
also be employed as a precise method of discovering key term relationships in the rhetoric of a social movement." 
See Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method." This critical move parallels McGee's notion that "social 
movement" can be indicative of a shift in collective meaning rather than merely marking the presence of a protest 
group bringing voice to bear on social problems. Michael Calvin McGee, "'Social Movement': Phenomenon or 
Meaning?" Central States Speech Journal 31 (1980): 233-244; Michael Calvin McGee, "Social Movement as 
Meaning," Central States Speech Journal 34 (1983): 74-77.  
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ICPD+5 (1999), ICPD+10 (2004). However, I have chosen to alter this organizational pattern, 
such that I start with Cairo in Chapter 2, then turn to Bucharest and Mexico City in Chapter 3, 
and then reach ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 in Chapter 4. This ordering might appear counterintuitive, 
but I do it for two primary reasons. First, one of the most important questions I pursue, as one of 
the “big picture” questions of the entire dissertation, is whether claims in support of Cairo’s 
novelty/paradigm change are warranted. Thus, by starting with Cairo, it then is much easier to 
view the claims of Cairo with regard to its past and future. Second, the rhetorical framing of 
these conferences, from the perspective of temporality and chrono-logics, is rooted in a 
progressive, evolutionary telos. By arranging the chapters in a strictly linear order, then, the 
dissertation already presumes the framing that I seek to interrogate. If the texts do indeed end up 
being progressive, this pattern does not preclude a reader from making that interpretive move, 
but if they are not, only my arrangement precludes a reader from understanding the movement 
across time without “stacking the deck” against them.   
1.5.1 Chapter Two: The Craft of Cairo 
Preparations for the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development began as 
early as 1991, the year that the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) agreed 
on the need and goals for the conference. In particular, when the resolution authorizing the Cairo 
conference passed, the enabling provisions of the resolution also formed six expert groups to 
help plan this landmark event. One of these expert groups, the Expert Group on Population 
Policies and Programmes, framed the question of quantitative population targets in a way that 
affirmed existing precedent (endorsing "the ultimate, internationally accepted goal . . . the 
stabilization of global population within the shortest period possible"), rather than emphasizing a 
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sharp break from it.117 This goal of "stabilization" implies a quantitative vision of numerical 
limits to carrying capacity, thereby reaffirming the quantitative, Malthusian sense of global 
limits. Such an approach appears at odds with the efforts of the Cairo conference, especially with 
regard to how it has been memorialized, by participants, scholars, and activists (as chronicled 
earlier in this chapter). More in line with the approach of Cairo is the group’s emphasis on 
integrating an array of different factors as the only sustainable approach to population. 
Specifically, the Expert Group Meeting on Population Policies and Programmes recommended 
all of the following as part of their vision of achieving "comprehensive population and 
development policies": 
While population limitation objectives were best made explicit and operationally 
defined in terms of quantitative targets, the participants noted that it might be 
better, in some instances, to integrate such goals with broader social and 
economic development strategies. Policies that complemented population 
limitation measures should be included in explicit population policies. Those 
might include interventions such as raising the minimum legal age at marriage, 
introducing literacy and educational programmes for women, encouraging young 
girls to stay in school longer, mobilizing non-governmental organizations for 
family planning campaigns, encouraging the private and commercial sector to 
play a more active role in population matters and so forth. Availability of 
contraceptive methods was a crucial element in a comprehensive population 
                                                 
117 United Nations Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes. "Recommendations." As I 
suggest throughout the dissertation, this move foreshadows the rhetorical role and prevalence of precedent in UN 
population conference texts. 
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policy. When appropriate, local production of contraceptives should be fully 
supported.118 
My investigation of the Cairo conference, and more specifically, its official Programme 
of Action, will be guided by the following research questions: 
• As the tensions in these expert group passages already suggest, what is the relationship 
between the Programme of Action and quantitative/demographic approaches to population? 
• How does the Programme of Action conceptualize the relationship between development and 
demographics (or, more generally, “population”)? 
• In calling for communication to carry out its goals, how does the Programme of Action 
conceive of the types of approach and types of knowledge that it will seek to employ and 
secure?  
• To what degree does the document explicitly reference controversies, either that were present 
at the conference, or that shape the scene/context of the conference’s efforts? 
• How does the Programme of Action balance particular calls with more universal calls? 
• How does the Programme of Action make space for participation by non-governmental 
actors?  
• How does the Cairo conference manage the perennial rhetorical challenge of kairos 
(timeliness and appropriateness)? 
                                                 
118 United Nations Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes. "Recommendations."  
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1.5.2 Chapter Three: The Early Years: Foil or Precursor? 
As noted earlier in this chapter, there were two major UN population conferences leading up to 
Cairo. In 1974, the World Population Conference was held in Bucharest. In 1984, Mexico City 
hosted the International Conference on Population. By examining these conferences I will both 
understand them on their own terms and also build further context to examine and interrogate the 
claims of novelty surrounding the 1994 ICPD. Specifically, I will consult the key work products 
from these conferences, Bucharest's "World Population Plan of Action" (1974) and Mexico 
City's "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of 
Action" (1984), as I pursue the following research questions:   
• How does the rise of the Group of ’77 and the NIEO influence the way in which the 
Bucharest and Mexico City conferences treat the relationship between demographics and 
development?  
• How do Bucharest and Mexico City imagine geographies of population?  
• How are appeals to sovereignty and international action negotiated at Bucharest and Mexico 
City? 
• How are rhetoric, argument, communication, and deliberation referenced or insinuated in 
these two conferences?  
• In what ways do these texts preview (or diverge from) the key themes embodied in the ICPD 
Programme of Action?  
• What is the relationship between Reagan’s “Mexico City policy” and the text of the Mexico 
City document? 
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1.5.3 Chapter Four: Reaffirmation or Reconfiguration? 
As part of the follow-up to the Cairo conference, there were efforts in 1999 (ICPD +5) and in 
2004 (ICPD+10), to evaluate the progress being made toward the goals detailed in the Cairo 
Programme of Action. Each five-year evaluation produced documents with formal findings: 
"Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population and Development" (1999, ICPD+5) and ICPD at Ten: The World 
Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review (2004, ICPD+10). I will examine 
the work produced by each follow-up session with the following research questions in mind: 
• What are the major reflexive judgments made about the benefits and shortcomings of the 
Cairo conference? 
• How pervasive is the language of "sustainable development" in these follow-up documents, 
now that significant time has passed since the Rio conference where the term was 
popularized? 
• How do these documents consider the appropriateness of sharing of responsibilities between 
the public and private sectors?  
• How do appeals to precedent function in these documents?  
• In what ways do these documents contain neoliberal assumptions? 
• How do “advocacy,” “civil society,” and “strategy” get configured in these texts?  
1.5.4 Chapter Five: Conclusion 
In chapter 5, I will summarize the key themes and findings from my study. I will return to the 
research questions that drove the study to see what types of preliminary conclusions one might 
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draw. I will utilize my analysis, particularly from Chapters 2 and 3, to weigh in authoritatively 
on whether or not the claims of novelty and paradigm change are warranted and, if they not, 
what the significance of such a falsehood might be. Additionally, I will speculate on future 
research in the area of population rhetoric and public argument, and what types of new and 
ongoing research questions this study suggests. I will also make some preliminary observations 
about possibilities in the future direction of the public argument on population. Finally, I will 
suggest some relevant theoretical findings and ongoing questions suggested by this project.  
1.6 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of a long-standing controversy: 
population growth (at times articulated as “overpopulation”). Though Rio started the pairing of 
environmental and economic concerns, it was not until Cairo, according to numerous scholars, 
activists, and policymakers, that environmental advocates linked environmental and public health 
issues. Given the range of issues that population implicates, including environmental 
degradation, state control over fertility and reproduction, women's rights, and public health, the 
academic study of population continues to be timely, with implications across multidisciplinary 
horizons.  
The groundwork laid in this chapter positions us now to turn to each major historical 
moment being surveyed, starting in Cairo in 1994, moving back to Bucharest in 1974 and 
Mexico City in 1984, and concluding with a five-year commemoration in 1999 and a largely 
decentralized ten-year review of the Cairo conference in 2004. At each point of historical 
analysis, I aim to elucidate key rhetorical features of the public argument as it was presented at 
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that particular point in time. Rather than attempt to chart every aspect of every conference, my 
goal is to utilize the unique tools offered by rhetorical criticism and theory and public argument 
analysis in order to provide a product that tells us not only about the rhetoric of these 
conferences for rhetoric’s sake, but about features of these conferences that, like Medhurst noted 
previously in this chapter, may be missed by scholars and practitioners approaching the artifacts 
from another perspective or “mode of investigation.” As such, I position some of my findings as 
an attempt to contribute to conversations and debates in other contexts, such as IR, the UN, and 
demographics/population. Along the way, I also consider what can be successfully articulated as 
connections and relationships between and among these conferences, and whether the current, 
evolutionary framing of these conferences across time, gels with the close textual read offered in 
each chapter and with the cumulative analysis offered in the concluding chapter. 
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2.0  THE CRAFT OF CAIRO 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of 1994, the world community completed preparations for a large-scale, 
intergovernmental, United Nations (UN)-sponsored conference on population. Perhaps the most 
notable element of the international “scene” was that it was situated in a post-Cold War context. 
As Jyoti Shankar Singh notes: "The ICPD [International Conference on Population and 
Development] process benefited from several political developments in the early 1990s. The end 
of the Cold War meant that the East-West issues, some of which created tensions and difficulties 
at both Bucharest and Mexico City, would not be a major factor in the discussions and 
negotiations leading up to Cairo."1 The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a newfound sense of 
optimism and hope about the possibilities of international relations, leading some to go so far as 
to describe the moment as "the end of history."2 In this spirit, even the Israel-Palestine question 
(a recurring, disabling point of controversy at all UN discussions, but particularly those including 
components relating to migration) was downplayed in favor of focusing on the task at hand. That 
task was to commit the international community and its constituent elements to a new 
                                                 
1 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The International Conference on 
Population and Development (London: Earthscan, 1998), 27-28.  
2 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989), 
http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm (accessed July 25, 2010) and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last 
Man (New York: Avon Books, 2006).  
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"Programme of Action." Rather than merely fine-tuning earlier efforts, Cairo conferees were 
authorized to and charged with the duty of charting a new course for population activities. 
Furthermore, this charge was broad in scope: "The 1994 Conference was explicitly given a 
broader mandate on development issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the 
growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the 
environment are so closely interconnected that none of them can be considered in isolation."3 
Thus, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo, Egypt 
in 1994, was tasked with a bold mission and a broad mandate, with a backdrop of a near-
euphoric global sensibility toward international cooperation.4 
This chapter examines the Programme of Action of the ICPD, agreed to in Cairo, in order 
to understand its primary rhetorical features as a public argument (or, in other words, how it 
operates) and to interpret the vision on human population it advanced (or, in other words, to 
examine the substance of its claims).5 I focus my analysis on the dynamics of the text itself, 
                                                 
3 United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Report of the ICPD (94/10/18).” 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html (Accessed December 27, 2008), Para 1.5. 
4 Admittedly, the international geopolitical situation was far from idyllic. The War in Bosnia spanned the 
period 1992-1995, and in 1993, images of dead US (United States) soldiers being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu, Somalia traumatized the American public and called into question the will of the US to play the role of 
superpower, insofar as that may entail humanitarian intervention (such fatigue continued with images of instability 
during US involvement in Haiti in 1994). On the media-politics nexus of the Mogadishu event, see, for instance, 
Jacqueline E. Sharkey, “When Pictures Drive Foreign Policy,” American Journalism Review (December 1993), 
http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=1579 (accessed July 25, 2010). Additionally, the Rwandan genocide occurred in 
early 1994. Nevertheless, there were tangible signs of hope, such as the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the 
Israel-Jordan peace treaty in 1994 (though Oslo eventually fell apart, this was not until after Cairo, following 
Rabin’s death in 1995). Throughout the 1990s, despite many events such as the War in Kosovo, the future of 
international relations (IR) looked uncertain, and, at least potentially, hopeful. On September 11, 2001, a new era 
began, whose chapter cannot yet be fully written, but clearly stands in sharp contrast to the euphoria of the 1990s. 
The post-9/11 IR climate might more closely represent what Samuel Huntington, one of Fukuyama’s main 
interlocutors, has called “the clash of civilizations.” 
5 "Report of the ICPD." 
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rather than weighing factors extrinsic to the text.6 The following pages provide a “close reading,” 
a primarily internal and textually-driven rhetorical analysis of the final conference document. By 
fleshing out the primary and most important characteristics of the Cairo text, I will then be in a 
better position to consider this effort in regard to its predecessors, Bucharest and Mexico City 
(Chapter 3), as well as its successors, ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 (Chapter 4). Before embarking on 
such analysis, however, I begin with a short historical overview surrounding the Cairo 
conference itself. 
2.2 CAIRO: SETTING THE SCENE 
With the approval of Resolution 47/176 on December 22, 1992 by the General Assembly of the 
UN, formal preparations began for the 1994 ICPD.7 Supported by a confluence of factors 
working in its favor (including, as noted above, the end of the Cold War), the site of the 
conference proved particularly opportune as well: 
Convening the meeting in Cairo turned out to be a felicitous choice: as a moderate 
Muslim state, it was able to reassure the Vatican and prevent most other Muslim 
governments from boycotting the conference for fears of the positions that the 
USA might take.8 
                                                 
6 Recall from Chapter 1 that my intent in the current project is to provide a close reading of the official 
conference texts, rather than of the multiple external texts that also bear on this public argument (such as, for 
instance, the acts of memorializing Cairo and/or the other related conferences). 
7 Michael G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences (London: Routledge, 2005), 134. Though 
formal approval occurred in 1992, the preparations began even earlier, in 1989, as Singh explains. Creating a New 
Consensus on Population, 22. 
8 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences,134. 
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In the broadest sense, the conference was devoted to "the theme of population, sustained 
economic growth and sustainable development."9 Again, the opportune timing of the conference 
is notable: just two years earlier, in 1992, the UN had convened the Rio Conference, of which the 
most lasting buzz-term was and continues to be "sustainable development." Therefore, the Cairo 
attendees were well positioned to make arguments that advanced economic development, but 
that also viewed economic development as one part of a larger whole, which included, among 
other components, the environment and natural resources. Also, the conference was set to occur 
just one year before the Beijing conference, giving Cairo participants a unique opportunity to 
engage questions such as women’s rights, educating girls on par with boys, and eliminating 
discriminating based on sex and/or gender, both discrimination enshrined in law as well as “de 
facto” discrimination.  
As Michael Schechter notes, there were notable reasons both for hope and for doubt 
emerging from the conference's outcomes. On the one hand, the Programme of Action was a 
success: "No voices were raised against the Program of Action as a whole and the fact that the 
Vatican limited its reservations to parts of the Program of Action was considered quite a 
triumph."10 Thus, spectators and participants were able to proclaim that a consensus, rather than 
merely a majority or super majority, had been attained.11 The rhetorical force of such a claim is 
powerful: just as a 9-0 Supreme Court decision makes an undivided statement, unlikely to be 
challenged or overturned, so too does a consensus spell overwhelming agreement on the part of 
                                                 
9 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 135. 
10 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 138. 
11 Of course, its status as a consensus document could also be marshaled by opponents as a definitive sign 
of just how off course the international community had gone.  
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all (or almost all) of the international community.12 On the other hand, a concern voiced in the 
document, and borne out in the immediate aftermath of the conference, relates to the financing of 
the policies and programs: "donor commitments have consistently fallen short."13 While we may 
choose to attribute these shortfalls to rocky economic times, there have been many periods of 
time, between 1994 and the present, in which we have witnessed sufficient global economic 
growth (and, for instance, US economic growth) that could have easily covered (and even far 
exceeded) the amounts to meet donor commitments.  
While there are a variety of ways of approaching the Cairo conference and its outcomes, 
my primary concern is textual and internal, that is, with the rhetorical outcomes of the 
conference (in particular the final, agreed-upon Programme), and this is best expressed by means 
of close rhetorical analysis of the final conference Programme of Action. One contextual element 
that overshadowed much of the conference itself, however, was the topic of abortion. The 
Vatican chose to make a set of public arguments in order to challenge any and every passage in 
the text that could be seen as promoting or allowing for abortion. This decision led international 
observers and the media to focus on this one issue, and even give air time to blatant lies about the 
issue (such as, for instance, that the conference was attempting to create an international right to 
abortions), to the exclusion of the rest of the conference work.14 The danger with following such 
                                                 
12 However, a rhetorical perspective also warrants backing off of the triumph of achieving consensus. 
While consensus is a powerful outcome, it also suggests that “the debate is over”/”there is no debate here.” Such a 
closing of deliberation makes efforts at dissent particularly difficult, as people begin to assume the consensus point 
of view as fact/knowledge rather than as an argument. In this sense, such closing of the debate is similar to a dead 
metaphor where its status as metaphor has been lost. None of this is to suggest that there is necessarily anything 
substantively dangerous about the “Cairo Consensus,” but rather to point out that the form of the argument contains 
particular entailments that may be problematic from the perspective of deliberation.  
13 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 138. 
14 In this sense, the theatrics of the Vatican in attempting to monopolize the discussion surrounding Cairo 
are very similar to the efforts by US President Reagan’s administration to obscure and obfuscate all other action that 
took place at the 1984 Mexico City conference. 
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tracts of analysis as a critic far removed from the conference itself is that such an approach 
misses all of the other important rhetorical work done by the text itself, it ignores its long-term 
implications (after the dust had settled regarding the abortion issue), and it engages in the exact 
strategy of reading that I argue against throughout this dissertation. Instead of finding one phrase 
in one page and using it to create and define the fight, we would be better served, as scholars and 
citizens, by engaging in more of a close reading of a text as a whole (a theme to which I return in 
Chapter 5).  
2.3 THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION (1994) 
2.3.1 Navigating the Text 
In the following two sections, I provide both a brief description of the structure of the 
Programme of Action (form) as well as a short account its primary argument/point of view 
(content/substance). 
2.3.1.1 Structure of the Text 
The Programme of Action of the ICPD, the official document produced by the Cairo 
conference, is composed of sixteen chapters. Other than the opening two chapters (the former 
being a preamble, the latter being a chapter on the "Principles" underlying the document), the 
other chapters are organized in a recurring pattern: "Basis for action," "Objectives," and 
"Actions." In many cases, there are significant sub-sections in each chapter. Where those occur, 
each sub-section contains this same "basis for action-objectives-actions" feature. Chapters 13-15 
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are different from Chapters 3-12 insofar as they more explicitly detail roles for agents (national, 
international, and “partnership with non-governmental sector,” respectively). Chapter 16, 
“Follow-up to the Conference,” details “activities” to be taken at the national, sub-regional, 
regional, and international level to ensure that progress is being made toward the goals of the 
Programme of Action. The Cairo Programme of Action, then, is a formidable rhetorical artifact, 
with over 42,000 words.  
Table 2. Top 20 Terms, Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development (Cairo)15 
Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number) 
1. Development 
2. Population 
3. Countries 
4. Health 
5. International 
6. Programmes 
7. Women 
8. Governments 
9. Including 
10. Reproductive 
11. Education 
12. Services 
13. Economic 
14. Action 
15. National 
16. Social 
17. Organizations 
18. Family 
19. Levels 
20. People 
                                                 
15 www.wordle.net. Wordle allows a user to select how many terms to see at a time. For instance, selecting 
“1” will show only the most prominent term in the text. Using this method, I expanded the number, one at a time, 
until I had a list, in order, of the top 20 terms in the document. This analysis was performed on May 14, 2009. There 
are significant limits, despite the utility of Wordle. For instance, it is not capable of “stemming” 
(http://www.wordle.net/faq). As a default, Wordle screens out “Stop Words” (and, the, etc…) 
(http://www.wordle.net/faq), which in this case, is actually very useful. Also, as a default, Wordle treats words as 
separate. It is possible to combine words using a tilde, but given that these documents have, at a minimum, around 
10,000 words, this is not very practical, and assumes in advance what I would be looking for in any case. For a 
visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix A.  
 
 65 
2.3.1.2 Crafting a Point of View 
Given that, by a conservative estimate, there are at least 243 action clauses in the 
Programme of Action, and furthermore, that many of those clauses contain numerous formal or 
informal sub-clauses, it would be impossible and counter-productive to catalog the full range of 
recommendations or policies advocated or ruled out by the document. However, there are some 
important broad themes that can help to characterize the essence of the document.  
The major argument of the document, especially in terms of demographic trends, seems 
to be this: on the whole, people will, under optimal conditions, pursue small and sustainable 
family sizes. The best way to achieve demographic goals, then, is to create conditions where 
such actions are possible (such as education, economic opportunities, health services), and to 
fulfill "unmet needs" (for instance, of contraceptives). In its most explicit discussion of 
demographic goals in the entire document, the Programme of Action argues, based on past 
population activities, that the best approach is to empower people to do the right thing: "The 
success of population education and family-planning programmes in a variety of settings 
demonstrates that informed individuals everywhere can and will act responsibly in the light of 
their own needs and those of their families and communities."16 This same section goes on to 
discourage coercion, incentive/disincentive programs, as well as any program that would anchor 
demographic goals on "targets or quotas for the recruitment of clients."17  
                                                 
16 "Report of the ICPD," Para 7.12. As Singh notes, the decision to maintain "individuals" was an important 
decision at the conference. At Bucharest and Mexico City, there were references to "couples and individuals" in 
terms of reproductive freedoms, but at Cairo, some parties wanted to make it refer only to "couples." However, 
partly based on the power of precedent, those parties that wanted to maintain the phrasing "couples and individuals" 
(and other references to "individuals" in the document) were victorious. Singh, Creating a New Consensus on 
Population. 
17 "Report of the ICPD," Para 7.12. While the document discourages and opposes incentive/disincentive 
schemes for demographic goals, it does advocate the use of incentives for other social goals suggested in the 
document (see 9.5, 11.8). 
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Beyond this important demographic argument, the document suggests a range of different 
types of actions, including: policy change, international cooperation, monetary/financial support, 
attitude change, behavior change, raising awareness, increasing political commitment, 
mobilizing public opinion, improving knowledge, increasing research, speaking out, supporting 
existing international agreements and conventions, as well as more nebulous "shoulds." In 
general, then, it is less useful to understand the document primarily in terms of specific actions or 
policies recommended than to grasp the basic attitude conveyed by the document. That attitude 
appears to be characterized by a weaving of an ever more intricate web that appreciates 
complexity and opposes reductionist approaches. Essentially, this document indicates that the 
simple formulas of Malthus, simple demographic approaches, simple incentive/disincentive 
schemes, and other reductive approaches cannot account for the complexity of involved factors. 
To borrow from social scientific communication theory, this approach might be characterized as 
something similar to a systems-level, "cybernetic" approach.18 In this worldview, it makes sense 
that there are so many references in the document to interconnections, interrelationships, 
intersectoral linkages, interlinages, and the need for integrated actions, incorporating multiple 
sectors, and linkages in policies and approaches. For instance, in the beginning of the document, 
it points to the importance of addressing "broad issues of and interrelationships between 
population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and advances in the 
education, economic status and empowerment of women" and "fundamental population, health, 
education and development challenges."19 
                                                 
18 Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, Theories of Human Communication, 8th Ed. (Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2005). 
19 "Report of the ICPD," Paras 1.5, 1.4. 
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As important as what types of actions should be taken, and what underlying approach 
characterizes such recommendations, the document also emphasizes the importance of how one 
makes these changes. The underlying approach here is that we should work to maximize 
participation of involved organizations, individuals, and groups.20 In addition to devoting an 
entire chapter to involving non-governmental organizations, the document also regularly 
references how important it is to consult groups as policies and actions are being devised and 
implemented, and how in many cases groups should participate as early as the formulation stage 
and as late as the evaluation stage. Thus calls for participation, involvement, collaboration, 
consultation, and incorporating (user/gender) perspectives appear regularly in the document. 
Thus, rather than confining actions to population experts and/or governmental agents, the 
document suggests a role for all elements of society: 
Implementation of effective population policies in the context of sustainable 
development, including reproductive health and family-planning programmes, 
require new forms of participation by various actors at all levels in the policy-
making process.21 
Rhetorically, this overall vision faces at least one major concern: how to deal with other 
approaches that it finds to be troublesome or counterproductive. In calling attention to more 
problematic ways of envisioning and acting on population concerns, the document faces 
particular rhetorical challenges. Both not wanting to demonize potential allies, and because of 
the specific way that international opinion on population is constructed in the document ("The 
                                                 
20 While I characterize "participation" here as a means to particular ends, the document also, in numerous 
places, suggests participation as an end itself. Most significantly, it calls for the full participation of women (see, for 
instance, 1.7). 
21 "Report of the ICPD," Para 3.27. 
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world as a whole has changed in ways that create important new opportunities for addressing 
population and development issues. Among the most significant are the major shifts in attitude 
among the world's people and their leaders in regard to reproductive health, family planning and 
population growth"), the document works more in elaborating on agons and problems as scene, 
rather than on the agents of those problems.22 In this way, it attempts an almost agent-less 
description of problems, both to prevent alienation and to claim that everybody is in support of 
the right direction but they have just been unable (for instance, due to a lack of resources) or 
conditioned by factors beyond their control (such as having to engage in structural adjustment) 
that have, as of yet, not allowed them to act more forcefully. Alternately, such statements may be 
framed almost as a quasi-hypothetical: we are not saying that this has happened before, but in 
any case, we should make sure that it does not happen now or in the future. In the next section, I 
chart a number of other rhetorical trajectories linked to the Programme of Action. 
2.3.2 Rhetorical Analysis 
If earlier public arguments surrounding population were considered too simplistic (such 
as those of Malthus), Cairo's Programme of Action runs the risk of being so complicated and 
multi-layered that it risks losing a clear "residual message," a theme to which I return later this 
chapter.23 Despite the array of possible vectors for analysis, given this multi-layered, dense, and 
complex document (as explained above), I isolate seven themes that both help us better 
understand the document and the topic of population (as manifested at this point in its rhetorical 
                                                 
22 "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.8. 
23 I include this term from a pedagogical context: Stephen E. Lucas' popular public speaking textbook, The 
Art of Public Speaking, 8th Ed., (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 100.  
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history), as well as provide cross-pollinating insight for scholars of rhetoric and IR. These seven 
themes, which I explore in order, relate to the situating of development and demographic rhetoric 
in terms of each other, the conceptual entailments of particular calls for “communication,” the 
complex rhetorical quandary facing the Cairo conferees, the way in which controversy becomes 
sanitized in the final argument-as-product, the re-working of the universal-particular dialectic, 
the enlistment of agents for a participatory politics of population, and finally, considering 
elements of kairos (and to prepon) at Cairo, and, more narrowly, in the Programme of Action. In 
this analysis, I draw both from Table 2 and Table 3, to see terms and clusters of importance, both 
from an exclusively quantitative perspective, as well as by my own selection of qualitatively 
important key terms.  
Table 3. Notable Terms & Phrases, International Conference on Population and Development 
(Cairo)24 
Notable Term/Phrase Frequency 
Development25 
   -“population and development” 
   -“sustainable development” 
   -“sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development” 
   -“sustained economic growth and sustainable development” 
   -“right to development” 
400 
123 
80 
12 
7 
4 
Health (including healthy, healthier, health-care, health-delivery, child health) 
   -reproductive health, reproductive health-care 
   -sexual health 
332 
126 
27 
Reproductive rights 
   -“decide freely and responsibly” 
   -‘”reproductive rights and responsibilities” 
8 
4 
2 
                                                 
24 For each conference, I include two tables: one that reports the results of Wordle’s “top 20 terms” 
analysis, and the second that reflects my sense of “notable terms & phrases” from the text. Including the latter table 
helps to a) counter-balance the risks of solely quantitative data (the top 20) with an interpretive, human sense of 
what matters, and b) provide a sense of some of the associated clusters and agons surrounding key terms. Those 
terms that appear as a dash under a broad term indicate that they were both counted under the umbrella term (for 
instance, “population and development” references are part of the 400 references, and then there are specifically 123 
references to the phrase “population and development.” 
25 In order to standardize my counting procedures and maintain a uniform counting standard, I chose to 
make one overall count. Except where otherwise explicitly noted, these totals include: references in the table of 
contents, chapter titles, section headings, in the text itself, and formal capitalized references and proper nouns (for 
instance, to names of other documents, declarations, and/or conferences).  
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Table 3 Continued. 
Sex/Gender 
   -woman, woman’s, women, women’s 
   -man, man’s, men, men’s 
   -gender 
   -sex 
   -girl 
   -boy 
   -male 
   -female 
 
234 
53 
51 
16 
43 
7 
16 
14 
Non-governmental 89 
Education (including educate, educated, educational, educators, educating) 
   -“information, education and communication” 
199 
23 
Interrelationship (includes interrelated, interrelate, interrelations, interrelationships, 
interdependence) 
 
25 
Future generations 
   -future children 
11 
1 
  
2.3.2.1 Negotiating the Development-Demographics Dialectic 
Cairo’s vision represents a strong level of depth and “thickness” in its notion of 
development. This trend is especially apparent in Cairo’s configuration of development and 
demographics in the areas of “sustainable development,” “population and development,” the 
“right to development,” “health” (and more particularly, “sexual health” and “reproductive 
health”), “reproductive rights,” “sex” and “gender,” and “education.”26 
“Sustainable Development”    
One of the most important clusters for “development” occurs in the phrase "sustainable 
development." Coming shortly after the 1992 Rio conference credited with popularizing the 
term, this is not particularly surprising. However, attaching development to sustainability 
                                                 
26 In addition to these major clusters, there are also a number of less significant but important clusters, 
including: human development, human resource development, skill development, cultural, economic, and social 
development. There are also a number of themes that figure into these clusters and associations, including poverty 
eradication, migration, children and youth, women, rural development, the importance of participation in 
development and development planning, and the interrelationships among development, population, the 
environment, health, education, and human rights. “Report of the ICPD.” 
 71 
recognizes that development is not merely economic (or even just social), but also necessarily 
related to environmental (and a host of other) factors. In addition to the frequent reference to 
"sustainable development," two similar phrases help to further contextualize the term: "sustained 
economic growth and sustainable development," and "sustained economic growth in the context 
of sustainable development." Both of these phrases promote the importance of economic 
development to achieve other goals (primarily population but also other concerns), yet also meld 
the economic growth emphasis with an environmental responsibility theme.  
“Population and Development” and “The Right to Development”27 
In addition to these references to the emphasis on sustainable development, development 
is also frequently paired with population as a co-equal term: "population and development." This 
phrasing places the terms population and development on an equal plane. Such a rhetorical shift 
indicates the importance of addressing both population and development with equal importance, 
rather than solving one first in order to resolve the other. Alongside "sustainable development" 
and "population and development," another critically important cluster is the phrase "right to 
development." Much as the document emphasizes the importance of reproductive rights, it also 
suggests the right to development, and the ultimate preferred goal for development: improved 
"quality of life." Such an alignment seems to support Tarla Rai Peterson’s claim that the melding 
of two distinct terms (in her case, “sustainable development;” in mine, “population and 
                                                 
27 As important as it is to note what is included in this new frame, we must first think in terms of what is 
missing from this frame that has been present in previous (over)population discourses. While questions related to the 
health of the biosphere and other environmental risks are not omitted, they fit much more with what Murray 
Bookchin terms "social ecology" (as opposed to previous frames of population discourse, which were in their most 
recent form more aligned with the "deep ecologists"). Numbers and target ranges did not disappear from these 
conference reports; rather, in every instance where they were included, they were "bookshelved" with claims about 
the primary importance of qualitative, social factors in addressing the problems of population. For an example of 
Bookchin's social ecology perspective, as well as his criticism of population rhetoric from such a perspective, see 
Murray Bookchin, Re-Enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit against Antihumanism, Misanthropy, 
Mysticism, and Primitivism (London: Cassell, 1995). 
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development”) generates a rich set of possible crystallizations (in the words of the rhetorical 
lexicon, such moments represent powerful opportunities for invention). 
“Health” and “Reproductive Rights” 
“Health” represents an emergent component of development and population discourse at 
Cairo. Two of the Programme of Action's 16 chapters feature the term "health" as part of their 
titles. Though references to “health” in population discourse are not new, Cairo frames health in 
terms of “reproductive health” and “sexual health” (and, since “reproductive rights” are seen as 
representing the protection of the capacity to seek and attain reproductive and sexual health, it 
too is a key component of the health rhetoric at Cairo, as I discuss next). Thus, many scholars, 
politicians, and activists who have discussed Cairo note as its landmark features the elevation of 
"reproductive health" and "reproductive rights" to central pillars in the population discussion, as 
noted in chapter 1. Frequently, the document makes references to "reproductive health care, 
which includes family planning and sexual health." There are even 6 references to "reproductive 
health"/"reproductive health-care" in the table of contents, chapter titles, and section headings, 
but no similar references for "sexual health" (suggesting its potentially more 
sensitive/controversial role in the document). Beyond the focus on sexual and reproductive 
health, and a large number of references to "primary health"/"primary health care," almost all of 
the other significant clusters for “health” relate to specific subgroups in the population. The most 
prominent relate to women's health, girl's (the document often refers to as "the girl child") health, 
maternal and child health, and infant/child/youth/adolescent health. When combined with the 
next feature, “reproductive rights,” we see a unique configuration of the communal and the 
individual that suggests the need for a re-conceptualization of many critiques of “rights” rhetoric. 
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"Reproductive rights," as a recurrent theme is critical to understanding the Programme of 
Action. From a quantitative perspective, the term is featured relatively minimally: only 8 total 
references. However, while not constantly featured in the text, its importance to the overall 
vision of the text cannot be denied. As the following passage suggests, reproductive rights 
safeguard the promotion of reproductive health: 
[R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in 
national laws, international human rights documents and other consensus 
documents.  These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples 
and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing 
of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to 
attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.  It also includes their 
right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion 
and violence, as expressed in human rights documents.  In the exercise of this 
right, they should take into account the needs of their living and future children 
and their responsibilities towards the community.  The promotion of the 
responsible exercise of these rights for all people should be the fundamental basis 
for government- and community-supported policies and programmes in the area 
of reproductive health, including family planning.  As part of their commitment, 
full attention should be given to the promotion of mutually respectful and 
equitable gender relations and particularly to meeting the educational and service 
needs of adolescents to enable them to deal in a positive and responsible way with 
their sexuality.28 
                                                 
28 "Report of the ICPD," Para 7.3. 
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Why do these appeals to health matter, and are they altered in rhetorically meaningful 
ways when they are coupled with appeals to rights? As Kenneth Burke notes in his essay on 
terministic screens, the linguistic frames we select to describe a set of phenomena both focus and 
limit our understanding of such phenomena.29 The increasing use of the frame of "health" to 
shape the contours of public policy debates can be seen as just such a screen, both enabling the 
policy controversy to operate in new ways, while simultaneously constraining it. Therefore, as 
the international debate relating to (over)population enmeshes with reproductive health and 
reproductive rights, we need to understand the unique features of the health frame, in terms of 
the vocabulary associated with it, the rhetorical entailments of that vocabulary, and how the 
health frame changes the context of the (over)population debate. 
In the context of public argument on public health matters, the word choices made by 
interlocutors structure ensuing communication in powerful ways.30 Though precise definitions of 
the phrase "public health" remain elusive, one of the central assumptions is that health problems 
are not only the result of individual choices and genetics, but also have an important 
social/cultural/environmental dimension. In this sense, "public health" goes beyond a narrow 
focus on medical diagnosis to include an examination of systematic factors that perpetuate health 
problems. For instance, economic conditions (such as poverty) become important in a systematic 
analysis of public health issues. Additionally, the health frame, as part of the broader genre of 
scientific discourse, includes both qualitative and quantitative indices in its analysis of the 
problem at hand. In the case of obesity discussions, the alarming quantitative analysis (rapid 
                                                 
29 Kenneth Burke, "Terministic Screens," in Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1966).  
30 Gordon R. Mitchell and Kathleen M. McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic': Metaphor, Method, or 
Madness?," Social Epistemology 21, no. 4 (2007): 391-423.  
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increase in the numbers/percentage of overweight youths/adults) is coupled with a qualitative 
analysis of the "health risks and economic consequences of overweight and obesity."31  
The implications of the health frame depend on at least two factors: the way in which the 
frame becomes situated in public discourse, and the other issues to which it becomes linked. In 
terms of the situating of the health frame in public discourse, it is important to understand that 
"health" becomes split into multiple types of utterance. For instance, Gordon Mitchell and 
Kathleen McTigue note that there are both metaphorical and literal uses of the notion of an 
"epidemic."32 Similarly, Susan Sontag famously traces the way in which disease both functions 
as metaphor and how it becomes described by means of other metaphors.33 This leads to the 
second factor that helps to determine the implications of using the health frame. In her analysis 
of how AIDS has become linked to a military metaphor, Sontag shows the troubling implications 
of this linkage.34 Similarly, those skeptical of claims of an obesity epidemic are concerned about 
the linkage of escalating body weight trends with a morality-based agenda insofar as it creates 
the possibility for scapegoating.35 Regardless of the type of utterance and the other agendas to 
which it becomes linked, the framing of an issue in terms of health, and especially as a "public 
health" issue (with all of its systematic, holistic connotations) places it squarely on the agenda 
for government response.  
                                                 
31 Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic'": 393-394.  
32 Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic.'"  
33 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors (New York: Doubleday), 1990.  
34 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor.  
35 Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic'": 399. For more on scapegoating, see, for instance, 
Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change.   
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One of the central features of the use of the health frame in relation to population 
discourse is the fusion of reproductive health and reproductive rights.36 Typically, in this most 
recent framing of (over)population rhetoric, both reproductive health and reproductive rights are 
centrally featured terms. This creates a complex interplay between individualist and community-
centered rhetoric. On the one hand, "public health" (in the form of "reproductive health") 
typically centers on the importance of viewing health issues from a community-centered 
perspective. Rights discourse (in this case, "reproductive rights"), as Mary Ann Glendon, Amitai 
Etzioni, and many others (most notably, the Communitarians) note, is identified centrally by its 
attachment to individualist concerns.37 Thus, either of these frames, viewed in isolation, would 
                                                 
36 The concepts of reproductive rights and reproductive health have had long-term staying power in public 
discourse. See Barbara A. Anderson, Reproductive Health: Women and Men's Shared Responsibility (Sudbury, MA: 
Jones and Bartless Publishers, 2005); Wendy Chavkin and Ellen Chesler, Where Human Rights Begin: Health, 
Sexuality, and Women in the New Millenium (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005); Shepard 
Forman and Romita Ghosh, Promoting Reproductive Health: Investing in Health for Development (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).  
37 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 
1991) and Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society (New York: Touchstone, 
1993). Notably, most of this Communitarian rhetoric limits itself to the US. Given that these documents elaborate 
international rights claims, it would be interesting to consider the role of a globalized Communitarian discourse. 
More generally, I am mindful that many scholars have critiqued notions of “rights” from a variety of perspectives. 
Nevertheless, I tend to support Ofelia Schutte, in her study of Latin American philosophy, in the argument that such 
critiques exhibit privilege in comparison to those for whom basic rights are not even necessarily guaranteed:  
A word of warning is in order given the transition period affecting cultural studies today, in particular, the 
shift from modern to postmodern views of social reality and culture. With only a few exceptions, Latin 
American philosophy of the sort to be studied in this work tends to be strongly modernist in orientation. 
This is not surprising, since basic concepts of freedom and justice still requiring implementation in various 
parts of the continent depend on the notion of an independent, individual subject who is the bearer of 
various rights and responsibilities in the sociopolitical arena. In the West, the postmodern deconstruction of 
the subject and of the discourse and logic of identity has often functioned as a critical tool against dominant 
normative discourses. In particular, postmodernism has helped to open up new conceptual spaces for the 
introduction of gender and racially diversified perspectives on cultural values in technologically advanced 
societies. But societies on the way to development cannot dispense so easily with concepts such as those of 
the subject, consciousness, or identity, for these are needed in order to establish and protect elementary 
legal and human rights, which cannot always be taken for granted. Postmodern theory is most compatible 
with the production of art, literature, and film in Latin America, whereas at present the social and political 
fabric of the various societies in the region is still in need of modern and high modern discourse in order to 
guarantee certain basic rights and services for variously defined communities and groups as well as 
individuals.  
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imply a concomitant set of commitments in relation to the individual-community binary. 
However, when they are fused, something new is created. For instance, one of the important 
clustered terms for "reproductive rights" is the idea of responsibility, cutting against the claims 
by many communitarians, such as Mary Ann Glendon and Etzioni, who claim that the 
proliferation of “rights” discourses necessarily compete with or even remove considerations of 
community, and, in this case, responsibility. Instead, this right and responsibility can be 
combined and clustered as the ability to "decide freely and responsibly," taking into account 
others (an implicit nod to responsibility), and "the responsible exercise of these rights." These 
terms are also clustered in the phrasing of "reproductive rights and responsibilities."38 This idea 
of a fusion between rights (individualist) and responsibilities (communitarian) has important 
policy implications, particularly in relation to the history of (over)population rhetoric is useful 
here. Given the history of fears of coercion in relation to reducing population (exemplified most 
clearly by China's one-child policy), an exclusive focus on the needs of the community would 
likely be associated with coercive, authoritarian state measures. Combining the two offers a new 
possibility, one in which government policy provides possibilities that individuals have to 
pursue/choose on their own (for instance, availability of contraceptives and reproductive 
education opportunities and, as noted above, the fulfillment of “unmet needs”). Such a 
conceptual fusion maintains the legitimacy of a state/community presence without the fears of 
top-down control over individual bodies as well as the body politic.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Ofelia Schutte, Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1993), 5.  
38 "Report of the ICPD," Paras 5.5, 7.36 Subsection B.  
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“Sex” and “Gender” 39 
The Programme of Action contains an extensive focus on sex and gender. Importantly, 
many references point to the importance of men taking more responsibility and educational 
efforts being directed toward men (in terms of, for instance, reproductive health and attitudes 
toward women). Beyond the quantitative power of gender and sex in the Programme of Action, it 
also figures centrally into the main claims of the conference. For instance, Principle 4 of Chapter 
2 notes: 
Advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women, and the elimination 
of all kinds of violence against women, and ensuring women's ability to control 
their own fertility, are cornerstones of population and development-related 
programmes. The human rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, 
intergral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal 
participation of women in civil, cultural, economic, political and social life, at the 
national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of 
discrimination on grounds of sex, are priority objectives of the international 
community.40 
Therefore, instead of merely listing the empowerment of women as one factor among many in 
the population and development equation, the Programme of Action places sex and gender 
concerns front and center (though again, given the enormous range of other factors that it cites as 
                                                 
39 I recognize that, in connecting sex and gender, I am continuing the sex/gender conflation that has been 
heavily scrutinized. However, as suggested in chapter 5, I do this partially because of the document's own confusion 
on this distinction, and also because, as a result of this confusion, I think lumping all the various threads together 
helps to bear light on the importance of these issues in the document. 
40 "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 4. 
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contributing to the “population and development” equation, even this theme risks getting under-
played or dissipated). 
 Unfortunately, in addition to the risk of being missed in the broad web of factors brought 
into interrelation in this text, the vision of sex/gender, as offered by the document, should be 
regarded with caution. Most importantly, the document fluctuates between, conflates, and 
equivocates in its use of the terms “sex” and “gender.” According to most academic treatments 
of this distinction, “sex” refers to differences rooted in biology, and thus reported as “male” and 
“female,” whereas “gender” indicates more socially constructed differences, and thus demarcated 
as “men” and “women.” Thus, “women should not seek employment outside the home” is a 
statement first and foremost about “gender,” while “we need to improve our admissions process 
because, right now, only 40% of our incoming class is female” is a statement about “sex.” In the 
world of population specifically, a clear vision about these two categories is especially 
important, as the biological body is involved in the discussion, as well as the socially constructed 
notions about the body.  
“Education” 
Finally, “education” is integrated as a central component of development, with a primary 
and multi-directional relevance, in the Programme of Action. Education serves a variety of 
functions from the perspective of the Cairo conference. Importantly, education is seen as a means 
to further many of the other primary goals, including development, reproductive health, 
gender/sex equity. Also, education represents one of the strategies for building support for the 
worldview and programmes of this document, as the reference to the cluster "information, 
education and communication" is used when discussing how public attitudes can be cultivated in 
favor of the recommendations of this Programme of Action (a theme to which I return in the next 
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section). Finally, education is called into service as one of the best methods for achieving the 
demographic goals of the document: 
The relationship between education and demographic and social changes is one of 
interdependence.  There is a close and complex relationship among education, 
marriage age, fertility, mortality, mobility and activity.  The increase in the 
education of women and girls contributes to greater empowerment of women, to a 
postponement of the age of marriage and to a reduction in the size of families.  
When mothers are better educated, their children's survival rate tends to increase.  
Broader access to education is also a factor in internal migration and the 
composition of the working population.41 
As suggested in this passage, many of the calls for improvements in education are geared 
specifically toward women and girls. 
Wither “Population?” 
Finally, given the overall focus of the document, and its widely divergent and 
multifaceted approaches and recommendations, one might ask whether the "population" 
component of the discussion still serves any usefulness. That is, if the discussion previously 
framed under the umbrella term “population” is more usefully considered in the spheres of 
education, women’s rights, health, and other related factors, and if improvement of those factors 
would necessarily fix any population/demographic “problem,” is there any reason to continue to 
have “population” as a separate set of public arguments? While I engage this question more fully 
in chapter five, I want to point to at least two reasons, in the context of the 1994 Cairo 
Programme of Action, that suggest on the part of conference participants a justification for 
                                                 
41 "Report of the ICPD," Para 11.3. 
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maintaining a focus on "population" at any level. First, the document makes suggestions as to 
why, though many of the goals could be achieved without a specific focus on population, the 
overall work is strengthened by focusing on both population and development: 
While . . . success can be facilitated by developments in the overall social and 
economic context, and by success in other development efforts, population and 
development are intrinsically interrelated and progress in any component can 
catalyse improvement in others.  The many facets of population relate to many 
facets of development.42 
Similarly, one of the objectives of the document is "To incorporate population concerns 
in all relevant national development strategies, plan, policies and programmes."43 Thus, far from 
trying to dissolve population into an array of other concerns, the Cairo document advocates for 
the importance of continuing to maintain a focus on population specifically, alongside a number 
of other concerns. The second, and rather ironic reason for maintaining a focus on "population" 
specifically is that the quantitative language of demography infuses the document. For instance, 
early in chapter one, the document suggests, "the world's nations by their actions or inactions 
will choose from among a range of alternative demographic futures."44 The document then 
breaks down low, medium, and high global population projections, and argues, "implementation 
of the goals and objectives contained in the present 20-year Programme of Action" are vital in 
ensuring "world population growth during this period and beyond at levels below the United 
Nations medium projection."45 Similarly, the document argues for "the crucial contribution that 
                                                 
42 "Report of the ICPD," Para 13.2. 
43 "Report of the ICPD," Para 13.4, Subsection A. 
44 "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.4. 
45 "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.4. 
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early stabilization of the world population would make towards the achievement of sustainable 
development."46 Finally, the document provides as one objective "to facilitate the demographic 
transition as soon as possible in countries where there is an imbalance between demographic 
rates and social, economic and environmental goals . . . This process will contribute to the 
stabilization of the world population."47 This is ironic given the memorializing of the Cairo 
conference in particular as a break from such quantitative, demographic analysis (as indicated, 
for instance, by the passages cited in chapter 1).    
Having now examined how development and demographics are cast in the Programme of 
Action, I turn next to a discussion of significant conceptual cross currents in the document, as 
expressed in recurring phrases such as “information, education and communication activities.”  
2.3.2.2 Conceptual Entailments of Calls for “Communication” 
While this issue is common to all five texts explored in this dissertation project, Cairo is 
particularly prominent, for it is in the Programme of Action that terms suggesting a rhetorically 
informed approach to the issue of population (rhetoric, persuasion, argument, debate, and similar 
terms) are avoided, and we are instead left with neologisms and the appearance of 
“communication” references that only partially fill the void. This is not simply an issue of 
refusing to use the terminology that I, as a rhetorician, would prefer to see. It is noteworthy, as 
indicated in Chapter 1, that in the field of IR, not only scholars but also (as these documents 
suggest) practitioners appear to have some residual distrust of the term “rhetoric.” However, in 
the US and around the world, the word “rhetoric” as a term is largely misunderstood or not 
                                                 
46 "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.11. 
47 "Report of the ICPD," Para 6.3. 
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familiar at all. Even then, replacements like “persuasion,” a much more universally recognized 
term, would be suitable to the task. In fact, the documents could even use the umbrella term 
“communication” in such a way that indicated a particular conception that included components 
related to rhetoric and persuasion. Therefore, my critique is not a clamoring for the term 
“rhetoric” solely for the sake of seeing the term on paper. Rather, my concern is the documents’ 
refusal to see the tasks called for in the recommendations for action, which invite (and at times 
demand) the global community’s participation, as essentially concerned with the types of 
knowledge about which rhetoric has something to say. Instead, as I suggest below, the 
entailments of “communication,” as represented in these texts generally and in the Cairo 
Programme of Action, become flattened and in important ways misguided. This moment of 
“ships passing in the night” leads to a “global” (figurative-academic) confusion over categories 
of knowledge. While not precisely the “social knowledge” described by Thomas Farrell, a type 
of common knowledge to which Aristotle thought you must appeal in the art of rhetoric, many of 
the activities for which the Programme of Action calls refer to knowledge that inhabits more of 
the province of doxa than episteme.48  
Cairo’s Programme of Action demonstrates some degree of reflexivity in its 
acknowledgment of the need for communication strategies to promote its goal, but it falls short 
conceptually by miscategorizing the types of knowledge claims involved. As suggested above, 
the term “rhetoric,” as well as many of its cousins, does not appear at all in any of the five 
documents, but again, I am not concerned first and foremost with the writers’ use of my 
                                                 
48 Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 
62, no. 1 (1976): 1-14. 
 84 
terminology.49 Instead, the most frequent phrase employed by the Programme of Action to 
suggest the role of communication in advancing its goals and recommendations is "information, 
education and communication" (often abbreviated in the IR and UN literature as IEC). Without 
ever being explicitly defined, a definition by contextual inference suggests that these “IEC” 
activities aim to accomplish the sort of work that we would typically refer to as the role of 
rhetoric. For instance, the document calls for “information, education, and communication 
activities” in areas like increasing acceptance for education for girls, or IEC activities for sharing 
family responsibilities in a more gender-equitable fashion within the family. In each case, we 
must consider what the nature of the “problem” is that IEC is designed to solve or ameliorate. 
For instance, when calling for accepting education for girls, is the implication that those who do 
not currently accept the idea are suffering from a deficit of information? When we call for gender 
equity in a family is the idea that men are unaware that women have other things to do besides 
housework? My sense is that we would say “no” on both accounts. Instead, when we say that we 
want more acceptance for girls to receive education, we are indicating that communication as 
persuasion needs to occur to move those who are opposed to at least less opposed, and those who 
are ambivalent to become supportive. And it seems similar with gender equity in the family. 
What is at stake here is a conceptual division between informational knowledge and doxa. If 
these problems existed in the realm of informational knowledge (perhaps the closest equivalent 
would be Aristotle’s classification of episteme, roughly translated as scientific knowledge), the 
implication would be that, on the whole, people are completely unaware, for instance, that there 
are arguments for gender equality in familial responsibilities or in sexual equality in educational 
                                                 
49 However, it is worth considering that this complete absence of "rhetoric" may be suggestive of a) a 
continuation of the Platonic distrust of rhetoric and sophistry, and/or b) evidence that not only IR scholars but also 
IR practitioners have artificially limited out rhetoric from other aspects like argument, communication, and 
education activities. 
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opportunities. Thus, what is not needed is a “syringe” with all of the bits of data that, upon 
reception and decoding, will transform the perspectives of those who do not already hold such 
attitudes and/or embody such attitudes in their daily practices.50 Instead, such activities fall 
distinctly within, what Chaim Perelman once called the “realm of rhetoric,” which, among other 
things, includes suasory activities aimed to maintain or modify particular doxa (popular 
opinion).51 Similarly, as Aristotle says that rhetoric relates to that category of knowledge that is 
contingent and could be otherwise, the types of issues on which the Programme of Action calls 
for “information” exist in the vast expanse of knowledge characterized by the ancient Greek 
tradition of dissoi logoi, literally translating as “different words,” but suggesting that, on most 
issues, there are (at least) two perspectives.52 By reading more closely, then, it becomes clear 
                                                 
50 This concern bears implications for the literature on public understanding of science. In particular, those 
accounts which tend to operate on a “deficit model” tend to oversimplify and sidestep the tasks facing any attempt to 
account for science in “extra-scientific” communities. It also represents a valuable analogy between the nature of the 
conference calls and the response of target communities. For more on public understanding of science and the deficit 
model, see, for instance, Alan G. Gross,  “The Roles of Rhetoric in the Public Understanding of Science,” Public 
Understanding of Science 3, no. 1 (1994): 3-23, and Patrick Sturgis and Nick Allum, “Science in Society: Re-
Evaluating the Deficit Model of Public Attitudes,” Public Understanding of Science 13, no. 1 (2004): 55-74. 
51 Chaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press). Perelman is 
an excellent figure in which we can begin to think about convergence between rhetorical and argumentation theory. 
Many argumentation theorists are quick to draw from The New Rhetoric because, apart from the first few sections 
(and despite its title), the remainder (and majority overall) of the text is devoted to specific argument schemes and 
strategies. I believe that The Realm of Rhetoric, in addition to those initial framing sections in The New Rhetoric, 
help us to better understand Perelman both in terms of argumentation theory and rhetorical theory, rather than 
merely one or the other.  
52 For more on dissoi logoi, see, for instance, Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach 
to Social Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Such an understanding of the types of 
information and communication involved links with Risse’s discussion of “cheap talk” and the “logic of arguing.” In 
the current form, many of the calls and recommendations in this text, especially for societal change such as gender 
equality in education and employment, risk coming across to target audiences as “cheap talk” in the sense suggested 
used in IR: communication that is “cheap” insofar as it risks nothing for the person sending it and asks for changes 
only on the part of the audience. This perspective is the one that Risse unfortunately terms “rhetorical,” but it really 
is neither pro-argument nor pro-rhetoric. Instead, by appearing to represent no “self-risk” to the parties initiating the 
calls for change (ie delegates to the conference) people in local communities might remain unconvinced (and thus, 
for instance, decline to interrogate gender roles in their communities). While problematic, the document also at 
times positions communication as a means of opening participation, which could conceivably match the vision of 
“argument” offered by Risse. 
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that IEC, in its clustering with recommendations, suggests the realm of doxa, but in its framing, 
comes across as operating in the realm of episteme.53  
Not only do IEC activities ultimately work to convince people to change attitudes and 
behaviors, but they also serving as a prerequisite for public participation:  
Effective information, education and communication are prerequisites for 
sustainable human development and pave the way for attitudinal and behavioural 
change.  Indeed, this begins with the recognition that decisions must be made 
freely, responsibly and in an informed manner, on the number and spacing of 
children and in all other aspects of daily life, including sexual and reproductive 
behaviour.  Greater public knowledge and commitment in a democratic setting 
create a climate conducive to responsible and informed decisions and behaviour.  
Most important, they also pave the way for democratic public discussion and 
thereby make possible strong political commitment and popular support for 
needed action at the local, national and international levels.54 
Pointing to what Joseph Wenzel describes as “argument as procedure” and “argument as 
process,” and what Douglas Ehninger describes as “argument as method,” the Programme 
                                                 
53 In addition to considering the conceptual entailments of “communication” and “information,” we would 
also be aided by assessing the force of the term “education.” As Mitchell and Kirk note, in applying the work of 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca to the controversies surrounding presidential libraries, “education” differs from 
“propaganda” in marked ways. They explain, “According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, education involves the 
epideictic transmission of commonly accepted values to audiences predisposed to embrace community norms and 
traditions, whereas propaganda operates in the realm of the contingent, where uncertain or incomplete knowledge 
creates conditions ripe for controversy.” (214-215) While conference delegates may believe in the values enshrined 
in the Cairo Programme of Action to such a degree that there is no uncertainty, the people out in the world see many 
of these matters (for instance, birth control, education, reproductive health and rights) as more fittingly in the realm 
of the contingent and the controversial. For instance, people who do not think that girls should receive an education 
will not respond to “information, education, and communication activities” insofar as they do not already embrace 
the norms in the Programme of Action, but will rather see them as propaganda and will have to be persuaded on the 
level of propaganda (and rhetoric), not information, education, or communication. 
54 "Report of the ICPD," Para 11.12. 
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addresses the importance of debates, on all levels, to create progress on the issues raised by the 
Cairo Conference. In writing on the importance of various "information, education and 
communication" technologies, the document notes: 
They can help ensure that the vast majority of the world's people are involved in 
debates at the local, national and global levels about demographic changes and 
sustainable human development, economic and social inequities, the importance 
of empowering women, reproductive health and family planning, health 
promotion, ageing populations, rapid urbanization and migration.55 
Furthermore, the document also suggests specific rhetorically-oriented situations that call for 
oratorical action on the part of leaders: "Leaders at all levels of the society must speak out and 
act forcefully against patterns of gender discrimination within the family, based on preference for 
sons."56 Here, then, is another paradox. The document categorizes problems of doxa as problems 
of information and education, but at the same time, appears to recognize, to a greater degree than 
either Bucharest or Mexico City, that the potential influence of its recommendations and calls 
will ultimately depend on public advocacy and effective rhetorical strategies. This paradox, 
along with companion threads, combines to form an overarching rhetorical quandary for Cairo 
conferees (and, by extension, their peers from each of the other conferences).  
2.3.2.3 Negotiating the Rhetorical Quandary 
Cairo, as well as its companion conferences, faces a multifaceted rhetorical quandary. 
First, with a state-centered system of international relations, the UN cannot enforce policy, 
                                                 
55 "Report of the ICPD," Para 11.14. 
56 "Report of the ICPD," Para 4.17. 
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outside of limited capabilities in situations of warfare and genocide. Therefore, to the degree that 
any of their recommendations take hold, it is not because anybody was required to do so, but 
rather because of the rhetorical effectiveness of the crafted argument. Second, in order to 
generate this kind of rhetorical support internationally, the conferees are generally in a better 
position to use arguments that appear scientific, rational, and fact-based (i.e. IEC and my claims 
about episteme), and thus by presenting stable, clear findings. This type of appeal has been 
described as “anti-rhetoric” insofar as appeals that appear non-rhetorical (or that even openly 
disavow their status as rhetoric) function persuasively as well.57 However, as explained in the 
previous section, the best hope for responding to the relevant exigencies rests in the realm of 
doxa, contingency, and rhetoric. Conferees thus end up weighing the potential for funding, 
acceptance of the Programme of Action, and instrumental achievement, against the recognition 
of the social, argumentation-oriented nature of the problems being considered and the support for 
creating appropriate solutions. Thus they appear to use the apparent opposite of rhetoric (solid, 
stable, scientific truths) in relation to problems that are ultimately tied fundamentally to rhetoric.  
Third, and again in order to negotiate the rhetorical situation, conferees end up presenting 
what appears to be a finished product, ready for acceptance and implementation. However, the 
Programme of Action, if taken seriously, is at best a precursor to improving the population 
problem, since democratic deliberation and participation will ultimately be required, not just to 
implement the vision of the conference, but to create meaning and internalize a vision of 
population that resonates with the needs of communities of all scales (an understanding of the 
nature of the document that is openly expressed in the document). Fourth and finally, conferees 
                                                 
57 Michael C. McGee and John R. Lyne, “What Are Nice Folks Like You Doing in a Place Like This?: 
Some Entailments of Treating Epistemic Claims Rhetorically," in The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language 
and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs, ed. John S. Nelson, et al. (Madison: University of Wisconsin): 
381-406.  
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must negotiate a dialectic that, on the one hand, asserts that debate is over and the population 
controversy is closed, and on the other hand, making calls for action while realizing that there are 
still significant points of disagreement about, or at least different perspectives regarding, public 
argument over population. Shutting the door completely closed means that the only role for 
public deliberation and participation is to implement what has already been universally agreed 
upon and resolved, and faces the recalcitrance that there are still many, such as a prominent 
portion of the Catholic Church, that still has concerns over the promotion of birth control. 
Leaving the door completely open, however, casts doubts on the ability of one conference to put 
forth any clear recommendations because all elements of the issue are still on the table for 
debate, deliberation, dialogue, endorsement, and/or revision. This tension of openness and 
closure is best seen in recent years with the Intelligent Design controversy, wherein scientists 
and educators largely respond rhetorically with the idea that there is no controversy, that 
everyone who knows science knows that evolution is beyond question, whereas ID advocates 
promote, as an intrinsic good, keeping the rhetorical space open for debate, discussion, and 
deliberation. Such dialectical tension is also now expressed in the global warming controversy, 
where assertions of consensus and unanimity that 1) global warming is happening, and 2) global 
warming is anthropogenic are debated, with warming advocates frequently asserting but not 
entirely succeeding at achieving closure on these questions. One way in which the document 
works to minimize the appearance of any disagreement is by sanitizing controversy and thus 
minimizing the role for argument (which, in terms of the dilemma articulated above, suggests 
more of an endorsement of the “debate is over” position).58  
                                                 
58 Notably, the efforts at “sanitizing controversy” do more to cloud the situation than to advance it since 
such efforts obscure our ability to see that argument is at stake. For instance, the following conditions, enumerated 
by Risse as one Habermasian vision of argumentation, all are apparently absent from the scene:  
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One defining aspect of these conference documents, which helps to understand them as a 
genre, and which separates them from the genre of legal decisions, is that they do not engage in 
explicit refutation. Perhaps in an extreme situation of Aristotle’s enthymeme, the reader must 
supply all of the interlocutors who may posit counter-points against the claims of the document. 
While there was clearly controversy and refutation in the debates and deliberations that led to 
this document, and while there was controversy and debate in the scene surrounding the 
document, before, during, and after it was produced (in other words, in argument as procedure 
and argument as process), the document itself (“argument” as product) appears sanitized of any 
controversy, leading to a spirit of glee, perhaps triumphalism, about the “consensus” (implying 
unanimity and a lack of division) achieved at Cairo. Indeed, participants, activists, and scholars, 
all point with great satisfaction to the achievement of consensus at Cairo. Given this sanitation, 
can we say that the document, by its own construction, engages in “argumentation” in any 
meaningful sense of the term?  In “Rhetorical Criticism as Argument,” Wayne Brockriede 
enumerates the basic conditions necessary to consider something as an “argument”:  
By “argument” I mean the process whereby a person reasons his way from one 
idea to the choice of another idea. This concept of argument implies five generic 
characteristics: (1) an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative 
statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well 
as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Argumentative rationality also 
implies that the participants in a discourse are open to being persuaded by the better argument and 
that relationships of power and social hierarchies recede in the background. Argumentative and 
deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interaction, but the goal is not to attain one’s 
fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus. Actors’ interests, preferences, and the 
perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed, but subject to discursive challenges. Where 
argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their given interests 
and preferences, but to challenge and to justify the validity claims inherent in them—and they are 
prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument. 
Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 7. 
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new belief or the reinforcement of an old one; (2) a perceived rationale to justify 
that leap; (3) a choice among two or more competing claims; (4) a regulation of 
uncertainty in relation to the selected claim—since someone has made an 
inferential leap, certainty can be neither zero nor total; and (5) a willingness to 
risk a confrontation of that claim with one’s peers.59 
In light of this definition of “argument,” can we define the Programme of Action as engaging in 
this model of “argument”? Based on the formal text of the Programme of Action, it would appear 
not. First, there is, because of the sanitizing of any element of controversy, no “inferential leap” 
and, by the way it is written, it appears that “certainty” is “total.” There are theoretically 
“choices” among “competing claims,” but there appear to be no coherent, viable arguments 
against the claims made by the document, thus offering no genuine choice. Finally, and reflective 
of the writing as sanitizing that occurs, it appears that there is no “risking” behavior, given the 
style of the document.  
 One specific strategy that the Cairo Programme of Action employs to make its claims 
appear uncontroversial is through the strategic use of precedent. In legal decisions, one of the 
most important aspects of the written decision is the use of precedent to justify the decision at 
hand. From a rhetorical perspective, the use of precedent is selective and driven by persuasive 
considerations. It is not a technical procedure of merely letting the facts (or in this case, the 
precedents) speak for themselves. Instead, precedents get packaged into a well (or in some cases, 
not so well) constructed argument. As Kenneth Burke explains:  
                                                 
59 Wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," The Quarterly Journal of Speech 60 (1974): 
166. 
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[A]fter a few decades when a sufficient number and variety of precedents had 
been amassed, the Court could ground its choice of "mandatory" decisions in a 
corresponding choice of precedents, by selecting the particular kind of precedent 
that best substantiated, or rationalized, the favored decision. Reference to 
precedent could thus function as reference to the extra-Constitutional scene; but in 
appearance such decisions were purely internal to the traditions of Constitutional 
law.60 
While consensus-driven, international conference documents are in many ways different from 
legal decisions (many more authors involved, the sense of "judgment" is very different, legal 
rhetoric is typically understood as forensic rhetoric, while conference documents tend, on the 
whole, to be more representative of deliberative rhetoric), the reliance on precedent provides a 
common link between the two.61 Throughout the Cairo Programme of Action, many references 
are made to other conference documents, as well as a number of important international 
protocols, agreements, and documents. The use of precedent in conference documents serves at 
least two important rhetorical functions (both of which are shared in the use of precedent for 
judicial purposes). First, prudent use of precedent bolsters the credibility (ethos) of the document 
                                                 
60 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 379. 
61 This distinction among deliberative, forensic, and epideictic is challenged, in the context of United 
Nations argument, by Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp. They argue:  
Our call here is for a rather dramatic rethinking of argumentative debate processes. The Aristotlean 
emphasis on deliberation to select action is supplanted by a moral deliberation that is productive of 
common values that can guide behavior. Different principles of argumentation follow from the altered goal 
of deliberation. The process is a texture of argument that shares, in Aristotlean terms, epideictic and even 
some forensic characteristics. We wish to affirm, however, that an argument is productive that generates a 
basis for judgments of legitimacy and will become increasingly powerful as legitimacy of action is affirmed 
as an expectation of international behavior. 
Patricia Riley, Thomas Hollihan, and James F. Klumpp, “On Taking the UN Seriously as a Site for Public 
Arguments: Does the UN Have a Role in the 21st Century?” in Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the 
International Society for the Study of Argumentation (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), edited by Frans H. van Eemeren, 
et al., 1169. 
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at hand. By placing the current document in connection with other well-established conferences 
and documents, the document's credibility is heightened, as it is seen to be building upon a rich 
foundation rather than coming out of nowhere. Second, the use of precedent safeguards against 
allegations that the current document is trying to create some new, controversial claim. For 
instance, in the context of both conference and legal rhetoric, one of the most important 
allegations against which authors would seek to safeguard is the claim that new rights are being 
manufactured/created in the document.62 Toward the end of the preamble, the Programme of 
Action makes clear that it is not creating something new but rather affirming what has already 
been agreed upon: "While the International Conference on Population and Development does not 
create any new international human rights, it affirms the application of universally recognized 
human rights standards to all aspects of population programmes."63 Precedent also carries some 
of the same structural, behind-the-scenes functions for conferences as it does for legal reasoning. 
As Singh notes, one of the enduring conflicts from Bucharest onward has been the phrase 
"couples and individuals," as in, for instance, "All couples and individuals have the basic right to 
decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the 
information, education and means to do so."64 A number of cultural and religious conservatives 
have continually objected to the "and individuals" clause, believing that issues relating to 
reproduction and sexuality should be limited to married couples. As Singh explains, however, the 
fact that this argument had already been won prior to Cairo (namely, at Bucharest) made it easier 
to keep it as is, rather than to entertain seriously a major change. 
                                                 
62 For more on this point, see Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population. 
63 "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.15. 
64 "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 8. 
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 Despite the uncontroversial appearance, many opponents were quick to attack, in 
significant ways, the new “Cairo consensus.” For instance, as Frances Kissling notes, the Vatican 
ratcheted up its opposition to birth control as a result of the framing of “reproductive health as a 
human right”:  
[A]t the 1994 conference, . . . the UN for the first time framed the right to 
reproductive health as a human right. The shift was unwelcome news inside the 
Vatican—where the conservative Pope John Paul II had begun to dismantle some 
of the reforms of the ‘60s—and it hardened the church’s resolve. Suddenly, 
opposition to contraception became almost as high a priority as battling abortion. . 
. . Even US bishops, who had pretty much ignored contraception for 20 years, 
began a fresh effort to persuade American Catholics.65 
Patricia Roberts-Miller, in Deliberate Conflict, challenges the emphasis on overly polite, 
consensual models of argument, at least to the extent that they are not contextualized as 
representing particular theories of argument. In her framework, the liberal model of deliberation 
is one of the most dispassionate, rational, and least agonistic, forms of argument. In this context, 
the Programme of Action, if read in a vacuum, seems even more sterile than the liberal model. 
Of course, the irony of this, as explained by numerous commentators, is that Cairo as a 
conference both was and is controversial, to the point of agonism, giving an odd perspective by 
incongruity between the textual evidence of the conference (as represented in the Programme of 
                                                 
65 Frances Kissling, “Close Your Eyes and Think of Rome,” Mother Jones (May/June 2010), 
http://motherjones.com/print/53181 (accessed July 22, 2010). While Kissling emphasizes a sharp division between 
the Catholic Church and the Cairo Conference, many others, including Singh, Schechter, as well as Catholic Voices, 
have pointed to points of convergence, rather than divergence, between the church and the conference. See Catholic 
Voices, Catholics and Cairo: A Common Language (Washington, DC: Catholic Voices, 1999). 
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Action) and the “scene” of the conference (such as a media circus around the myth that the 
conference was trying to create an international “right to abortion”).  
Finally, in order to further bolster its uncontroversial nature, and because of the genre of 
these international texts, there is very little direct citation of evidence to support broad based 
claims, such as “experience shows X” or “history has demonstrated that X.”66 In some ways, this 
could be classified as an example of the classic begging the question fallacy. However, in 
begging the question, the arguer is assuming the conclusion that they need to prove. Here, the 
arguer (or, since it is not a person, the text) is assuming the evidence that fits their conclusion. 
The closest parallel to this in the fallacy literature is a little discussed fallacy known as “proof 
surrogate.” In proof surrogate, the arguer uses broad claims like “everybody knows” or “we all 
believe this, don’t we” rather than actually supply evidence to demonstrate those claims. This 
classification seems vital, given how frequently such claims are made in contemporary discourse, 
especially in politics. However, rhetoricians and argumentation theorists have been slow to 
utilize such an analytically useful concept. Even if it is classified as a special case of the begging 
the question fallacy, it is still analytically distinct and deserves more treatment from the rhetoric 
and argumentation scholarly communities.  
These indications that suggest a lack of possibility of/for argumentation, as the texts are 
configured, again indicate the possibility that, in order to generate resources and actions in a 
timely manner, there was an interest in attempting to demonstrate closure on any remaining 
                                                 
66 As I suggest throughout this dissertation, some elements of these conference texts are most profitably 
understood as elements of the genre. It could be argued that the lack of citations to support something like “history 
has demonstrated that X” might be just one of these generic constraints. However, even if this is the case, it still 
merits an interrogation of the element of the genre, since certain components of genre may be more or less 
enriching. As one (albeit extreme) example, even though one defining characteristic of war rhetoric is dehumanize 
the enemy (sometimes even in racist ways), a rhetorical critic can both understand the way in which it figures into 
genre and provide a negative judgment in rejecting such dehumanizing rhetoric. 
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points of controversy. Unfortunately, Burkean recalcitrance, on issues such as religion, made 
such closure impossible, despite claims that unanimity had created the “Cairo Consensus.” 
Besides side-stepping particular points of controversy, the Programme of Action gains much 
rhetorical purchase by (re-) configuring the universal-particular dialectic.  
2.3.2.4 The Universal-Particular Dialectic 
Michael Leff argues that all rhetoric is about configuring the universal-particular 
dialectic, and the ICPD Programme of Action is no exception, as it focuses heavily on reworking 
the universal-particular dialectic in population and development issues. In many of its goals, the 
document stresses the need to meet X goal "for all people." However, in addition to these 
obviously universal declarations, and usually following directly after them, the document 
reintroduces and highlights particulars for special emphasis. For instance, Principle 10 of the 
document opens, "Everyone has the right to education, which shall be directed to the full 
development of human resources, and human dignity and potential, with particular attention to 
women and the girl child."67 In this way, the document makes a universal call and then indicates 
particular cases meriting special attention. In this example, and in many cases in the document, 
the universal ("everyone") is noted, but then the particular ("with particular attention to women 
and the girl child") is included, gesturing to the international community that, while these issues 
deserve treatment for all, particular parties have unique needs that require additional emphasis. 
In fact, one of the most interesting, repeated uses of this "universal plus particular" framing 
strategy is the call addressed to countries of the world: "All countries should recognize their 
                                                 
67 "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 10. 
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common but differentiated responsibilities."68 This statement, or its very similar counterpart, 
"shared but differentiated responsibilities," can be found in a number of places in the document, 
and indicates an awareness of the difficulties posed by purely universal or purely particular 
rhetorical directives. The most perplexing, or at the very least, most complicated, reworking of 
universal-particular comes in terms of respecting individual cultures but also pressing forward on 
items of universal recognition. For instance, the document suggests that actions on population 
and development should, "with full respect for various religious and ethical values and cultural 
backgrounds of each country's peoples, adhere to basic human rights recognized by the 
international community."69 In some ways, this may be relatively insignificant language. 
However, in cultural situations in which gender, racial, or ethnic dynamics are hotly contested, 
the document appears to uphold simultaneously what may be (at least potentially) contradictory 
visions: fully respecting values and cultures of every country's peoples, and also upholding 
international visions of human rights.70 This idea of simultaneously promoting potentially 
contradictory values mirrors Burke’s observations about constitutions being able to create 
“generalized wishes”:  
A constitution may, for instance, propound a set of generalized rights or duties, 
and all these may be considered as a grand promissory unity, a panspermia in 
which they all exist together in perfect peace and amity. Yet when, in the realm of 
the practical, a given case comes before the courts, you promptly find that this 
merger or balance or equilibrium among the Constitutional clauses becomes 
                                                 
68 "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 15. 
69 "Report of the ICPD," Para 14.3.  
70 Along with the discussion of precedents in this chapter, I provide more analysis of the similarities 
between Burke's constitutions and international conference documents in chapter 5. 
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transformed into a conflict among the clauses—and to satisfy the promise 
contained in one clause, you must forego the promise contained in another.71 
Again, by reworking the universal-particular dialectic, the document again elides controversy by 
assuming that, for instance, there is no conflict between religious and ethical and cultural values, 
and international human rights.  
While the document mutes and downplays controversy, it does suggest that public 
participation is both a method of setting the agenda for ongoing population policy and 
communication, as well as a means of implementing specific, particular goals. Though still 
incomplete, and falling prey to similar problems suggested above, the text’s treatment of public 
deliberation and participation, and of deliberative democracy, in pursuit of the conference goals, 
is promising.   
2.3.2.5 Participatory Population Politics 
The Cairo Programme of Action envisions public participation on two levels: the agents 
called to action in the document utilizing participatory procedures and processes to engage 
broader publics, and these actors recruiting organizations that can then engage in participatory 
politics. Therefore, it would be fair to say that the ICPD envisions an array of agents, even an 
army, to carry out its recommendations and to achieve its goals. Also, the document actively 
courts non-governmental organizations to play fundamental roles in population and development 
activities. Chapter 15, "Partnership with the Non-Governmental Sector," is, as the title suggests, 
devoted entirely to the role of non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, the title of the 
chapter positions the role of NGOs as "partners" rather than some more diminished, 
                                                 
71 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 349. 
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hierarchically-determined role. Furthermore, the document envisions a role that starts at the 
initial formulation role all the way through programme evaluation:  
To address the challenges of population and development effectively, broad and 
effective partnership is essential between Governments and non-governmental 
organizations (comprising not-for-profit groups and organizations at the local, 
national and international levels) to assist in the formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of population and development objectives and 
activities.72 
In this passage, the Programme of Action calls for participation by an array of actors throughout 
society. Reflecting a post-Cold War environment, major Cold War powers (such as the United 
States and Russia) have no notable opposition to a bottom-up approach to policymaking, even 
when that policy may spillover into transnational and international effects. During the Cold War, 
the United States was willing to encourage parties in the USSR to “rise up” and use a bottom-up 
approach to take hold of society, while no doubt parties in the USSR would have been happy for 
a domestic uprising in the West. However, in those contexts, neither party was particularly 
thrilled about a destabilized, networked, and decentralized set of actors involved in policymaking 
in the public sphere in their own countries. Potentially anticipating the ascent of the Internet and 
information forces in society that would make a traditional, top-down transmission model 
unsustainable, major powers were happy to encourage NGOs, and moreover all possible parties 
at the local, national, and international  level, to seize power to change the structure and 
policymaking of society.  
                                                 
72 "Report of the ICPD," 15.1. 
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2.3.2.6 Assessing Cairo’s Kairos 
 Depending on the theorist, kairos and to prepon, opportune timing and appropriateness, 
are either two distinct concepts, or both are components of kairos. In some articulations, kairos is 
seen as being appropriate to the conventions as they are already assembled, while in more radical 
formulations, kairos involves the daring rhetor who we could only understand in retrospect as 
being kairotic.73 In contrast to traditional understandings of kairos that understand kairos, in 
relation to rhetoric, as being the ability of a rhetor to seize an a situation at the opportune 
moment, or with opportune timing, in order to create the optimal conditions for rhetorical 
success, I suggest that kairos may be as driven by the realm of the symbolic as by the realm of 
the material. In response to Lloyd Bitzer’s claim in “The Rhetorical Situation” that rhetorical 
situations necessarily referred to material situations, and could not be “cooked up” through 
discourse alone, Richard Vatz pointed to the ways in which rhetors could in fact create and 
shape, rather than merely put forth a “fitting response” to rhetorical situations.74 In a similar 
vein, I want to argue that kairos, or the opportune moment, can be constructed and then fulfilled 
by the speaker. For instance, civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and others, 
needed to create a sense of urgency in order to generate momentum for change, and thus spoke 
such tropes as “the fierce urgency of now.” After creating the conditions wherein the timing was 
now opportune, they could then aim to respond to the moment of kairos that they had created. 
Similarly, John F. Kennedy’s call for being the first to put a human on the moon first created the 
exigence, or the opportune timing, and then answered the call rhetorically.  
                                                 
73 Carolyn R. Miller, “Foreword,” and Phillip Sipiora, “Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos,” in 
Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, Eds. Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin (Albany, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).  
74 In gesturing toward “cooked up,” I allude to Plato’s conceptualization of rhetoric as mere “cookery.” 
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 To a greater extent than Bucharest or Mexico City, Cairo’s Programme of Action, as a 
very reflexive document, aims to create a sense of opportunity, timing, and urgency, which it 
then hopes to fulfill through the course of the document. Both because of the point in history 
when the conference occurred, and because its population efforts did not exist in a vacuum, the 
document needed to address history, both in the broad sense of its moment in history and the 
history of UN population efforts. Consistent with the timing of the conference, occurring against 
the backdrop of newly hopeful post-Cold War international scene, it is no surprise that the 
attitude of possibility and optimism prevails in the document. For instance, the very first 
sentence of the preamble notes that the Cairo Conference "occurs at a defining moment in the 
history of international cooperation."75 Similarly, the document claims that the 1994 conference 
represents "the last opportunity in the twentieth century for the international community to 
collectively address the critical challenges and interrelationships between population and 
development."76 In the intervening years since the conference, the near-euphoria associated with 
the possibilities of a new international relations structure have faded, but one detects in the 
document an understanding of the possibilities that existed, even if only momentarily. In fact, 
this very moment of hope appeared to undermine the realpolitik vision of international relations 
that insisted on self-interest and constant danger, and of individual nation-states, in conflict with 
other nation-states, as being the only, or at least primary, actors. Beyond the specifics of the 
moment, however, the self-reflective understanding of the Cairo Conference's moment in a larger 
history carries important rhetorical functions. 
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Rhetorically, Cairo had to walk a fine line in its treatment of the past- for instance, in 
terms of progress achieved and problems remaining. Since most international observers would 
recognize Cairo as being part of a broader trajectory that included Bucharest and Mexico City, 
Cairo needed to acknowledge the successes of the 1974 and 1984 conferences, but still provide 
justification for its own necessity.  Additionally, the rhetorical task became more difficult 
because, to over-sell the accomplishments of prior conferences would present, in the words of 
Kenneth Burke, a problem of "recalcitrance," as efforts to curb poverty, accelerate development, 
reduce health problems, and other similar efforts, had not been able to downplay, significantly 
reduce, or eliminate the ongoing, systemic prominence of these problems.77 
The overarching narrative of the preamble helps to provide clues for how Cairo was to 
deal with this dilemma. Early in the preamble, the document notes "significant progress in many 
fields," but also concedes the ongoing problems facing the international community.78 One of the 
ways that it attempts to shield previous conferences from blame for these ongoing problems is to 
make the argument that things have changed in substantial ways that require new approaches 
(which, of course, the participants at Bucharest and Mexico City could not have foreseen). Thus, 
even before promoting the "significant progress," the document notes how "the world has 
undergone far-reaching changes in the past two decades."79 Beyond arguing based on a change 
of situation, the document also attempts to contextualize the current state of affairs on some 
middle point of a continuum, rather than as overall success or overall failure: "Much has been 
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See, for instance, 255. 
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achieved . . . but more needs to be done."80 Nevertheless, the document does suggest significant 
positive changes in the intervening years since Bucharest and Mexico City, despite not naming 
them explicitly: 
[C]onsiderable changes . . . have taken place during the past two decades, 
particularly with the greater awareness of the magnitude, diversity and urgency of 
unmet needs. Countries that formerly attached minimal importance to population 
issues now recognize them at the core of their development challenge. 
International migration and AIDS, for instance, formerly matters of marginal 
concern to a few countries, are currently high-priority issues in a large number of 
countries.81 
In addition to situating itself in time and history, the document also has to deal with the 
persistently rhetorical concern of propriety or appropriateness. Interestingly, one of the important 
adjectives enlisted by the document and meant to guide activities carried out in the name of this 
Programme of Action, "appropriate," maps onto fundamentally rhetorical concerns. Aristotle's 
understanding of rhetoric as "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of 
persuasion," implies that certain strategies of persuasion are inappropriate for some contexts.82 In 
fact, some people have traced, in classical and contemporary contexts, a "rhetoric of propriety" 
and questions of "appropriateness" have always been significant for rhetoricians.83 While the 
ICPD Programme of Action is more explicitly concerned about appropriateness insofar as 
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programs should seek to avoid offending particular cultures' values, the principle is the same, 
and the awareness of "cultural propriety" also becomes, for the document, a moment of 
"rhetorical propriety." In the document, some variant on "appropriate" (appropriate, 
appropriately, inappropriate) appears exactly 100 times. Again, such an implicit understanding of 
the conditions for rhetorical appropriateness and effectiveness suggests the ways in which these 
documents would present themselves much more powerfully if they admitted of rhetoric, even if 
not calling it by its precise name. 
Propriety also relates to the style of the document. While never attempting to present 
itself as fully antirhetorical, the "style" of the document's rhetoric (or, more to the point, the 
apparent lack thereof), is indicative of a sense of propriety, related to a plain style that may help 
one to understand the rhetoric of conference/international documents more generally.84 Apart 
from some language in the preamble and the principles, there are very few rhetorical flourishes, 
few clear uses of metaphor, alliteration, or other stylized features that, in traditional public 
address, as well as in rhetoric and composition, become the defining rhetorical points of interest. 
In addition to the other varying uses of time and history in the document and the efforts 
to configure propriety, one of the most rhetorically effective uses is to point toward experiences 
in the past to show what does/does not work. Because of the already lengthy nature of the 
document, it would be out of place for a document of this type to cite specific studies (as it is, the 
procession of conference/document citing is cumbersome enough). Therefore, when the 
document references something like "history/experience shows", these claims have strong 
authoritative power, because they are not specifically refutable. For instance, in talking about the 
                                                 
84 As I suggest later, these characteristics may help to sketch a vision of the defining characteristics of a 
rhetorical genre. 
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importance of improving the status of women for population success, the document argues: 
"Experience shows that population and development programmes are most effective when steps 
have simultaneously been taken to improve the status of women."85 I do not mean to suggest that 
these claims are necessarily false or should be suspected as such, but rather point to the way in 
which evidentiary support becomes assumed and taken for granted rather than demonstrated. As 
suggested above, this type of rhetorical approach may be both evidence of a part of the genre, 
while also an expression of the “proof surrogate” fallacy. 
The possibility of a new, different rhetorical genre, as suggested by this text (and those 
explored in Chapters 3 and 4) is important for a few reasons. First, as Riley, Hollihan, and 
Klumpp note, the nation-state’s significance, vis a vis the international community,  is waning. 
Thus, we are likely to see an ever greater number of internationally-produced (and likely UN-
related) texts, for which our traditional tools of rhetorical analysis are currently poorly suited. 
Second, just as rhetoricians of science have taken on the task of understanding different 
components of scientific text as unique genres, so too does this offer a more systematic approach 
to understanding these documents without merely pointing out that they are rhetorical even if 
they appear not to be. The latter observation, while important, is unlikely to be a significant 
breakthrough for rhetoricians or argumentation theorists, and, insofar as it may be perceived as a 
moment of critical “debunking,” is likely to have a limited effect by broader audiences. 
2.3.2.7 Searching for a ‘Residual Message’ 
While there are many attractive elements to the comprehensive vision provided in these 
documents, and most especially, in the Programme of Action, a fully proportionalized rhetorical 
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account of these texts must also examine potential weaknesses or limitations of the 
comprehensiveness of the document. In Stephen Lucas' widely adopted public speaking 
textbook, he suggests the importance of having a clear "residual message" in one's speech: 
“Another way to think of the central idea is as your residual message—what you want your 
audience to remember after they have forgotten everything else in the speech.”86 In other words, 
one needs to have a clear and memorable position that, when stripped of linking details and 
parallel aspects, is both remembered and appreciated by audiences. For all of the many 
weaknesses of Malthus and Ehrlich, the residual messages in their positions are inescapably 
obvious. My claim is not that all rhetorical documents must be capable of being reduced to 10-
second sound bites, but they must have some memorable core or else they risk being forgotten or 
lost in the minds and actions of their audiences. The sheer length of the Cairo document is not 
necessarily a problem, but that its basic bottom line is the interconnectedness of countless 
sectors—from health to education to the environment, as but a few examples—makes it hard to 
isolate a consistent, substantive message that can be carried forward, remembered, and even 
strategically deployed in future contexts and situations.87 
This is particularly true given the contemporary information scene. As Richard A. 
Lanham notes:  
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So, we live in an “information economy.” But information is not in short supply 
in the new information economy. We’re drowning in it. What we lack is the 
human attention needed to make sense of it all. It will be easier to find our place 
in the new regime if we think of it as an economics of attention. Attention is the 
commodity in short supply.  . . . The devices that regulate attention are stylistic 
devices. Attracting attention is what style is all about. If attention is now at the 
center of the economy rather than stuff, then so is style. It moves from the 
periphery to the center. Style and substance trade places.88 
In gesturing for the need to understand style and attention as central rather than peripheral, 
Lanham explicitly references rhetoric as the domain where the attention economy most 
significantly takes place. He argues:  
“Rhetoric” has not always been a synonym for humbug. For most of Western 
history, it has meant the body of doctrine that teaches people how to speak and 
write and, thus, act effectively in public life. Usually defined as “the art of 
persuasion,” it might as well have been called “the economics of attention.” It 
tells us how to allocate our central scarce resource, to invite people to attend to 
what we would like them to attend to. Rhetoric has been the central repository of 
wisdom on how we make sense of and use information since the Greeks first 
invented it sometime in the middle of the last millennium before Christ.89 
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One might object by arguing that this “attention economy” is pertinent first and foremost to the 
public and private spheres, but that these conference texts represent the technical sphere, and 
thus the situation is different. Even in the technical sphere, scientists, politicians, bureaucrats, 
strategists, and countless other actors are equally bombarded with information, such that, like the 
rhetoric of science, even technical sphere actors need a “style” to convert information from raw 
substance to usable information. Also, as I suggest throughout this project, I am unconvinced 
that these texts, and more generally the conferences from which they emerge, are clearly 
disconnected from the public sphere.  
While my observations are rooted in the disciplinary domain of rhetoric, my analysis 
converges with, for instance, scholars primarily focused on the topical area of the Cairo 
conference, as well as scholars from the disciplinary domain of demography, who have similar 
interests in and reservations about the Programme of Action of the International Conference on 
Population and Development. Though their critique goes beyond the lack of a clear rhetorical 
residual message, and extends to the ways in which a broadened agenda harms the effort to 
prioritize goals in the context of finite resources, their concern about the broad expansion of the 
population agenda intersects with my concern regarding a lack of clear residual message. As 
John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner argue, “international population assistance has become 
increasingly unfocused, lacking in sensibly articulated priorities, and overly broad in 
conception.”90 Furthermore, they claim, “[b]esides being broad in conception, the Programme of 
Action does not prioritize these goals or specify achievement outcomes.”91 
                                                 
90 John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and 
Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 153.  
91 Kantner and Kantner, The Struggle for International Consensus, 138. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo, 
Egypt, represented an important moment in the history of international public argument relating 
to population (even if not representing something truly novel or different) . Regardless of any 
material, tangible efforts made as a result of the conference, the rhetorically significant aspects of 
the document are worthy of scholarly attention. For instance, the document places the rhetorical 
frames of “development” and “demographics” in a unique dialectical tension, refusing to assert 
causality or sequencing between the two. The Programme of Action also attempts to marshal 
“objective” knowledge while at the same time implicating human deliberation and decision-
making on contingent issues, thereby creating a particular rhetorical quandary for the conferees. 
Since Cairo exists mid-stream between past and future rhetorics of population, the text utilizes 
components of the Burkean pentad to suggest exigencies without particular agents being 
responsible, while also rhetorically downplaying the degree of controversy in the conference’s 
vision by presenting its claims as facts and/or uncontroversial premises and conclusions.  
As noted in Chapter 1, participants, scholars, and activists have all made grand 
proclamations regarding the significance of the meeting (and, as the Vatican example from 
earlier in the chapter demonstrates, many critics too have made Cairo a defining moment in 
history). Having now examined the text itself, through a close read of the document’s contents 
and its rhetorically notable features, we are well-positioned to consider both the predecessors to 
Cairo (Bucharest in 1974 and Mexico City in 1984), as well as the follow ups to the Cairo 
process (ICPD+5 in 1999 and ICPD+10 in 2004). In one sense, I have arranged the chapters such 
that Cairo becomes like a Janus-faced moment, looking both back and forward in it time, rather 
than as another step along the purportedly linear development of UN rhetoric about population. 
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Thus, in Chapter 3, I look back toward Bucharest and Mexico City, while in Chapter 4, I look 
forward to ICPD+5 and ICPD+10. It is with such a perspective that I will be best situated to 
address how Cairo fits into the history of international public argument on population, as well as 
to investigate whether it was really a “paradigm changer. In addition, after having examined all 
five moments, I will better understand each document’s significant rhetorical features on their 
own, individual terms, as well as the significant rhetorical dynamics common to all and those 
that are significant in reference to each other.
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3.0  THE EARLY YEARS: FOIL OR PRECURSOR? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine two conferences of particular importance for the issue of 
human population growth: the Bucharest Conference of 1974 and the Mexico City Conference of 
1984. My interest in these conferences in two-fold: first, to understand these texts on their own 
terms, and for themselves, and second, to understand these texts in relation to the 1994 Cairo 
conference (though, as my analysis indicates, in this current project, I tend toward the latter, 
seeing these texts in relation to the ICPD Programme of Action). In order to analyze these 
conferences, both on their own terms, and cumulatively, I first turn to the official document 
produced by the Bucharest Conference, the "World Population Plan of Action" (1974).1 After 
providing context for the Bucharest Conference generally and this document specifically, I then 
perform a rhetorical criticism of the text. After this section, I will turn to the Mexico City 
Conference. To guide this analysis, I will again look at the primary document produced by the 
conference, "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of 
Action" (1984). Just as with the World Population Plan of Action, I will perform a rhetorical 
criticism of the text. Following the section on Mexico City, I will provide an analysis that 
                                                 
1 United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "World Population Plan of Action," 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/bkg/wppa.html (Accessed November 15, 2008). 
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combines Bucharest and Mexico City. As part of this synthetic analysis, I will, among other 
vectors of interpretation, look for evidence of the preliminary markers of the key rhetorical 
benchmarks of Cairo (as indicated by Chapter 2), such as "reproductive rights," "reproductive 
health," "women's rights," “sustainability,” and a holistic sense of population policy being 
intertwined with broader policy changes. Finally, I will conclude the chapter by transitioning to 
chapter 4, the analysis of the ICPD+5 (1999) and ICPD+10 (2004). 
3.2 THE WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE (BUCHAREST, 1974)  
As explained in Chapter 1, the 1974 conference was neither the first international conference on 
population nor even the first United Nations-sponsored conference on population. As Schechter 
notes, "The World Population Conference . . . was actually the third such conference sponsored 
by the UN, but the first that meets the criteria adopted herein (and elsewhere) as a UN global 
conference."2 Notably, and relatively hidden from a purely internal analysis of the final 
conference text, is the way in which the vision of Bucharest was substantially contested along 
developed-developing country lines. As Greene explains, the "Group of 77" played a significant 
and decisive role challenging the United States in conceptualizing the work of the Bucharest 
conference: 
[T]he "Group of 77," a coalition of African, Asian, and Latin American countries 
who . . . began to demand a new set of economic relationships between the First 
and Third Worlds . . . The Group of 77 did not conceptualize their development 
                                                 
2 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 42. 
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problems as essentially population problems but instead as the residual hangover 
of colonialism . . . In preparation for the Bucharest Conference a set of 
preliminary meetings were held on a regional basis in an effort to formulate a 
draft of the World Population Plan of Action. At these meetings there was little 
opposition to the basic reasoning of the U.S. wing of the population apparatus that 
the growth in population was the primary reason for the failure of development 
programs and family planning should be institutionalized in an effort to directly 
reduce the rate of population growth. . . However, as the Conference unfolded it 
became clear that the Group of 77 would block the preferences of the United 
States . . . the dominant organization of the elements within the population 
apparatus was ambushed at the Bucharest Conference. A new articulation of the 
population apparatus was in the making.3 
In this page, Greene only alludes to “a new articulation.” While I unwrap this new 
formulation throughout this chapter, its essence relates to the relationship between population 
goals (expressed specifically in terms of figures such as fertility rates) and economic and social 
development (and, as noted in this passage from Greene, geopolitical issues such as colonialism). 
From the perspective of demographers, primarily those residing in the United States or other 
parts of the developed world, population growth rates needed to be managed as a pre-condition 
for facilitating and strengthening economic and social development. In stark contrast, the Group 
                                                 
3 Greene, Malthusian Worlds, 80-82. For more on the “Group of 77” and the “New International Economic 
Order” (NIEO), see, for instance, Karl P Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug, The New International Economic Order: 
Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); Karl P Sauvant, 
The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization (New York: Oceana Publications, 1981); ———, Changing 
Priorities on the International Agenda: The New International Economic Order (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); 
and Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of 
the Non-Aligned Countries (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1978). Notably in addition to the other factors 
that united to challenge the basic assumptions of (over)population, this passage indicates the importance of 
decolonization rhetorically for developing countries in suggesting an alternate genealogy of causality.  
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of 77 argued forcefully that development must occur before, or at a minimum, concurrently with, 
population management, rather than as a postscript to it. As part of this shift in articulation, the 
notion of quantitative, demographic goals receded into the background, to the chagrin of 
delegates representing the United States, as Connelly explains:  
[I]n a decisive vote, a majority of delegates rejected a U.S. proposal that the 
WPPA [World Population Plan of Action] recommend reducing the average size 
of families. But the coalition included many who would have supported goals for 
establishing voluntary family planning services, as opposed to population control. 
Nevertheless, the Americans continued pressing for a plank that would set targets 
for reducing the rate of population growth by 1985. The final result—"rammed 
down the throats of substantial opposition," as Notestein put it—just recognized 
that some countries had set population targets and invited others to consider doing 
the same.4 
Now, having provided a basic backdrop of some significant historical and contextual factors 
surrounding and impacting the Bucharest Conference, I turn next to its primary textual product: 
the World Population Plan of Action. 
                                                 
4 Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 315. I find Connelly’s distinction between “population control” and 
“family planning services,” a distinction that becomes a central topos in his book, to be troubling. Overwhelmingly, 
most contemporary advocates for “population control” have articulated such concerns in connection with calls for 
“family planning services” (notwithstanding high-profile foils like China’s one-child policy and attempts by some to 
utilize population control to advance eugenic, racist, xenophobic, or sexist agendas). Without denying that some 
have viewed “control” as a strategy of top-down administration, such coercive strategies are, in my read, the 
exception more so than the rule.  
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3.3 THE WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (1974)  
3.3.1 Key Features of the Text 
The World Population Plan of Action “weighs in” at approximately 11,000 words. The Plan 
opens with a short preamble (just 59 words), in the form of a legislative resolution (present 
participle statements, concluded with an action verb and some claim of decision). It proceeds 
with a lengthy “background to the plan,” (just under 20% of the overall document), then directs 
our attention to the “principles and objectives of the plan” (just over 10% of the document). 
After these preliminaries, the document delves into a lengthy section entitled “recommendations 
for action.” Constituting more than 50% of the document, the recommendations fall into three 
broad categories: “population goals and policies” (the longest sub-section of the three), “socio-
economic policies,” (by far the shortest, despite the centering of development in this text) and 
“promotion of knowledge and policies” (about half the length of the “population goals and 
policies section).5 The document concludes with “recommendations for implementation.” 
Comprising approximately 10% of the document, this section is divided into three sections (of 
which the middle section, on international co-operation, is about twice as long as each of the 
other two sections, despite the limited role that the document envisions for international action): 
“role of national governments,” “role of international co-operation,” and “monitoring, review 
and appraisal.”  
Why is this structure important? While some analyses may point merely to the 
functionality of such an arrangement, a rhetorically informed perspective offers an appreciation 
                                                 
5 This “Recommendations for Action” section also includes one endnote of 7 words, not counted in any of 
the overall counts.  
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of the role of form and not merely content or function.6 Following Kenneth Burke’s discussion 
of the pentad, I would argue that the document opens, in the preamble, background, and 
principles and objectives sections, by laying out the current “scene,” including a discussion of 
the current ills and why they cannot be fixed without a new series of actions, while also 
providing the overarching “purpose” for this episode of dramatism.7 It then proceeds, in the 
“recommendations for action” section, to offer the “act,” as well as some indications of the 
“agents” and the “agency.” In the “recommendations for implementation,” the document 
continues with its description of “agent” and “agency.”8 Particularly given this structure, and 
also with the many references to “policies,” “action,” “plan,” and “programmes” (8, 9, 10, and 
11, respectively, in the top 20 frequency analysis, depicted in Table 2 above), it is clear that this 
plan is best considered in the broad Aristotlean genre of deliberative rhetoric (as opposed to 
forensic or epideictic rhetoric), since it deals with what actions should be taken for the future.9  
                                                 
6 For the vital role that form and genre play in understanding rhetoric and public argument, see, for 
instance, Aram A. Aghazarian and Herbert W. Simons, Form, Genre, and the Study of Political Discourse 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986); Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 
Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action (Falls Church, VA: The Speech Communication Association, 1978); 
———, Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1990); ———, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2008).  
7 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969).  
8 As I have already alluded, in Chapter 1, to the close relationship between stasis theory and “stock issues” 
analysis in debate, and given my interest in achieving reunification between debate and rhetoric/argument theory, I 
believe that each of these elements of the Burkean scene contain counterparts in the language of stock issues. For 
instance, the portion of the “scene” that describes current ills approximates “harms” and “significance,” while the 
aspect of scene that explains why a new series of actions are needed is the equivalent of “inherency.” The “act” 
approximates a debate “plan” (and, in old debate theory language, issues like “agents” and “agency” would have 
been subsumed under different “planks” of the plan). While “purpose” does not have as clear of an analogue, one 
might consider the debate “resolution” to serve both as the “scene” upon which the debate occurs and also the 
“purpose” for the debate. 
9 However, as explained in Chapter 2, these texts also share many similarities with judicial decisions, thus 
suggesting an overlap between these texts and forensic rhetoric. Also, as indicated by the passage cited, also in 
Chapter 2, from Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, UN texts challenge the tidy distinctions between and among 
deliberative, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric.  
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When considering audience, we as critics should proceed with caution. As noted in the 
exclusion/inclusion criteria in Chapter 1, this conference, unlike its predecessors, was not meant 
as a purely technocratic, expertise-driven exercise. Therefore, it would be incorrect to understand 
this communication as occurring in an inwardly-focused expert enclave. However, on the other 
extreme, it is not a document well suited for broad public consumption. Coming in at over 
10,000 words, and consisting primarily of logical appeals, devoid of rhetorical style or artistry 
(such as metaphor, parallelism, or alliteration), few people in the “general public” are likely a) to 
seek out this document, or b) to invest the time to engage in a close read of the text. Seeking 
some middle ground, we should understand the primary, explicitly identified audience of this 
document to be governments and “the international community.” To a lesser extent, stakeholders 
representing international agencies working on population-related efforts, as well as NGOs, 
would also have some interest. However, as I detail, particularly in Chapters 1 and 5, many of 
the broader stakeholders (such as NGO representatives) on these debates have appeared not to 
follow the intricacies of these final conference texts very closely. Such a “deferral of the text,” as 
Gaonkar and Leff have discussed, then, not only afflicts scholars, but also activists and 
policymakers. Such a reading strategy, which is premised on a skimming model, neglects the 
intricacies of the text, such as the most frequently invoked terms and themes (see Table 2) and 
notable terms and phrases that help to open interpretive possibilities for the document (see Table 
3). 
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Table 4. Top 20 Terms, World Population Plan of Action (Bucharest)10 
Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number) 
1. Population 
2. Countries 
3. Development 
4. International 
5. Social 
6. Economic 
7. National 
8. Policies 
9. Action 
10. Family 
11. Plan 
12. Programmes 
13. Nations 
14. United 
15. Developing 
16. World 
17. Human 
18. Governments 
19. Socio-economic 
20. Mortality  
3.3.2 Rhetorical Analysis  
While contextual and historical work can help to illuminate what might be missed with a purely 
textual analysis (such as, for instance, the pivotal role played by the Group of 77 and the NIEO, 
as well as the oblique, indirect references to the situation with Israel and the Palestinians), there 
are many valuable critical benefits to be derived from an internal reading of the text. Prior to 
asking questions about the effects of or influence of the document, only a close read of the text 
                                                 
10 www.wordle.net. Wordle allows a user to select how many terms to see at a time. For instance, selecting 
“1” will show only the most prominent term in the text. Using this method, I expanded the number, one at a time, 
until I had a list, in order, of the top 20 terms in the document. This analysis was performed on May 14, 2009. There 
are significant limits, despite the utility of Wordle. For instance, it is not capable of “stemming” 
(http://www.wordle.net/faq). As a default, Wordle screens out “Stop Words” (and, the, etc…) 
(http://www.wordle.net/faq), which in this case, is actually very useful. Also, as a default, Wordle treats words as 
separate. It is possible to combine words using a tilde, but given that these documents have, at a minimum, around 
10,000 words, this is not very practical, and assumes in advance what I would be looking for in any case. Thus, #14, 
“United,” probably refers to “United Nations,” but does not read as such to Wordle (at least not without manual 
alteration of every instance in the text). For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire 
document, see Appendix A.  
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itself traces an intricate, in-depth thematic analysis, a “mapping” of the key components and how 
they interact, and a featuring of the key vocabulary (significant terms and phrases) in the 
document. Also, as the passage from David Zarefsky in Chapter 1 indicated, when rhetoricians 
talk about effects of discourse (most famously, in the passage by Herbert Wichelns), they are not 
asking about empirical measurements showing clear causality, but instead are asking about key 
features of the text that may indicate a vision of the audience, strategies devised in the hope of 
swaying an audience, and other similar types of questions. Also, even when discussing influence, 
as my overall project suggests, and as I discuss most pointedly in Chapter 5, being un- or under-
informed about the specifics of the text can lead to an impoverished analysis of both the 
document and its importance/influence. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, I perform a 
rhetorical criticism of the World Population Plan of Action. 
Table 5. Notable Terms & Phrases, World Population Conference (Bucharest) 
Notable Term/Phrase Frequency 
Development/developmental11 
-socio-economic 
-culture, cultural, socio-cultural  
Developing [countries/regions] 
Developed [countries/regions] 
82 
29 
11 
33 
24 
Quality of life 8 
Interrelationship, interrelationships, interrelations 8 
Progress 9 
Right, rights, freedom, freedoms 34 
Co-operation (such as “international co-operation), co-operate 17 
Sovereignty, sovereign 5 
 
The "World Population Plan of Action" features a number of key terms, clusters, and 
agons.12 In my reading, there are at least seven critical key terms that are worthy of analysis: 
                                                 
11 For the purposes of this count, I excluded uses of the term “development” when it was used in a different 
context, such as “development of indicators” or “development of policies,” as that is a substantially different 
referent than socio-economic development in international relations theory. Similarly, for “developing” and 
“developed,” I only counted references to regions or countries, not to phrases such as calls for “developing 
guidelines.” Also, in some cases, “developed” is used to describe “less developed” countries or regions, so the 
reader should not assume that a reference to “developed” refers necessarily to a “developed” country.  
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“development” (with clusters such as socio-economic and culture), "quality of life," 
"interrelationship," "progress," "human rights"/"fundamental freedoms," "international co-
operation," and "sovereignty."13 Table 3 shows the frequency of each set of terms. Reading this 
table against Table 2 produces a tension, in that the terms selected for Table 3 are not necessarily 
those featured most frequently (Table 2). As I explain in Chapter 1, one of the major potential 
mistakes of over-doing cluster-agon criticism is that, in some cases, the most important terms (in 
terms of understanding and interpreting the text) are not the most frequent, and vice versa.14 
Therefore, I have chosen these seven sets of terms because they tell us something about the state 
of the public argument over population, and also because they enable us to peer into the 
rhetorical strategy of the text. Rather than detailing each of these sets of terms individually, I turn 
next to an assessment of three critical vectors for rhetorical analysis, and utilize these notable 
terms and phrases as part of such analysis. These three vectors include “putting the development 
horse before the demographic cart,” about the modification of the relationship between 
demography and development at Bucharest, “re-viewing the geopolitical landscape,” relating to 
the ways in which the World Population Plan of Action adds complexity to the geographical and 
geopolitical factors affecting the question of population, and finally “securing sovereignty,” 
which discusses the role of nation-states and the international community, as expressed in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 "World Population Plan of Action." 
13 Importantly, as a quick comparison with Table 2 will indicate, these terms do not map, in any exact way, 
with the most frequently used terms, though there are important bridges and links. Judging terms that are important 
to unlock a text, even if they do not appear most frequently, is one of the important correctives required for anyone 
committed to cluster-agon analysis.  
14 Similarly, in many cases, the placement/arrangement of certain portions of the text says as much or more 
about a term/phrase’s importance than its frequency. For instance, terms that track prominently in the “preamble” of 
a document are likely to contain an elevated interpretive status, as compared to terms that might be buried in the 
middle of the text.  
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document. My analysis begins with a discussion of the re-working of the demographics-
development relationship, or dialectic, in the World Population Plan of Action. 
3.3.2.1 Putting the Development Horse Before the Demographic Cart 
The consideration of population problems cannot be reduced to the analysis of 
population trends only. It must also be borne in mind that the present situation of 
the developing countries originates in the unequal processes of socio-economic 
development which have divided peoples since the beginning of the modern era. 
This inequity still exists and is intensified by lack of equity in international 
economic relations with consequent disparity in levels of living.15  
As Greene and Connelly have extensively documented, one of the early manifestations of 
“population control” assumed that demographic stability (namely, reducing fertility) must 
precede development, especially in an economic sense. Thus, many developing countries were 
told by demographers and leaders in developed countries that their best hope for achieving a 
“demographic transition,” and thus to experience prosperity and growth, was to stabilize 
population rates first. Many participants and observers of the Bucharest process assumed that this 
conference would continue with that same “demographics, then development” logic. However, 
as noted by Greene and Connelly, earlier this chapter, developing countries, and in particular the 
“Group of 77” and those supporting the New International Economic Order, arose at Bucharest 
to contest this logic sharply and offer a different vision of the relationship between demographics 
and development.  
                                                 
15 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 4. 
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 While at times the tone of the World Population Plan of Action sounds moderate and 
only attempts to stress the complex relationship between demographics and development (“the 
interrelationship between population situations and socio-economic development” [Preamble]), 
at other times the document asserts a more thorough reversal of the equation.16 In this more 
aggressive formulation, the argument appears to be that development is a prerequisite, or a 
foundation, for demographic stability. For instance, the first paragraph of the document states, 
“The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic 
transformation.”  
 This shift is significant, both for the issue of population, and from a rhetorical 
perspective. In terms of population, Bucharest was the beginning of the end of relatively tidy, 
seamless, linear calculations about demographic possibilities. While Bucharest already adds 
complexity, it itself looks straightforward in comparison to its successors, as each new document 
continues to ramp up its anti-reductionist posture by adding an ever greater series of variables 
that systematically affect the population question (including, for instance, as I argued in Chapter 
2, the shift to a systems-level or cybernetic approach). This shift is rhetorically significant 
because, on most controversial, enduring public policy questions, we have come to assume 
incremental shifts in the tenor of the public argument. Rarely do major reversals and shifts come 
about in single episodes. Moreover, in those episodes when such shifts do occur, they usually 
occur because the new formulation makes a successful and pointed criticism of the earlier 
formulation. The form of the international conference document, however, is much less 
                                                 
16 The more moderate version, of the complex interrelationships among demographics, development, and a 
range of other factors, ultimately prevails, as explained in Chapter 2, and also as I indicate when examining Mexico 
City, as well as ICPD + 5 and + 10.  
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agonistic.17 As Greene and Connelly note, the atmosphere of the conference (argument as 
process and procedure) was no doubt contentious and agonistic, if not antagonistic, the final 
document (argument as product) positioned itself as an uncontroversial conclusion borne out of 
uncontroversial premises (which I analyzed in chapter 2 under the notion of “sanitizing 
controversy”).18  
 In addition to re-shaping population, the Bucharest text also re-configures the terms of 
development. Rather than conceptualizing development as an exclusively economic issue, the 
clustering tendencies of the document reveal a more holistic understanding of development. For 
instance, one of the most frequent clusters is “socio-economic,” such as “socio-economic 
development.”19 Already, such a configuration assumes that development is not merely about the 
modes of production and increasing the GDP, but also includes the social development of a 
population. While not as frequent, development is also clustered with “culture” and “cultural,” as 
well as at times, “socio-cultural.” Again, these are non-economic frames to interpret the question 
of development. Moreover, in a move that anticipates the theme of sustainability, prevalent 
especially at the 1992 Rio conference, and also at the 1994 Cairo population conference (as 
analyzed in Chapter 2), the World Population Plan of Action clusters “social, economic, and 
environmental factors” and foreshadowing the ideograph of the 1992 Rio conference, a version 
of “sustainable development” ("for the achievement of sustained development").20 This approach 
                                                 
17 Again, as also suggested in Chapter 2 and throughout, these types of characteristics indicate elements of 
a genre. 
18 Joseph W. Wenzel, “Three Perspectives on Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic,” in Janice Schuetz and 
Robert Trapp, eds., Perspectives in Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede (Prospect Heights, IL: 
Waveland Press, 1990), 9-26.  
19 For instance, the expression of “due regard . . . for rapid socio-economic development,” is featured 
prominently in the Preamble, both in Clauses 1 and 2, of the "World Population Plan of Action." 
20 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 1.  
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to development, as something much bigger and more diverse than just economics, creates an 
asymmetry in relation to the earlier logic. While in many ways the Bucharest text mirrors and 
reverses the old demographic-development equation, it refuses to take the old focus of developed 
countries, which was overwhelmingly economic, and instead adds nuance and depth to the idea 
of development (though, of course, embracing the economic component of development as well). 
If the World Population Plan of Action’s emphasis on modifying the demography-
development dialectic re-shapes the terms of the public debate, in what ways does this 
modification affect some of the most long-standing topoi of population? Traditionally, 
population advocacy is driven by a concern for life in terms of quantity. Therefore, in this 
tendency, such efforts have promoted sanctity of life and size of populations. In contrast to this 
numerical vision of the lifeworld, the WPPA responds forcefully, though implicitly, by 
promoting “quality of life.” The text promotes “quality of life” in the opening clause of its 
preamble. 21 Moreover, beyond the arrangement and placement of this term in such a central, 
opening location, “quality of life” figures prominently into the vision of the document:  
The principal aim of social, economic and cultural development, of which 
population goals are integral parts, is to improve levels of living and the quality of 
life of the people. Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Man's 
knowledge and ability to master himself and his environment will continue to 
grow. Mankind's future can be made infinitely bright.22 
Again, passages such as this one re-work development (as social, economic and cultural), 
emphasize a part/whole relation in which population is a part and development is the whole, and 
                                                 
21 "World Population Plan of Action," Preamble, Clause 1. 
22 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 14, Subsection A. 
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foreground people and life, not just in quantity, but quality. It also expresses a form of eco-
optimism that, again implicitly, stands in stark contrast to the eco-pessimism that traditionally 
characterizes population rhetoric (such as Garrett Hardin and Paul Ehrlich). This optimism is 
spread throughout the document, in its numerous calls for making “progress,” not just in relation 
to particular, instrumental goals developed in the document, but also for humanity.23 While 
coercion has rarely been advocated openly as part of population advocacy, its role in the history 
of population efforts is undeniable. Therefore, while re-working development, the WPPA also 
expresses support for rights and freedoms as part of its overall vision for “population”: early in 
the “Background to the Plan,” the document expresses support for “the promotion of economic 
development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms."24 While some of the 
references to freedoms and rights are references to other agreements and documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, many of the references are normative claims about how 
population rhetoric/policy should proceed. These markers, again fencing with an unnamed 
opponent only known by reference to the scene surrounding the WPPA, reflect an awareness of 
the risks of abridging rights in favor of faster demographic results.25  
 Finally, though the document, by virtues of its primary players, as well as its particular 
moment in history, invests significant efforts in demonstrating the primacy of “development” as 
the key to unlock and resolve a variety of interlocking problems, at times the WPPA 
                                                 
23 For more on the specific intellectual history of the idea/term "progress," see Richard Weaver, The Ethics 
of Rhetoric (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1985) and Charles Van Doren, The Idea of Progress (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967). 
24 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 1. As addressed in Chapter 2, these texts ultimately create a 
rights rhetoric that appears to transcend some of the typical limitations associated with “rights talk” (as Glendon 
terms it), by embracing individual and community simultaneously, rather than picking one or the other.  
25 My intent with such language as “fencing with an unnamed opponent” is to direct attention to the odd 
ways in which rhetorical foils are used (implicitly and explicitly) to build, sustain, oppose, and/or re-direct 
population rhetoric. I discuss this theme at length in Chapter 5. 
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foreshadows its conference progeny by promoting the idea of complexity and interrelationships 
in the area of population (as detailed, for instance, in Chapter 2). For instance, even in the 
preamble, “interrelationship” is already invoked.26 This advocacy of complexity and 
interrelationships appears throughout the document (though somewhat subdued/tempered by the 
emphasis on development as an overarching solution). One of the primary "general objectives" 
of the World Population Plan of Action calls for such an interrelated approach: 
To advance national and international understanding of the complex relations 
among the problems of population, resources, environment and development, and 
to promote a unified analytical approach to the study of these interrelationships 
and to relevant policies.27 
Again, as expressed above, the WPPA in particular fluctuates between making the “soft case” for 
re-orienting population efforts (population cannot be a precursor to development and other social 
and cultural factors) and going for the “hard case” (development should attain the “God term” 
status that demography once held, and population, social, and cultural factors are ultimately and 
best resolved by recourse to development). As we move closer to Cairo, as examined in Chapter 
2, the “hard case” will increasingly give way to the “soft case,” thus beginning to dissolve this 
tension between, on the one hand, a view that sees a web of factors, where claims to linear 
causality are dubious at best, and on the other hand, a perspective that situates development as 
a/the linear cause, with population and other issues as its effects. 
 These efforts to re-deploy the rhetoric of “development” in the World Population Plan of 
Action (and, more generally, though less obviously and explicitly, in all five texts), in contrast to 
                                                 
26 "World Population Plan of Action," Preamble, Clause 2. 
27 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 15, Subsection B. 
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its decidedly developed/expert origins, deserve closer scholarly attention. In recent years, 
critiques of "development" have been mounting in IR literature, especially in relation to 
development's problematic effects on the global South. For instance, the edited collection The 
Post-Development Reader and Arturo Escobar's Encountering Development stand out as two 
exemplars of such critiques.28 Much like "population" rhetoric, "development" rhetoric has now 
been so maligned that one possibility, that has been advocated, is to drop such rhetoric altogether 
(in a move strikingly similar to many calls to stop producing rhetorics of "population" and 
"overpopulation"). However, much like Peterson noted the ambiguities in and alternate 
potentialities for the term "sustainable development," another possibility, seized by some, has 
been to try to reinvent and recraft "development" rhetoric and discourses in order to challenge 
and change their essential trajectories.29 Such a strategy is on display with the documents 
examined in this project, especially when one considers that, from Bucharest to ICPD+10, some 
of the most prominent participants in structuring and producing these documents have been 
representatives of developing countries and NGOs from the global South. This, to me, is a deeply 
rhetorical approach, in the sense of rhetoric as contingent and involving that which could be 
otherwise. 
                                                 
28 Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, Eds. The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed Books, 1997); 
Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Also, see Richard B. 
Norgaard, Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future (London: 
Routledge, 1994) and Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 3rd ed. 
(Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2008). 
29 Tarla Rai Peterson, Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development (Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1997).  For one such effort at re-casting “development” discourse from within, 
see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). Also, see Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), Amartya Sen, 
Resources, Values and Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), and Martha Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006). 
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 While one of the World Population Plan of Action’s most important rhetorical 
components is the manner in which it re-structures the demography-development dialectic, its 
rhetorical significance extends beyond this particular component. In the next section, I look at 
the way in which, by virtue of the participation and power of the Group of 77, the story of 
geopolitics is told very differently in the 1974 text. 
3.3.2.2 Blame-Shifting 
Most accounts of human population growth, whether configured as a “problem” or not, take into 
account the geographical and geopolitical issues relating to population, such as the different 
situations in developed and developing countries. However, given that many intergovernmental 
and expert-written documents prior to Bucharest were influenced heavily by the logic of or 
directly authored by developed countries, the account from the global “South,” prior to 
Bucharest, had been relatively limited. As many scholars, including those writing in the area of 
geopolitics, have noted, such a perspective has typically represented an idealistic “view from 
nowhere,” wherein the particular perspective of those, primarily in the global “North,” was 
assumed to represent a universal perspective on geopolitics.30 However, in the World Population 
Plan of Action, in large part due to the influence exerted by the Group of 77, a more complete 
account is provided. Notably, the developed-developing country dynamic is not always depicted 
antagonistically. At times, the document expresses common challenges facing developed and 
developing countries alike. At other times, the document marshals statistical evidence to suggest 
                                                 
30 As Gearóid Ó Tuathail explains, “The ideal of an abstract, universal position, a position beyond race, 
class, gender, history, and geography, is termed a ‘view from nowhere’ by Bordo, after Thomas Nagel’s book of the 
same name. See Suan Bordo, ‘Feminism, Post-Modernism and Gender-Skepticism,’ in Feminism/Post-modernism, 
ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 137; and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986).” Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 
1996), 211. 
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that certain problems affect developed or developing countries differently. However, at times the 
document does offer fairly pointed words for the responsibilities and burdens faced by developed 
countries. For instance, in noting differential consumption, the document argues “[r]ecognizing 
that per capita use of world resources is much higher in the developed than in the developing 
countries, the developed countries are urged to adopt appropriate policies in population, 
consumption and investment, bearing in mind the need for fundamental improvement in 
international equity.”31 
Similarly, thought not developed to the same degree as it is in Mexico City and its 
followers, the geopolitical perspective enshrined in the WPPA expounds forcefully about 
colonialism and other forms of geopolitical inequality as driving factors inhibiting progress on 
development and population:  
True development cannot take place in the absence of national independence and 
liberation. Alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, wars of aggression, 
racial discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be 
among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the 
developing countries and all the people involved. Co-operation among nations on 
the basis of national sovereignty is essential for development. Development also 
requires recognition of the dignity of the individual, appreciation for the human 
person and his self-determination, as well as the elimination of discrimination in 
all its forms.32 
                                                 
31 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 19. 
32 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 14b.  
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Though “agons” are relatively rare in a consensus document like this one, this paragraph stands 
out as one of the rare, most direct and agon-istic passages in the World Population Plan of 
Action. This passage also reverses a presumption in international relations: whereas, in the past, 
developing countries were able to be blamed for not achieving development goals (for instance, 
as Greene notes, for having fertility rates that undermine economic progress), in this new 
articulation, significant blame gets shifted to external factors, such as colonialism, war, and 
systemic discrimination.  
 While the WPPA contains a vision for worldwide action, its primary focal point for 
emphasis, in terms of who should be in charge of enacting the goals of the plan, is the state. In 
the next section, then, I describe the ways in which the document engages in significant efforts to 
“secure sovereignty.”  
3.3.2.3 Securing Sovereignty 
While any internationally produced document aims to enable some type of international 
action (and, similarly, to disable other types of international action), how such advocacy squares 
with positions regarding the status of state sovereignty tends to vary considerably. In some 
instances, an international text can set out to enable and activate international action by 
emphasizing international cooperation and allowing sovereignty, while ever-present, to recede to 
the background. Alternately, an international text can exist primarily to safeguard a state’s 
sovereignty. In this case, the document takes on more of a self-restraining status, wherein it 
exists to limit its own influence. Obviously, between these two extremes, there are many  
possibilities along the continuum. Nevertheless, when speaking in terms of tendencies, the 
WPPA clearly falls primarily in the realm of sovereignty protection, rather than proactively 
encouraging a strong international role.  
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“Sovereignty,” as a topos, significantly structures the World Population Plan of Action.33 
At the very beginning of the section on "Principles and Objectives of the Plan," the document 
notes: 
This Plan of Action is based on a number of principles which underlie its 
objectives and are observed in its formulation. The formulation and 
implementation of population policies is the sovereign right of each nation. This 
right is to be exercised in accordance with national objectives and needs and 
without external interference, taking into account universal solidarity in order to 
improve the Quality of life of the peoples of the world. The main responsibility 
for national population policies and programmes lies with national authorities.  
However, international co-operation should play an important role in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter.34 
Thus, while the document creates space for international efforts, its primary point of 
reference rests with the importance of sovereign decisions by individual states. Similarly, though 
the text is lukewarm, at best, in the importance it assigns population or demographic efforts, it 
                                                 
33 Claims to “sovereignty,” understood from a rhetorical perspective, can have a number of possible 
trajectories. For instance, writing in reference to the problem of genocide, Ben Voth and Aaron Noland argue:  
The inevitability of genocide is arguably a function of an international legal system bounded by a pre-
eminence of sovereignty for states over and against the sovereignty of human individuals. The current 
privilege of states rights, like the American era that struggled with civil rights of the 1960s, obviates our 
discourse of community regarding the present victims of genocide. Ultimately, the young white northern 
outsiders of Michael Schwerner and Goodman had to join the indigenous James Chaney in the human 
struggle against regimes of violence bolstered by states rights in order to disrupt the institutional violence 
of the South. Until the nation began to empathize with the struggles of individual civil rights activists in the 
South, it was not possible to overcome the blockade of states rights rhetoric that protected Jim Crowe 
practices. Ethnic tensions like those in the civil rights era of the United States permeate the entire globe. 
Without dedicated activism and critique, the progress of human dignity will be slowed and the stubborn 
hold of intimidating violence will remain. 
Ben Voth & Aaron Noland, “Argumentation and the International Problem of Genocide,” Contemporary 
Argumentation and Debate, 2007, 28: 40. 
34 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 14. 
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opens the door, via sovereignty, for individual countries to pursue particular population goals as 
they see fit: 
In the light of the principles of this Plan of Action, countries which consider their 
birth-rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to consider setting 
quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of 
such goals by 1985. Nothing herein should interfere with the sovereignty of any 
Government to adopt or not to adopt such quantitative goals.35 
Nevertheless, while the text is organized around sovereignty and the primacy of the nation-state, 
the document, as an international conference document, indicates a number of legitimate roles 
that the international community might play in advancing the goals of the document.36 The 
WPPA contains an entire section devoted to the "Role of international co-operation." Among the 
many suggestions it provides for particular aspects of such cooperation, it notes the pivotal 
importance of international cooperation in achieving conference goals:  
International co-operation, based on the peaceful coexistence of States having 
different social systems, should play a supportive role in achieving the goals of 
the Plan of Action. This supportive role could take the form of direct assistance, 
technical or financial, in response to national and regional requests and be 
additional to economic development assistance, or the form of other activities, 
such as monitoring progress, undertaking comparative research in the area of 
                                                 
35 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 37. 
36 If the document did not envision any appropriate roles for the international community, there would be a 
strong rhetorical paradox as to why the participants wrote a document in the first place. That is, each UN document 
must create its own legitimacy, rhetorically, for its existence. A document that said in effect “this document says that 
we as the international community have no legitimate role to play” would seem highly suspect. Even in such a 
scenario, though, and likely in terms of the WPPA, even a weakly worded text might prevent and take the place of 
one that others might have written that would have been worded more strongly. 
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population, resources and consumption, and furthering the exchange among 
countries of information and policy experiences in the field of population and 
consumption.  Assistance should be provided on the basis of respect for 
sovereignty of the recipient country and its national policy.37 
A rhetorical perspective highlights how appeals to sovereignty carry multiple possible 
entailments. On the one hand, appeals to “sovereignty” can be used as shields to prevent 
international action on pressing geopolitical issues (such as genocide and humanitarian crises). 
On the other hand, without structured and significant safeguards for sovereignty, many potential 
participants are likely to stay out of the process, for fear that they will lose decision-making and 
control, particularly in regard to what may or may not happen in their own countries. 
Nevertheless, to a much greater degree than any of its followers, the World Population Plan of 
Action emphasizes the overwhelming centrality of the state in addressing the goals of the 
document, and places the international community as a distant second actor, there to provide 
financial, technical, informational, technological, and other forms of instance when requested 
and supported by host countries.  
3.3.3 Rhetoric: Missing in Action?  
How, in light of Gaonkar’s arguments against globalizing rhetoric (presented in Chapter 
1), do we make light of texts such as the World Population Plan of Action, and the other 
conference texts in this project, with regard to these critiques of scope? In some ways, these 
documents seem radically outside the domain of rhetoric. Whereas Edwin Black and Michael 
                                                 
37 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 100. 
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Leff looked at great rhetorical exemplars to discover more about the conditions of rhetoric, and 
those exemplars usually exemplified the height of artistic and stylistic technique, these 
documents appear, in contrast, to be bland and devoid of style (such as metaphor, alliteration, 
and parallelism). Whereas Abraham Lincoln, as Leff has explained, masterfully used his 
opponents as villains/agons to develop his own position rhetorically, there are very few “villains” 
in these texts, and to the extent that there are various discrete elements that could be combined to 
form an “enemy,” they are never constructed as such. While most rhetoric is performed by a 
particular person or set of persons, in this case, the rhetoric (in the form of the final approved text 
as argument as product) is never “performed” (beyond being approved and published, in paper 
form and online), and there is no clearly discernable “author.” While legal decisions may be 
relatively dry at times, they almost always contain explicit acts of logical refutation, an apparent 
cornerstone of rhetoric, but in these texts, the refutation is almost entirely conducted indirectly, 
by inference, and assuming knowledge of an external scene (an extreme version of the 
enthymeme, to be sure). There is very little imagery, and apart from the sheer volume of data 
(notably, most of which is not backed up with formal citations, making it difficult to refute), the 
attempts, in the words of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, to give “presence” to 
these issues is also relatively weak.38 In so many ways then, this is either a) not a set of artifacts 
most productively classified under the heading of “rhetoric,” or b) a massive failure, from any 
rhetorically informed judgment. While each claim is understandable, I find both suggestions 
incorrect. Despite the challenges that have been made to the “globalizing” of rhetoric, these texts 
deserve consideration as rhetoric. Most importantly, they deal with the most fundamentally 
                                                 
38 Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 115-120. 
 
 135 
rhetorical of conditions: uncertain knowledge, contingency, and a need to take political action 
despite imperfect information. While not having the same “jump off the page” power as a 
declaration of war or a state of the union address, these texts are fundamentally deliberative in 
genre, and, though obscured and incredibly understated, they contain appeals based on ethos, 
pathos, and logos. Therefore, I argue that these texts exist within the scope of rhetoric, and that 
as rhetoricians, we have the opportunity to engage in new set of timely, significant artifacts by 
seeing the rhetorical element in a broader range of artifacts. With regard to whether these texts 
represent rhetorical successes or failures, I would suggest that they can only be understood on 
their own terms, which means that we must consider form and genre, and adapt standards 
accordingly. Rhetoric is fundamentally situational, contextual, and audience-driven, so it seems 
particularly out of place to judge any rhetorical text by simple, universal standards. Perhaps as a 
precursor to any final judgment, some sense of the unique formal requirements/expectations of 
the UN conference document would be warranted. Like standard scientific prose, rhetorical 
flourishes are outside of the norm and likely to be frowned upon. In particular, appeals to 
character or emotion are likely to be less significant than the presentation of data and the 
formation of relatively straightforward logical analysis. Like political resolutions, the document 
typically starts with a preamble. The conventions of length are closer to a government report or a 
legal decision than to a short political oration. Developing a set of standards for the form or 
genre of international conference documents, such as those produced by the United Nations, not 
only challenges conventional evaluations or judgments of these texts, but also provides a 
valuable heuristic with which to approach a whole range of artifacts that, as noted in chapter one, 
are currently understudied by rhetoricians and public argument scholars. Thus, instead of 
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viewing this artifact as another mistaken instance of “globalizing rhetoric,” it is more profitably 
understood as keying in on another moment of “rhetoric gone global.”  
In considering the notion of rhetorical form, especially in relation to these conference 
documents, we would do well to remember Kenneth Burke’s discussion about the role of 
“Constitutions”:  
Constitutions are of primary importance in suggesting what coordinates one will 
think by. That is, one cannot "guaranty" a people any rights which future 
conditions themselves make impracticable; and whatever the limits and resources 
of liberty in the future may be, if they are there, they need no Constitutional 
guaranty; but Constitutions are important in singling out certain directives for 
special attention, and thus in bringing them more clearly to men's 
consciousness.39 
This sense of a Constitution as directing attention/consciousness toward particular issues 
and directives provides a common link with the texts/artifacts examined in this project. As 
expressed in Chapter 2, this analogy to Burke’s constitutions is validated with the similarities of 
text as providing “generalized wishes” and creating the basis upon which future decisions will 
rhetorically attempt to capture the status of “following precedent.”  
However, despite the many similarities between these UN conference documents and 
Burke's Constitutions, there are also important differences. Most significantly, if one were to 
imagine a Constitution as the most highly generalized statement on a continuum, and national 
laws on the other end of the continuum, as very specific, enforceable claims specifying 
                                                 
39 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 367. See 
note in Chapter 1 regarding the importance of considering rhetorical genres, and explaining the relationship between 
rhetorical genre, and in particular UN conference documents, and the theory of constitutions put forth by Burke. 
This is also a theme that I develop and continue to explore in Chapter 5. 
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permissible and impermissible, or required or forbidden, actions, then the conference documents 
fall somewhere in between. In one sense, the documents have the kind of (relatively and/or 
apparently) timeless rhetoric that suggests their similarity to constitutions. On the other hand, 
these documents also make very specific calls for action, which align their likeness more closely 
to laws. Of course, lacking sovereign authority, these calls to action are unenforceable outside of 
the rhetorical force of their arguments. In working toward developing a set of characteristics that 
help to define the genre of these documents, I argue that we would be well served in watching 
how other, non-traditional texts have made arguments in favor of their inclusion in the realm of 
rhetoric. Perhaps the most salient can be found in the rhetoric of science literature. 
In working toward an understanding of international document as form, the insights of 
the rhetoric of science are especially useful. Unlike classic public address, which surveys 
eloquence and highly stylized rhetoric, such as may be found in the speeches of Lincoln or 
Obama, these documents, much like scientific and technical reports, appear largely arhetorical. 
Beyond a standard preamble, these documents appear largely as a laundry list of goals, 
objectives, and actions. The prose is relatively dry, and one strains to find metaphor, alliteration, 
or other highly stylized rhetorical devices. Nevertheless, these documents deserve consideration 
from the perspective of rhetoric and argument.40 First, ever since Plato, texts that appear or 
proclaim themselves as either arhetorical or even antirhetorical are often some of the most 
powerful. Second, given the importance and regularity with which documents like these texts are 
being produced, and the symbolic and material effects of their words, we would do a disservice 
not to study them. Third, much as the rhetoric of science helped to uncover a subtle but 
                                                 
40 Also, see Robert L. Scott, “A Rhetoric of Facts: Arthur Larson’s Stance as a Persuader,” Communication 
Monographs 35, no. 2 (June 1968): 109-121.  
 
 138 
important set of rhetorical strategies in apparently (and purportedly) arhetorical documents, so 
too can the same be realized by studying international diplomatic documents. Finally, unlike 
scientific documents, these documents are not explicitly in denial that their purpose is to 
persuade. While grounding themselves in detailed analysis of the situation, these documents exist 
for the purpose of attempting to secure assent and eventually action. 
Unlike scientific documents that, by and large, aim to be objective, dispassionate, and 
free of normative or prescriptive claims, the WPPA expressly aims toward the adoption of new 
policies and approaches to development and population. Therefore, it is informative to assess the 
degree to which the document textually recognizes, supports, and/or encourages rhetoric and/or 
deliberation about the issues under discussion, or on behalf of the plan itself. In one sense, this is 
a near-universal consideration for international texts, as very few ever have any authority beyond 
the power of persuasion to try to influence individuals, communities, or nations, with either 
indirect or direct action. However, the question of reproduction, due to fears of community and 
state-based coercion, especially requires a strong sense of rhetoric in order to achieve success. In 
the "Principles and Objectives of the Plan," paragraph 15(g) notes as one of the "general 
objectives . . . for this Plan of Action": "To promote the development and implementation of 
population policies where necessary, including improvement in the communication of the 
purposes and goals of those policies to the public and the promotion of popular participation in 
their formulation and implementation."41 This stress on communication and popular 
participation, not just in the implementation of already-decided upon policy, but also helping in 
preliminary stages such as policy formulation, demonstrates an awareness of the uniquely 
rhetorical set of challenges faced in addressing the problems posed in the World Population Plan 
                                                 
41 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 15, Subsection G. 
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of Action. This type of language repeats throughout the document. More specifically, the 
consultation and involvement of women in socio-economic and population policy is given 
particularly high value: "Women should be actively involved both as individuals and through 
political and non-governmental organizations, at every stage and every level in the planning and 
implementation of development programmes, including population policies."42 Furthermore, 
participation and involvement is not only valued in creating development and population 
policies, but also in day to day activities in societies. For instance, paragraph 32 lists a variety of 
"development goals [that] generally have an effect on the socio-economic context of 
reproductive decisions that tends to moderate fertility levels," including "The promotion of social 
justice, social mobility and social development, particularly by means of a wide participation of 
the population in development and a more equitable distribution of income, land, social services 
and amenities."43 Furthermore, an entire subsection of "Recommendations for Action," 
"Promotion of knowledge and policies," argues for the need "to elicit the co-operation and 
participation of all concerned in the formulation and implementation of these policies."44 In the 
research subset of this "Promotion" area, the Plan calls for research to provide "understanding 
and improving the motivations of people to participate in the formulation and implementation of 
population programmes; study of education and communication aspects of population policy."45 
Clearly, there is an implicit recognition in the text of the need for rhetoric and deliberation, and 
thus, following Wenzel, Leff, and others, these documents both call for argument/rhetoric as 
product, procedure, and process, while simultaneously, performatively representing each of the 
                                                 
42 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 41, Subsection B. 
43 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 32; Para 32, Subsection C. 
44 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 71. 
45 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 78, Subsection F. 
 140 
“three p’s.” Each conference document puts forth a series of arguments and claims (argument as 
product), follows generic constraints (preamble, reasons for recommendations, and 
recommendations, for instance) and implicitly follows suit as well (citing relevant precedent), 
thus indicating argument as procedure, and indicates an awareness of the public argument as 
something that has a history and series of exchanges, as well as a complex set of geographical 
and geopolitical coordinates, thus suggesting a recognition of argument as process. All of these 
points of intersection with rhetoric and argument suggest that, far from being outside the domain 
of rhetoric, that these texts are thoroughly rhetorical but merely require a different set of tools 
and concepts to understand, appreciate, and evaluate them.  
Having now described and interpreted the official document of the Bucharest Conference, 
the World Population Plan of Action, I turn next to a discussion of the historical and rhetorical 
transition from Bucharest to Mexico City, the next UN population conference, which occurred in 
1984. 
3.3.4 Transitioning from Bucharest to Mexico City 
As we turn to the 1984 Mexico City Conference, we see two different trajectories develop. On 
the one hand, the actual conference text, as well as the overall conference consensus, continued 
to endorse the vision offered at Bucharest. As Riad Tabbarah notes: 
The International Conference on Population held in Mexico City in 1984, i.e., 
Bucharest +10, followed, in its recommendations, the outline and concepts found 
in the World Population Plan of Action. Indeed, the rules of engagement at that 
conference were explicit: the purpose of the recommendations was the “further 
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implementation of the World Population Plan of Action.” As a result, innovations 
were kept to a minimum.46  
However, the other major trajectory is based on the actions taken by Ronald Reagan's 
administration on behalf of the United States.47 At Mexico City, he pushed for a number of 
changes to the population agenda (many representing reversals from the United States' own 
previous population positions). In the next section, I set up the history of the Mexico City 
conference, both from an international perspective as well as with special regard for Reagan's 
maneuvers in Mexico City. I then analyze the official conference text by means of rhetorical 
criticism. 
3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION (MEXICO CITY, 
1984)  
The stated goal of the Mexico City International Conference on Population, as per the 1981 
proposal for the conference by ECOSOC, was "to appraise the implementation of the World 
Population Plan of Action adopted at the 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference."48 In 
many ways, the dynamics of North-South relations had shifted since Bucharest: "Compared with 
                                                 
46 Riad Tabbarah, "ICPD+10 or Bucharest +30?" Keynote Address, March 25, 2004, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/cpd/cpd2004/Tabbarahspeech.doc (accessed November 15, 2008). 
47 Again, I recognize that comments like this one reflect, as discussed in Chapter 1, the way that scholarly 
treatment of international events tends to privilege US issues and thus normalize a very particular view of 
international relations as if it were a universal view (in similar to the “view from nowhere” discussed earlier this 
chapter). However, given most narratives surrounding the international effects of Reagan's actions, this might be a 
valuable exception. Furthermore, the argument I ultimately suggest is that we lose too much by focusing our 
understanding of the conference on Reagan’s actions, and would be better served doing a close read of the 
international, consensus-based text. 
48 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 95. 
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Bucharest, this time there was a great deal of support among economically less developed 
countries for such a conference . . . On the other hand, many developed countries were not so 
keen and the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries preferred that the Bucharest 
consensus not be disturbed in any way. Countries' reservations explain why the conference 
agenda was focused on the Bucharest Plan of Action and on furthering its implementation."49 
Despite the actual objectives for and accomplishments from the Mexico City conference, 
most observers remember this conference for the actions of Ronald Reagan's Administration. 
Reagan had two primary objectives at Mexico City: condemning abortion as it related to family 
planning, and redefining the role of economic growth and free markets in relation to the 
population question. With regard to the former, Reagan, "with the active support of the Vatican, 
lobbied heavily against initiatives to define abortion as a legally enforceable universal human 
right and indeed made clear, even before the conference, that it was no longer going to provide 
funds to any organization that underwrote abortions."50 Though the "Mexico City Policy" 
actually refers to a broad set of principles espoused by the United States in 1984, the standard 
circulation of this trope in public discourse signals its opposition to abortion. In other writings, 
this Mexico City Policy is also known as the Global Gag Rule. Such a rule has gone back and 
forth since Reagan, as Bill Clinton removed it at the start of his administration, George W. Bush 
re-enacted it at the start of his administration in 2001, and Barack Obama rescinded the policy at 
the start of his administration in 2009.51 In terms of redefining population and economic growth, 
Greene explains how "[t]he Reagan administration was attempting to attach the population 
                                                 
49 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 96-97. 
50 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 98. 
51 For information on Reagan's imposition of the gag rule as well as Clinton's act in lifting it, see Greene, 
Malthusian Worlds. 
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apparatus to this neoliberal accumulation strategy just as the Group of 77 attempted to link the 
population apparatus to the New International Economic Order in 1974."52 Schechter elaborates 
on the specifics of this "neoliberal accumulation strategy": "The US administration took the 
position that the best way to reduce population growth was to accelerate economic growth; 
family planning programs were deemed not to be up to the task . . . they went on and suggested 
that, based on past experience, there was a clear recipe to achieve rapid economic growth that 
could assist in controlling population growth. That was reliance on markets and entrepreneurial 
initiative."53 Connelly explains the jolt that these twin positions caused in Mexico City: 
The U.S. statement at Mexico City was a startling turnaround . . . Its two feet 
were planted firmly in the two sides of Reagan's ruling coalition—social 
conservatives and Wall Street Republicans—and by surrounding the pro-life 
thrust with free-market rhetoric, it threw critics off balance. In the heady 
atmosphere of a United Nations conference, where most attendees were 
committed to spending large sums to persuade poor people to have fewer 
children, it seemed like an outrageous provocation to suggest that "population 
growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon" and that "more people do not 
necessarily mean less growth." It rankled to hear the United States—once the 
world's leading worrier—argue that population growth had provoked an 
"overreaction." Rather than focus on the hidden agenda, many opponents 
followed the waving of the invisible hand. The debate about the "voodoo 
demographics" of the Reagan administration distracted attention from the revival 
                                                 
52 Greene, Malthusian Worlds, 211. 
53 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, 98-99. 
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of hard-core population control in Asia as well as the pressure put on African 
states to follow suit.54 
Therefore, largely because of the stir that was caused by Reagan and his representatives 
at Mexico City, the elements of the "Mexico City Policy" have received much of the treatment 
from this conference. However, such explorations, whether they occur in scholarly works (such 
as Schechter, Connelly, or Greene), or in popular media, ignore the textual accomplishments of 
the conference as a whole: the final conference document, "Recommendations for the Further 
Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action" (1984).55 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, 
studies of international and foreign policy rhetoric that continue to place the rhetoric of the 
United States on a pedestal ignore the contributions made by the rest of the conference attendees. 
Also, and again with reference to Chapter 1 I want to push beyond Tarla Rai Peterson's claim of 
the risks of rhetorical grandstanding at these conferences to show that the final textual consensus 
of the conference represents significant rhetorical invention and production. Therefore, in the 
next section, I perform a close reading of this final conference document, in order to understand 
its most salient features, from the perspectives of rhetoric and public argument. 
                                                 
54 Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 354. 
55 United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Recommendations for the Further 
Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action," 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/bkg/mexrecs.html (Accessed November 15, 2008). 
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3.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (1984) 
3.5.1 Positioning Itself in Relation to the WPPA 
Before discussing the key features of this text and engaging in rhetorical analysis, I want to 
address the issue of how Bucharest and the World Population Plan of Action are referenced in 
this 1984 document. As per the preamble of "Recommendations," the primary tendency in 
relation to the World Population Plan of Action is to continue to support it: 
During the years since the United Nations World Population Conference in 1974, 
the World Conference Plan of Action has served as a guide to action in the field 
of population for Governments, for international organizations and for non-
governmental organizations. The consensus of Bucharest has facilitated 
international co-operation and helped to bring population issues to the forefront. 
The principles and objectives of the Plan have shown themselves to remain valid 
and are reaffirmed.56 
Two phrases in particular stand out from this preamble: first, the remembrance of Bucharest as a 
moment of international "consensus," and second, the idea that the primary purposes of the 
"Recommendations" document is based on a "reaffirm[ation]" of the 1974 Conference. This 
latter tone, of reaffirmation, represents the primary textual marker of reference to its predecessor. 
In fact, variations of "reaffirm" ("reaffirm," "reaffirmed," "reaffirmation") appear six times in the 
text, indicating the notion of continuity with rather than sharp break from the 1974 text. To the 
                                                 
56 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 1. 
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extent that anything is explicitly questioned in regard to Bucharest, it is based on a) changing 
conditions ("the demographic, social, economic and political conditions of the world have 
changed considerably") and/or b) a notion of refinement ("as foreseen at Bucharest, some of the 
goals and recommendations of the Plan now call for complementing and further refinement . . . 
there is still a great need for continuation and acceleration in these efforts to realize those goals, 
as they have been refined at Mexico City in August 1984").57 Therefore, much like at Cairo, as 
explained in Chapter 2, this document too generates its timeliness and relevance, but not by 
throwing previous population efforts “under the bus.” 
Furthermore, the 1984 text engages in the heavy use of precedent in order to build and 
maintain its ethos. In addition to continuously referencing, summarizing, and reaffirming the 
Bucharest conference, the Mexico City text also references numerous other United Nations and 
intergovernmental documents to marshal credibility and authority. Paragraph 11 opens by 
suggesting, "The Plan and the following recommendations for its further implementation should 
be considered within the framework of other intergovernmental strategies and plans."58 After 
providing a laundry list of important UN documents, the document then claims that, in addition 
to those already listed, "the following declarations, plans of action and other relevant texts that 
have emanated from intergovernmental meetings must be stressed because of their relevance to 
the objectives of the World Population Plan of Action."59 It then goes on to list 18 additional 
references, with subheadings "a" through "r." Thus, much like a legal decision aims to enhance 
                                                 
57 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 2. Beyond the references to the World 
Population Plan of Action of 1974, one of the central rhetorical features of these conferences, and in fact all of the 
conference documents, is a reliance on the concept (common in legal rhetoric) of precedent in order to provide a 
sense of authority and continuity with past actions. This theme will be developed at the end of this chapter, as well 
as in chapter 5. 
58 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 11. 
59 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 11. 
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its legitimacy and authority by embedding itself within a long history of concurring precedents 
and opinions, so too does this UN artifact build its credibility by means of association with other 
international agreements and documents.60  
3.5.2 Key Features of the Text  
Longer than the original World Population Plan of Action, “Recommendations for the Further 
Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action” contains just over 15,000 words. While 
sharing many structural similarities with its predecessor, “Recommendations” contains 
organizational modifications. Unlike the WPAA, the Preamble for “Recommendations” is 
significantly longer (11 paragraphs, many with extensive sub-clauses, for a total of 2,773 words, 
almost 20% of the document). Between the preamble and the recommendations, there is a short, 
substantive section entitled “Peace, Security and Population” (just 1 paragraph, 97 words). After 
this brief section, there is an extensive “Recommendations for Action” section, followed by a 
brief “Recommendations for Implementation” section. The “Recommendations for Action” 
(9,681 words, or almost 65% of the document as a whole) is divided into five main sub-sections 
(though many sub-sections themselves have extensive sub-structures): “Socio-economic 
development, the environment and population” (1 paragraph), “The role and the status of 
women” (3 paragraphs), “Development of population policies” (1 paragraph), “Population goals 
and policies” (14 paragraphs), and “Promotion of knowledge and policy” (3 paragraphs). The 
“Recommendations for Implementation” (1,288 words, or under 10% of overall document) is 
divided into three primary sections (which mirror the WPPA precisely): “Role of national 
                                                 
60 Notably, in some ways, this is a self-legitimizing effort, as many of the other international agreements 
and documents are themselves products of work performed by the United Nations. 
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Governments,” “Role of international co-operation,” and “Monitoring, review and appraisal.” 
Since there are not separate sections for basis for action or principles and objectives, each section 
of recommendations is preceded by on average, one paragraph, that lays out the “scene” in which 
the “acts” (recommendations) are meant to be understood.  
Table 6. Top 20 Terms, Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population 
Plan of Action (Mexico City)61 
Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number) 
1. Population 
2. Countries 
3. Governments 
4. Development 
5. International 
6. Recommendation 
7. Action 
8. World 
9. Plan 
10. Policies 
11. Programmes 
12. Nations 
13. Social 
14. United 
15. Women 
16. Economic 
17. Family 
18. Health 
19. Urged 
20. Developing 
3.5.3 Rhetorical Analysis 
Though there are many key terms from which to choose (for instance, see Table 6), I utilize eight 
key terms/threads to help center my rhetorical analysis: intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations, women (status of and discrimination against), peace/security, 
                                                 
61 See note on Bucharest “top 20” for information and limits about Wordle. This Wordle finding was 
conducted May 14, 2009. For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see 
Appendix B.  
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environment/ecology, health, the family, rights/human rights, and education/information 
dissemination and the public (as presented in Table 7). While some of these terms/threads are 
closely related and overlapping, they offer important clues into the relevant topoi and points of 
stasis of the Mexico City Conference. Rather than charting each of these terms individually, I 
weave the threads into four vectors of rhetorical analysis: the subtle reconciliation of the 
development/demographics and national/international dialectics, the ways in which Mexico City 
expands the round table (both in terms of actor-involvement and issue-breadth), how Mexico 
City assembles the pieces of the puzzle (such as women, environment, health) in a way that 
anticipates the Cairo Programme of Action, and the ways in which communication and public 
involvement and participation continues to expand at Mexico City. First, I turn to the re-figuring 
of the dialectics of demographics/development and national/international at Mexico City. 
Table 7. Notable Terms & Phrases, International Conference on Population (Mexico City) 
Notable Term/Phrase Frequency 
Non-governmental organizations 
Intergovernmental organizations 
International organizations 
International agencies 
23 
14 
8 
2 
Women/women’s 
Status of women 
Discrimination against women 
64 
9 
2 
Environment, environmental 12 
Health 53 
Family, families, familial 72 
Right, rights, freedom, freedoms 54 
 
3.5.3.1 Recalibrating Key Dialectics  
The World Population Conference struck a relatively ambitious, hard line on at least two 
fundamental dialectics related to population rhetoric: development/demographics and 
national/international. As argued earlier in this chapter, the World Population Plan of Action 
endorsed a vision in which development was a precursor and the whole, whereas demographics 
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was more likely an effect of development, or at most, a part of the whole. Similarly, while acting 
as an international point of consensus, the WPPA charted a course for population policy in 
which, overwhelmingly, power and control centered on the nation-state, giving the international 
community a backseat (beyond its potential to provide assistance, when [and only when] 
requested by individual countries). As a consensus document, confrontational rhetoric remains 
always at a minimum. Therefore, rather than openly argue for a shift in the emphasis or tendency 
in each dialectic, the “Recommendations” document makes subtle shifts on each question that 
serve as stepping stones for an even more ambitious shift in Cairo (as analyzed in Chapter 2).  
First, the document works to subtly renegotiate the relationship articulated at Bucharest 
between demographics and development. As a document existing to reaffirm the WPPA, the 
Mexico City “Recommendations” text quotes and cites passages that indicate the hard-line view 
expressed at Bucharest in which, for instance, development had to come first, population 
concerns were subsumed by development concerns, and other related formulations. However, 
even while reaffirming Bucharest, the Mexico City text is able to soften the division between 
demographics and development and indicate, instead of a linear relationship in either direction, 
that the two are best understood as mutually informing and affecting each other, and thus for 
equal importance to be attached to each. For instance, the first recommendation of the entire text 
reads:  
Considering that social and economic development is a central factor in the 
solution of population and interrelated problems and that population factors are 
very important in development plans and strategies and have a major impact on 
the attainment of development objectives, national development policies, plans 
and programmes, as well as international development strategies, should be 
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formulated on the basis of an integrated approach that takes into account the 
interrelationships between population, resources, environment and development. 
In this context, national and international efforts should give priority to action 
programmes integrating population and development.62 
In this passage, the “softer” version of the argument is given priority, in which each are “very 
important” and “central factor(s)” for the other, and thus only “an integrated approach” is 
appropriate to the complexity of this relationship.  
Second, unlike the 1974 document, which envisioned an international role but was 
significantly invested in the primacy of national sovereignty, the 1984 document begins to 
provide a series of transitions that both acknowledge sovereignty and open the door for 
international efforts. The recognition of the importance of international actors, especially for 
financing, is readily acknowledged: 
The international community should play an important role in the further 
implementation of the World Population Plan of Action. For this purpose, among 
other things, adequate and substantial international measures of support and 
assistance should be provided by developed countries, other donor countries and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.63 
Nevertheless, while not intended as exclusive, the primary calls in the 1984 document are 
still for actions to be taken at the national level: 
Many of the following recommendations are addressed to Governments. This is 
not meant to preclude the efforts or initiative of international organizations, non-
                                                 
62 Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 1. 
63 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 79. 
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governmental organizations, private institutions or organizations, or families and 
individuals where their efforts can make an effective contribution to overall 
population or development goals on the basis of strict respect for sovereignty and 
national legislation in force.64 
Thus, while still tied strongly to the vision of the Bucharest conference, Mexico City makes 
significant transitions in re-negotiating the significant dialectics of development-demographics 
and national-international. 
Why, then, were these shifts made, after being just ten years out from Bucharest? First, 
while the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and ‘Group of 77’ still existed in 1984, 
their geopolitical power had receded in the intervening years, resulting in a diminished role for a 
hard-line voice from the global “South.” While the NIEO and ‘Group of 77’ exerted a pervasive 
influence on the conference and on the textual proceeding at Bucharest, they clearly exerted less 
clout in Mexico City. The NIEO is referenced only twice in the 1984 text: once in the laundry 
list of previous agreements with which the present document is affiliated, and once in noting "the 
bearing that international migration may have on the process of establishing a New International 
Economic Order."65 Though never explicitly repudiating the NIEO or its importance, the near-
complete textual disappearance of any reference to an idea so pivotal to the 1974 text indicates a 
definite shift. What effects did this geopolitical shift have on the two aforementioned dialectics? 
The NIEO and ‘Group of 77’ acted as significant advocates, as argued earlier in this chapter by 
Greene and Connelly, for reversing (or at a minimum complicating) the relationship between 
demographics and development. Similarly, in voicing concerns over colonialism and neo-
                                                 
64 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 13. 
65 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 28. 
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colonialism by developed countries in the global North, the countries argued strongly for a 
protection of state sovereignty to ensure a minimum of outside interference, and to constrain the 
international community’s role to assist only upon request. Beyond this historical shift, the 
modification of these dialectics acts rhetorically to anticipate the shift, started in Bucharest, and 
fulfilled in Cairo, of an anti-reductionist paradigm of complexity and holism, as detailed in 
Chapter 2. As argued earlier in this chapter, merely reversing the causality of demographics and 
development ignored the systems-level possibility that, rather than being a relationship of linear 
causality, these two factors were probably implicated, along with a host of other factors, in a web 
or network of relationships. Similarly, in tandem with the mantra that “it takes a village,” Mexico 
City began to anticipate the move in Cairo to the vision of the web/network, not just in terms of 
“causality,” but also in the broad range of actors. In the next section, I follow up more on the 
question of expanding ranges of issues and actors, by discussing the growing “round table” at 
Mexico City. 
3.5.3.2 Expanding the Round Table  
Part of the development of population policy and rhetoric as it “comes of age” is the 
recognition that breadth is as important as depth when addressing the question of population (a 
vision realized most significantly in Cairo, as discussed in Chapter 2). That is, a failure to 
consider a horizontally broad range of issues, and to engage the broadest corps of participants, is 
likely to translate into a failure to meet goals, however narrowly or broadly they may be defined. 
Therefore, in the transition from Bucharest and Mexico City, it is difficult not to notice the ways 
in which the “round table,” not only of participants, but also issues, is expanded. While I discuss 
the expansion of issues, particularly as they tend to pre-figure and anticipate Cairo, in the next 
section, here I analyze the recruitment of ever-greater numbers of participants, both directly, 
 154 
from the document itself, and also indirectly, insofar as the document encourages actors in its 
audience to engage a network of participants as well.  
By far, the most significant, and most discussed, expansion of participation, seen at 
Mexico City and then, to an even greater degree, at Cairo (as seen in Chapter 2), comes from 
calls for involvement by international, intergovernmental, and most critically, non-governmental 
organizations. As indicated in Table 7, the “Recommendations” text contains 23 references to 
“non-governmental,” whereas the same phrase appears only 7 times in the 1974 World 
Population Plan of Action. Beyond the quantitative importance, these terms are also important 
qualitatively in the text. Though paragraph 13 specifies "many of the following 
recommendations are addressed to Governments," there are 17 occasions in which the action 
statement is addressed to Governments, international/intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and/or other regional, national, or international bodies, as co-
functioning units. Clearly, then, the 1984 document envisions non-governmental organizations as 
playing a vital role in population policy. Furthermore, while a number of references to non-
governmental organizations are stand-alone references, it is also clustered on a number of 
occasions with women's organizations. In these situations, the statement suggests something to 
the effect of 'non-governmental organizations, and in particular women's organizations,' 
indicating a special sensitivity and awareness of the potentially dynamic role that women's non-
governmental organizations might play in achieving the goals of Bucharest and Mexico City 
(also foreshadowing the trend, explained in Chapter 2, of the re-negotiation of the universal-
particular dialectic). 
Building on a theme initiated at Bucharest, and anticipating a major thematic thread in 
the Cairo Programme of Action, the “Recommendations” document praises the family and 
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enlists its participation to achieve the goals of Bucharest and Mexico City. While many of the 72 
references to a variant of “family” (as noted in Table 5) occur in the context of the phrase 
“family planning,” the family is also articulated in terms of a number of other important terms 
and concepts. Most significantly is the recognition of the importance of the family in society. In 
a section titled "Reproduction and the family," the document exalts the role of the family in 
society and the necessity for understanding its role in terms of population efforts: 
The World Population Plan of Action recognizes the family, in its many forms, as 
the basic unit of society and recommends that it should be given legal protection 
and that measures should be taken to protect both the rights of spouses and the 
rights of children in the case of the termination or dissolution of marriage and the 
right of individuals to enter marriage only with their free and full consent 
(paragraph 39). It also recommends that all children, regardless of the 
circumstances of their parentage, should enjoy equal legal and social status and 
the full support of both parents (paragraph 40). The family is the main institution 
through which social, economic and cultural change affects fertility. While the 
family has undergone and continues to undergo fundamental changes in its 
structure and function, the family continues to be recognized as the proper setting 
for mutual love, support and companionship of spouses, as the primary 
determinant of the survival of children born into it, as the first agent of the 
socialization of future generations, and in many societies as the only supporting 
institution for the aged. The family is also an important agent of social, political 
and cultural change. Therefore, in the design and implementation of fertility 
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policies, Governments must respect individual rights while at the same time 
giving full recognition to the important role of the family.66 
Thus, in the range of actors that the document highlights as agents of change and population 
action, including individuals, communities, governments, non-governmental organizations, and 
the international community, "the family" as a unit is also considered absolutely essential to any 
successful attempt to address population. This move to expand the round table decentralizes 
activity on behalf of population efforts, while also enlarging the scope of expertise and ethos, 
that is, who is qualified to take action in support of population goals. While “expanding the 
round table” includes actual participants, expanding the table also refers to the expanding range 
of substantive issues brought under the umbrella of “population and development.” Such an 
umbrella actualizes in a state of high holism in the Cairo text (as seen in Chapter 2), but in the 
next section, I show that many of the pieces of the puzzle that will formulate the Cairo 
Programme of Action are put into place at Mexico City, thus anticipating its successor in ways 
that most moments of rhetorical memorializing of Cairo (as seen in Chapter 1) tend to forget or 
suppress.  
3.5.3.3 Previewing the Puzzle 
As indicated in Chapter 1, activist and academic treatments of the Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development argue forcefully for its novelty and its “sharp break” 
from a long, problematic history of population argument and policy. While rhetorically effective 
in drawing in an audience, as any claim to novelty is, one of my major arguments in this 
dissertation is that such claims are dubious, at best, when held up against a close textual 
                                                 
66 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 24. As Singh explains, this appeal to the 
significance of the family was, at least in part, a move made to placate conservatives.  
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comparison, starting at Bucharest, continuing through Mexico City, and arriving at Cairo.67 
Indeed, while the proclamations of a “new day” are plentiful, at times there is a clearer 
recognition that the threads for the tapestry of Cairo were cultivated long before the meeting in 
Egypt. Even the United Nations, in a document titled Population Consensus at Cairo, Mexico 
City and Bucharest: An Analytical Comparison (1995), suggests, at least at some points, this 
recognition of Cairo as continuation rather than coining an entirely new era:  
In the light of the above, it seems well justified to conclude that if so much 
progress could be achieved at Cairo, it was undoubtedly because the International 
Conference on Population and Development and its preparatory process could 
rely and build upon a set of firmly agreed principles and precedent-setting 
language negotiated at the Bucharest and Mexico City Conferences. From that 
perspective, the contribution of the Programme of Action stands out not as an 
isolated landmark but rather as a highly important and timely incremental step on 
the road that began at Bucharest in 1974.68 
Sadly, these types of sober reflection on Cairo, understood intertextually and with reference to 
Bucharest and Mexico City, are much less common than those that proclaim Cairo as a 
proverbial “game changer” in the realm of population policy and argument.69 In this section, 
                                                 
67 As indicated in Chapter 1, while my primary emphasis, especially in Chapters 2-4, is descriptive and 
understanding-oriented, I am interested in the normative question of whether Cairo “lived up to its billing.” In 
Chapter 5, as I provide an evaluation and judgment of the conferences, I detail a number of scholarly implications of 
this mismatch between advertisement and actuality. One of these implications is that “close reading” represents a 
normative standard rather than just a methodological approach.  
68 United Nations, Population Consensus at Cairo, Mexico City and Bucharest: An Analytical Comparison 
(New York: United Nations, 1995), 7. 
69 Again, as indicated in the above footnote, Chapter 1 sets out as a standard whether or not the proclaimed 
novelty of the Cairo conference and its Programme of Action is warranted. While my primary analysis on this point 
occurs in Chapter 5, the sequencing of 1974 and 1984 right after Chapter 2’s criticism of the Cairo conference seems 
an appropriate marker at which to appraise similarities and differences across these three moments in time. Also, 
while I offer a number of criteria and implications for interpreting and evaluating this claimed and actual 
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then, I trace some of the themes that appear at Mexico City that would become developed more 
comprehensively in 1994. Specifically, I discuss the role of “women” and issues impacting 
women, in relation to population and development, in the “Recommendations” text. Next, I 
examine the ways in which “health” becomes configured at Mexico City, as well as the 
“environment” and “ecological issues” are featured in ways that anticipate the ICPD’s focus on 
“sustainability” and “sustainable development.” Finally, I examine the special section in 
“Recommendations” devoted to international security and peace issues as a representative 
anecdote of the type of comprehensive holism foreshadowed at Mexico City and brought to 
fruition in Cairo.  
 One of the primary claims advanced by advocates of Cairo, on behalf of its supposed 
‘novelty,’ is that Cairo’s Programme of Action expressed a newfound recognition of the 
importance of involving women and issues facing women in policies and rhetoric surrounding 
population and development. However, a close read of Cairo’s predecessors, and in particular, 
the Mexico City “Recommendations” document, casts significant doubt on the veracity of such 
claims. While not expressed as comprehensively as the Cairo Programme of Action, 
“Recommendations” devotes significant text to the role of women in population and 
development. Moreover, these are not passing platitudes, but rather in-depth discussions of 
topics such as the “status of women” (which actually has its own sub-section, “The role and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
relationship, I also believe that “close reading” exists not only as a strategy of rhetorical criticism, but also as a 
politically responsible approach and normative goal. Stan Katz, in analyzing the Tea Party’s refusal to interrogate 
the textual and historical discrepancies between the goals and assumptions of the Declaration of Independence, 
argues for the importance of close reading: “All democracies contest their history. But we owe it to the founders and 
framers to argue in a more nuanced and historically sensitive manner. I carry a copy of the Constitution in my jacket 
pocket, too, but it may not say the same thing that yours does. That is what we need to discuss.” Stan Katz, “When 
in the Course of the Tea Party . . .,” The Chronicle of Higher Education Brainstorm Blog, July 5, 2010, 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/when-in-the-course-of-the-tea-party/25294 (Accessed January 6, 2012). Thus, 
I would argue that “close reading” constitutes an important end in and of itself, rather than merely a means to some 
other goal. 
 159 
status of women,” within the extensive “Recommendations for Action” section) and 
“discrimination against women.” Additionally, the document recognizes the importance of 
international agreements to advance the status of women, and thus calls for member states to 
ratify the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). In all, there are 64 references to "women" or "women's" in this draft (to give a sense 
of comparison, there are 23 references to women in the 1974 World Population Plan of Action, 
though the 1974 document is significantly shorter than the 1984 document, about 11,000 to about 
15,000 words).70 This might seem like an odd marker, but it serves as a reminder that the focus 
on women in Cairo's International Conference on Population and Development Programme of 
Action, while articulated in some novel and different ways, was not at all new. Though the 
specific phrases “reproductive rights” and “reproductive health” are not contained in the 1984 
text, and are generally suggested as additional evidence of Cairo’s novelty, the document focuses 
extensively on rights, including women’s rights, and, as I discuss next, the focus on health, and 
issues that are de facto reproductive health issues are given significant consideration at Mexico 
City.   
In all, there are 53 references to health in the document. Frequently, this term is clustered 
with children's and mother's health, and is also frequently tied to primary health care. Again, in a 
vacuum, this may seem like an odd concept to trace, but given that "health" becomes another 
argument in favor of the novelty of the Cairo conference, we see once again a sense of continuity 
in the movement toward Cairo, rather than an innovation from nowhere in Cairo.  
                                                 
70 As noted in Chapter 2, in order to maintain a uniform counting standard, these totals include (unless 
otherwise explicitly noted): references in the table of contents, chapter titles, section headings, in the text itself, as 
well as proper nouns (for instance, other declarations or conferences). 
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The third major foreshadowing thread relates to the areas of environment and ecology. In 
addition to quantitative markers of the importance of these topics (see Table 7), the 1984 
"Recommendations" text makes reference to the need for environmental sustainability: "To 
achieve the goals of development, the formulation of national population goals and policies must 
take into account the need to contribute to an economic development which is environmentally 
sustainable over the long run and which protects the ecological balance."71 Though the phrase 
“sustainable development” was not popularized until the 1992 Rio conference, the 
foreshadowing in this text, in 1984, suggests that, much like the purported novelty of the themes 
in Cairo, the novelty of “sustainability” may too be overstated. Again, the location of 
environmental questions in the organization of the text is salient. The first two subsets in the 
"Recommendations for Action" section are, first, "Socio-economic development, the 
environment and population," and second, "The role and the status of women." This movement 
of the environment to the forefront of concerns helps to differentiate it from the 1974 document, 
in which there are also twelve references to the environment. 
While not one of the overriding themes of Cairo, Mexico City’s decision to place a 
special section on international peace and security represents a foreshadowing, not so much of 
the specific topic, but of the sensibility of antireductionism, complexity, interconnections, and 
holism. Quantitatively, key terms such as peace and security in international relations appear 
relatively infrequently. Instead of valuing it from a quantitative perspective, the qualitative 
importance of this set of key terms can be seen in the role that it plays in the overall document. 
In this sense, the organization of the document is particularly telling: the first section in the 
document is the preamble, and the third section contains the recommendations for action. In 
                                                 
71 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 8. 
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between these two sections, though, resides a section titled "Peace, Security and Population." 
Though only one paragraph, it is worth quoting at length, for its awareness of the linkages among 
socio-economic issues, population, and national and international security problems: 
Being aware of the existing close links between peace and development, it is of 
great importance for the world community to work ceaselessly to promote, among 
nations, peace, security, disarmament and co-operation, which are indispensable 
for the achievement of the goals of humane population policies and for economic 
and social development. Creating the conditions for real peace and security would 
permit an allocation of resources to social and economic rather than to military 
programmes, which would greatly help to attain the goals and objectives of the 
World Population Plan of Action.72 
Contrast such a clearly marked statement of importance with just one sentence in the 
World Population Plan of Action, buried in paragraph 100: "International co-operation, based on 
the peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems, should play a supportive role 
in achieving the goals of the Plan of Action."73 Given that both of these conferences took place 
in the context of Cold War relations, it marks a clear development in the awareness of the 
comprehensive/interrelationship-filled analysis of population that, ten years later, peace and 
security are made an important priority for addressing population problems (as a subset of 
broader social and economic concerns, of course). 
                                                 
72 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 12. 
73 "World Population Plan of Action," Para 100. 
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3.5.3.4 Carving Space for Communication and Deliberation 
As indicated earlier this chapter, even in the World Population Plan of Action, the 
document recognized the importance of communication and public involvement, though the 
emphasis on these issues was relatively minimal, and the phrasing was at times awkward. In 
Mexico City, the focus on communication (increasingly framed textually as dissemination of 
education and information) and public participation (as a whole or in particular subsets) is 
heightened, though, as I discuss in Chapter 2 and 4, it attains significantly more nuance at Cairo 
and its follow-up efforts (+5 and +10). Though not as intricate or as developed as it is in the 
Cairo Programme of Action, the 1984 text demonstrates an awareness of the importance of 
rhetoric in order to achieve its goals. While many of its references to communication are still to 
providing "information," there are important exceptions, where a more robust role for rhetoric 
and awareness-raising is prescribed. Some of these references are relatively minor. For instance, 
in noting the need for an informed public, the document suggests:  
Governments which have adopted or intend to adopt national fertility goals should 
translate these goals into specific policies and operational steps that are clearly 
understood by the citizens.74 
Similarly, in the context of some specific primary health care measures, the document 
suggests, “All available communication channels should be used to promote these techniques."75  
While some envisioned "communication" roles are minor, others are promoted as more 
significant. For instance, the document favors: 
                                                 
74 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 32. 
75 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 19. 
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[E]ncourag[ing] community education to change prevailing attitudes which 
countenance pregnancy and childbearing at young ages, recognizing that 
pregnancy occurring in adolescent girls, whether married or unmarried, has 
adverse effects on the morbidity and mortality of both mother and child.76 
Similarly, elsewhere in the document, "Governments are urged to promote and support 
breast-feeding."77 In the same way, "Governments are urged to initiate or strengthen preventive 
action programmes to reduce the consumption of tobacco, alcohol, drugs and other products 
potentially dangerous to health."78 Additionally, the document notes, "the experience of the past 
10 years suggests that Governments can do more to assist people in making their reproductive 
decisions in a responsible way."79 The document also suggests a public, communicative role in 
relation to migration specifically:  
Countries of origin and receiving countries should undertake information and 
education activities to increase the awareness of migrants regarding their legal 
position and rights and to provide realistic assessments of the situation of 
migrants, including the availability of job opportunities.80 
Another aspect of such a public role for migration activities is to prevent prejudice and 
discrimination toward migrants: 
Governments of countries of origin and of receiving countries should encourage 
and promote the widest dissemination, inter alia, through the mass media, of 
                                                 
76 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 18, Subsection G. 
77 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 20. 
78 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 23. 
79 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 26. 
80 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 50. 
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information aimed at promoting public understanding of and preventing any 
activity prejudicial to the contribution of documented migrant workers to 
economic development and cultural interchange.81 
Finally, in some cases, there is a sense of a vitally robust role for rhetoric and deliberation 
in the document. For instance, the document recommends "involv[ing] communities more 
actively in the planning and development of population programmes."82 In addition to 
governments assuming such roles, the text recognizes that other actors can also assume such 
responsibilities: 
Governments, with the assistance, as appropriate, of intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, should continue to explore innovative methods for 
spreading awareness of demographic factors and for fostering the active 
involvement and participation of the public in population policies and 
programmes and to intensify training of national personnel who are engaged in 
information, education and communication activities (including the management 
and planning of those activities), in developing integrated communication 
activities and education strategies, utilizing mass media and community-level and 
interpersonal communication techniques.83 
The document also makes use of high-profile leaders to play roles in achieving the 
document's goals. They are promoted as being able to create awareness and support action: 
Members of parliament, the scientific community, the mass media, and others in 
influential positions are invited, in their respective areas of competence, to create 
                                                 
81 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 51. 
82 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 77, Subsection D. 
83 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 74. 
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an awareness of population and development issues and to support appropriate 
ways of dealing with these issues.84 
Other than the second to last passage, promoting “innovative methods,” all of the other 
designated roles for communication, rhetoric, and awareness are unidirectional: governments and 
other organizations are encouraged to use whatever channels are available to transmit already 
finished information from point A to point B. Even that “innovative methods” passage is vague 
as to the role envisioned for the public. Most of the passage speaks to spreading awareness and 
training personnel to enact (pre-figured) policies, so it is difficult to conceptualize a significantly 
more robust role for public participation. Unfortunately, as explained in Chapter 2, this approach 
attempts to speed action by asserting closure, but in doing so, reduces the role for the public and 
citizens to shape the discussion on problems, solutions, and optimal strategies for addressing 
these potential exigencies.  
While most of the calls for communication and involvement are limited in scope and 
vision, one of the first, that calls for “community education” to “change prevailing attitudes” 
represents one of the rare exceptions, following Chapter 2, when the solution to many of the 
problems is framed openly as one that involves first and foremost changing attitudes and 
opinions, rather than simply putting forth a linear transmission model in place for disseminating 
already formalized and finalized information. 
                                                 
84 "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 85; also see Rec 86. 
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3.5.4 Re-Reading Mexico City 
Lost in Ronald Reagan's strategies of agitation and discord at the Mexico City conference 
were many critical elements. First, as noted in the introduction to the conference, the 
international consensus had shifted, such that family planning, which had been controversial in 
the 1974 setting, especially with developing countries, was now widely accepted and advocated 
(only to then be re-questioned by the leadership of the United States). Second, despite all the 
focus on Reagan's "gag rule" and his suspicion of any problematic relation between 
demographics and economic growth (if anything, he saw the relationship as "neutral" or perhaps 
even positive), the real achievements, from a textual perspective, indicated a different 
significance altogether. Even if one disagrees with Tabbarah (quoted in the next section) that 
Cairo (or more precisely, the ICPD process) represented the culmination of efforts began at 
Bucharest, it would be difficult not to notice the multitude of ways in which the Mexico City 
conference anticipated and began all of what was supposedly novel and path-shattering about the 
Cairo agreement. Though the terms "reproductive health" and "reproductive rights" are not 
featured in the 1984 text, the vital points of emphasis in the Programme of Action, from women's 
rights to health to environmental sustainability to the many other facets, were all contained in 
critical ways in 1984. Given Kenneth Burke's "paradox of substance," one may be able to say 
that the Programme of Action both was and was not contained in the Mexico City text.85 Thus, 
far from introducing elements into the public argument that might have complicated subsequent 
rhetorical efforts to galvanize action on the population issue, the Mexico City document 
                                                 
85 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 21-23. 
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appeared to put all the elements in place that would lead to the highly popular Programme of 
Action in 1994 and thus tended to anticipate, rather than complicate, such efforts. 
3.6 CONCLUSION: READING BUCHAREST AND MEXICO CITY TOGETHER, 
AND LOOKING AHEAD 
Riad Tabbarah, Director of the Center for Development Studies and Projects (MADMA) in 
Beirut, Lebanon, delivered the keynote address at the ICPD+10 conference in New York in 
2004. The title of the address, "ICPD+10 or Bucharest+30?" is telling, because Tabbarah's point 
is that the 2004 meeting was as much a continuation of Bucharest (and Mexico City) as it was of 
Cairo. Tabbarah specifically differentiates United Nations-led population efforts into a number 
of stages. Stage one was the earliest work of technical experts in the formation and formal 
development of demography as an area of study. This covered the first two conferences, those 
that preceded Bucharest and were attended mostly by scientific experts, rather than by 
representatives of member states. Stage two commenced with the planning for and enactment of 
the Bucharest Conference in 1974, and, as Tabbarah notes, the 1974 Plan of Action was 
characterized by two primary, significant achievements: 
The first important document of this second phase in international thinking on 
population was undoubtedly the World Population Plan of Action. Of all the 
contributions it made I should like to throw light on only two questions the Plan 
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answered, namely: what is the scope of the field of population and what is the 
nature of population policies.86 
Thus, far from the cold quantitative logic of Malthus, so popularly conjured up in 
contemporary public discussions of population, Bucharest (and Mexico City) was more of a 
precursor of Cairo than a foil against which Cairo would set itself. This is not to say that every 
critical concept embodied in the Bucharest or Mexico City text survived intact at Cairo, but 
rather than Bucharest's and Mexico City’s tendency and orientation was more aligned in the 
fundamentally same direction as Cairo, rather than being sharply divergent or opposed to it. 
What an attentive, close reader finds in the documents of Bucharest and Mexico City is 
not a set of texts laced with apocalyptic demographic projections, misanthropic commentary, 
opposition to birth control and family planning, and such overriding focus on quantitative criteria 
that qualitative social criteria are ultimately displaced or absent entirely. Though there are other 
historical trajectories that population arguments have taken that have followed these routes, as 
Ehrlich arguably represents and Greene and Conelly analyze at length, such trajectories were not 
those assumed by the international community in its intergovernmental, textual productions. 
Unless they were targeting some other unspecified foil, the enthusiasts for and advocates of 
Cairo, who were so critical of the past arguments about population, would seem to have been 
addressing a past including Bucharest and Mexico City. However, at least from the texts 
deliberated upon, agreed upon, and distributed as the formal results of these two conferences, 
such "dangerous," "harmful," and/or "unproductive" arguments were not in force, if even present 
at all. 
                                                 
86 Riad Tabbarah, "ICPD+10 or Bucharest +30?" Interestingly, Tabbarah's formulation here aligns very 
closely with my own analysis of points of stasis, as it is concerned with the scope and nature of population issues 
and policies. 
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In chapter four, I leap ahead in order to turn to the two major follow-ups to the ICPD: 
ICPD+5 (1999) and ICPD+10 (2004). In the final chapter of the Cairo ICPD Programme of 
Action, "Follow-up to the Conference," the document suggests the need for follow-up activities 
on the national, subregional, regional, and international levels. As part of its recommendations 
for international follow-up, it notes: 
The General Assembly is the highest intergovernmental mechanism for the 
formulation and appraisal of policy on matters relating to the follow-up to this 
Conference. To ensure effective follow-up to the Conference, as well as to 
enhance intergovernmental decision-making capacity for the integration of 
population and development issues, the Assembly should organize a regular 
review of the implementation of the present Programme of Action. In fulfilling 
this task, the Assembly should consider the timing, format and organizational 
aspects of such a review.87 
Two major follow-ups were initiated in the first ten years after Cairo, ICPD+5 in 1999, and 
ICPD+10 in 2004. In the next chapter, I analyze the official document produced by each set of 
efforts in order to trace ongoing points of similarity and difference from their predecessors.
                                                 
87 "Report of the ICPD," Para 16.21. 
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4.0  REAFFIRMATION OR RECONFIGURATION? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the renewed optimism generated by the Cairo conference in 1994, the pivotal question 
regarding its potential was posed by the Programme of Action itself: 
The significance of the International Conference on Population and Development 
will depend on the willingness of Governments, local communities, the non-
governmental sector, the international community and all other concerned 
organizations and individuals to turn the recommendations of the Conference into 
action.1   
No less important, from the perspective of rhetoric, was what types of continuities and 
transformations would occur in the public arguments as they continued to unfold across time.  
Fortunately, these are not, in the shallow sense of the word, merely "rhetorical 
questions."2 Following the Programme of Action's call to monitor the progress of its 
recommendations and goals, the United Nations has produced official documents at regular 
intervals to evaluate progress, which simultaneously offer us a glimpse into and an ability to 
                                                 
1 United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Report of the ICPD (94/10/18)," 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html (Accessed December 27, 2008), Para 16.1. 
2 Ed Black plays on the dual meaning of "rhetorical questions" to provide a more robust role for the study 
of rhetoric. Edwin Black, Rhetorical Questions: Studies of Public Discourse (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1992). 
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chart the ongoing public argument. The first major interval at which the UN took stock of the 
accomplishments and shortcomings of international progress toward the Programme of Action 
was 1999, five years after the Cairo conference. With General Assembly "Resolution 52/188. 
Population and development," the membership of the United Nations "Decides to convene a 
special session for a duration of three days from 30 June to 2 July 1999, at the highest possible 
level of participation, in order to review and appraise the implementation of the Programme of 
Action of the International Conference on Population and Development."3 The eventual result of 
this special session was the document "Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the 
Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development."4 This 
conference, and its resulting document, is often referred with the shorthand of ICPD+5 or ICPD 
at 5 (and also sometimes Cairo+5 or Cairo at 5). The next major review of the progress toward 
the Programme of Action occurred in 2004, five years after the first review and ten years after 
the Cairo conference. Unlike Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo, it was not a separate 
conference, and unlike ICPD+5, its major work did not occur at a special session of the United 
Nations. Instead, a number of UN regional commissions convened and produced "official 
outcomes," which were combined to form the publication ICPD at Ten: The World Affirms 
Cairo.5 While the primary work of ICPD+10/ICPD at Ten did not occur in the General 
Assembly, the GA did commemorate the 10 year anniversary: 
                                                 
3 United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 52/188," http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/icpd5/ga5res.htm 
(Accessed June 3, 2009). 
4 United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-first Special Session of the 
General Assembly, "Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population and Development," United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), 
http://www.un.org/popin/unpopcom/32ndsess/gass/215a1e.pdf (Accessed June 30, 2009), 1999. 
5 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes 
of the ICPD at Ten Review (New York: UNFPA, 2005). 
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In December 2003, the General Assembly adopted decision 58/529, entitled 
"Commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the International Conference on 
Population and Development." By this decision, the Assembly decided to devote 
one day, during its fifty-ninth session in 2004, to the Commemoration of the 
Tenth Anniversary of the International Conference on Population and 
Development. The Commemoration was held on 14 October 2004, and provided 
an opportunity for Member States of the United Nations to make statements and 
to re-affirm their commitment to the Cairo Programme of Action.6  
As noted in Chapter 1, my primary focus is on the agreed-upon texts of each conference, so my 
analysis in this chapter is centered on the documents included in the 2005 publication ICPD at 
Ten: The World Affirms Cairo. 
As with my analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, my approach involves engaging in rhetorical 
criticism of each official conference outcome. I aim, through rhetorical analysis, to understand 
each document, both in its own right as well as in comparison to the texts that preceded and 
proceeded it. Also, as with before, I am primarily interested in understanding the internal 
features of the documents. In this chapter, I turn first to ICPD+5 and the "Key Actions" 
document, then proceed to ICPD+10 and the ICPD at Ten publication. After considering each 
document on its own, I then turn to comparative analysis of how the reports relate to each other.  
                                                 
6 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/note.cfm (accessed June 3, 2009). 
 173 
4.2 ICPD+5 (UN, 1999) 
As with its predecessors, one of the keys to encouraging widespread participation in ICPD+5 
was to reassure 1994 participants, and other involved constituencies, that there would not be any 
paradigm-smashing at +5 that would radically re-work the “Cairo Consensus:”  
In order to allay the concerns of several countries that the proposed special 
session might reopen some of the issues settled at the Cairo Conference, the 
General Assembly resolution reaffirmed that the special session will be 
undertaken ‘on the basis of and with full respect for the Programme of Action; 
and that there will be no renegotiation of the existing agreements contained 
therein’.7 
Much like Mexico City then (as discussed in Chapter 2), key players preferred that the +5 
process follow established precedent rather than charting new terrain. The result, according to 
Singh, was significant (even more so than anything at ICPD+10):   
The 1998-1999 review and appraisal, which culminated in the Twenty-First 
Special Session of the General Assembly, remains to date the most significant 
updating of the ICPD Programme of Action. The ICPD Programme of Action and 
the Key Actions taken together reflect the current international consensus on 
population and development issues. There was no comparable international event 
                                                 
7 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 159. This closure 
simultaneously increases participation but also prevents the opportunity to re-formulate any parts, major or minor, of 
the ‘Cairo consensus,’’ that may very well need re-negotiation.  
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during the ICPD+10 review period; and none is foreseen for the ICPD+15 
review.8  
 Without doubting Singh’s expertise, and recognizing his particularly pivotal role in 
ongoing UN deliberation regarding population, my chapter treats this statement about ICPD+5’s 
importance as a claim in need of analysis, rather than taking it at face value as an historical truth. 
Therefore, in the next section, I turn to the “Key Actions” text, the approved result of the 
ICPD+5 process, to discover, from an internal, textually-oriented perspective, in what ways, if at 
all, the Key Actions can be said to be “significant” in its “updating of the ICPD Programme of 
Action.” 
4.3 KEY ACTIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1999) 
4.3.1 Key Features of the Text 
From a procedural point of view, the points of stasis remain largely the same in relation 
to the Cairo Programme of Action. There is no fundamentally altered stance on whether there is 
a problem, what the problem is, of what kind/quality it is, and if/what kind of action should be 
taken. If anything, the shift is more from a stasis-setting moment at Cairo to a stasis-refining or 
                                                 
8 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 159. Again, there is a 
tension between these two statements offered by Singh: if everyone agreed not to make any major changes, how 
could the results be significant and important? 
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implementation of the vision of Cairo. Calls for monitoring and implementation suggest more of 
an emphasis on technical matters relating to population rather than agenda-setting claims meant 
to (re-) shape and/or (re-) define the public argument about population. In terms of the 
substantive points of stasis, there is also little that is novel. Perhaps most significantly, the 
recognition of resource shortfalls leads this document to push for creative financing options, 
including a variety of partnership concepts, as well as short-term assistance that will "build 
capacity" and "improve self-reliance" so that individual countries will fend for themselves.  
While much of the substance remains the same, higher priority is afforded to some issues 
in the 1999 texts. For instance, in recognition of the escalating nature of the issue, HIV/AIDS 
becomes a prominently featured term in the 1999 document. There are 23 references to 
"HIV/AIDS," another 12 to "HIV," another 2 to "AIDS," and 4 to the UN agency in charge of 
coordinating efforts, "UNAIDS." Again, this is not absent in previous documents, but there is a 
recognition in the 1999 text that more focus is needed. The situation is regularly classified in the 
document as a "pandemic," and the document calls for urgent, increased attention to the issue: 
Since the HIV/AIDS pandemic is having a more severe impact than was 
originally projected, special attention should be given to providing promptly the 
necessary resources as has been called for in the Programme of Action for the 
prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. Particular attention should 
be given to vulnerable populations, especially children and young people. All 
countries affected by the pandemic must continue to make efforts to mobilize 
domestic resources from all sources in order to combat it. The international 
community is called upon to assist developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition in their efforts. Additionally, Governments and the donor 
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community should intensify efforts to provide resources for care and support of 
those affected by HIV/AIDS and for specialized prevention needs.9 
Second, this text specifically challenges two sets of “agons” facing the international 
community in its attempt at improving the population and development outlook: debt and 
structural adjustment programmes. As explained in Chapter 1, agons are rarely featured in this 
rhetorical genre, so the featuring of these agons implies a significant degree of concern to the 
point of being willing to challenge some potential partners to the process. Though debt or a 
variant only occurs 5 times in the text, it attains more prominence in this document than in prior 
conferences. The text refers to "the debt burden" and also contains an extended passage arguing 
for strategies to relieve debt in order to pursue the goals embraced by the ICPD process: 
Consideration should also be given to more efficient and coordinated mechanisms 
to address the debt problem, including the reduction of the burden of external debt 
through various measures such as debt cancellation and debt swaps for 
population, health and other social sector investment to promote sustainable 
development.10 
Structural adjustment programmes are also addressed in the document as a primary agon. While 
the text does not outright reject the use of these programmes, it contains some strong language 
about their design and their possible effects. The document points to "the adverse impact of 
structural adjustment policies" and, by implicit suggestion, indicates a problematic history of 
                                                 
9 "Key Actions," Para 97. For a snapshot of the importance of "pandemic" as a rhetorical label, see the 
World Health Organization's delays in calling the "swine flu" outbreak a "pandemic." 
10 "Key Actions," Para 16; Para 100. 
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structural adjustment programmes, calling for "ensuring that structural adjustment programmes 
are responsive to social, economic and environmental concerns."11 
Table 8. Top 20 Terms, Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of 
the International Conference on Population and Development (UN)12 
Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number) 
1. Health 
2. Including 
3. Countries 
4. Reproductive 
5. Governments 
6. Services 
7. International 
8. Women 
9. Action 
10. Development 
11. Programme 
12. Population 
13. Sexual 
14. Programmes 
15. Ensure 
16. Rights 
17. Appropriate 
18. Education 
19. United 
20. Human 
4.3.2 Rhetorical Analysis 
To begin my analysis of the 1999 follow-up on Cairo's Programme of Action, I turn to an 
analysis of three primary thematic threads that help to unpack the document’s contents: 
precedents and memorials, re-configuring the private-public dialectic, and “advocacy” and “civil 
society” as the newest markers of “communication” (and, potentially implicitly, rhetoric) in UN 
population conference documents. 
                                                 
11 "Key Actions," Para 57, Subsection D; Para 16. 
12 See comments after table 2 (chapter 2), for explanation of Wordle. This analysis was performed May 25, 
2009. For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix D.  
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Table 9. Notable Terms & Phrases, ICPD + 5 (UN) 
Notable Term/Phrase Frequency 
Civil Society 26 
Partner, Partners, Partnership, Partnerships 11 
Indicator, indicators 
-Benchmark indicator 
15 
2 
Gender 38 
Enable, enables, enabling 
-Self-reliance 
10 
1 
Capacity, capacity-building 12 
Integrate, integrates, integrated, integration 6 
Adolescent, adolescents 
-Youth, youths 
-Child, children 
-boy, boys 
-girl, girls 
        TOTAL 
27 
17 
35 
2 
26 
121 
4.3.2.1 Precedents and Memorials 
“Key Actions” both enmeshes itself with other international conference work and thus 
validates itself via precedent, while also actively memorializing the Cairo conference. First, I 
analyze the ways in which “Key Actions” articulates itself, and Cairo, in relation to other high 
profile international conference work, and in the process, ends up citing them as precedent. 
 Cairo's Programme of Action had linked itself to a number of other high-profile 
international, United Nations-sponsored conferences. Without the same degree of specificity 
(every conference was not named on its own), the "Key Actions" document continues this 
support for envisioning the efforts toward the Programme of Action within a broader 
international context:  
The International Conference on Population and Development and its 
implementation must be seen as being closely related to the outcome and 
coordinated follow-up to the other major United Nations conferences held in the 
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1990s. Progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action should be 
supportive of and consistent with the integrated follow up to all major United 
Nations conferences and summits.13 
Second, ICPD+5’s text actively (self-)memorializes the Cairo conference. Though it does 
not reference Bucharest or Mexico City, it both refers regularly to the 1994 conference and 
praises it significantly as well. There are, in all, 76 references either to "Cairo," "the International 
Conference on Population and Development," "the Programme of Action," or "the Conference." 
In some ways, this makes sense, given that the role of the document is to assess the progress 
toward the goals and objectives outlined in the 1994 Programme of Action. As such, its name is 
"Key actions for the further implementation of the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population and Development," and its primary role is to reinforce and to support, 
rather than to deviate from or change course from, the 1994 conference. Indeed, not only does 
the "Key actions" document support and reinforce the 1994 conference, it actively (self-) 
memorializes the importance of the 1994 conference: "The Programme of Action of the 
International Conference on Population and Development . . . marked the beginning of a new era 
in population and development."14 Again, as I examine throughout this dissertation, the 
conferences themselves, in addition to scholars and activists writing about Cairo, insist on 
defining is as a paradigm changer or, in this quotation, a “new era.” 
                                                 
13 "Key Actions," Para 4. 
14 "Key Actions," Para 1. Again, this points to the oddity of the foil being employed. If even the UN, and in 
all likelihood largely the same people who participated in pre-Cairo conferences (such as Singh), calling this “the 
beginning of a new era” begs the question of why, for the UN and population “experts” worldwide, opening space 
for Cairo requires a significant act of forgetting of Bucharest and Mexico City. This also suggests that at least some 
of the language employed to refer to the past cannot simply be referencing back to earlier, non-UN advocates like 
Malthus and Ehrlich.  
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4.3.2.2 Re-Configuring the Private-Public Dialectic 
As Henry Giroux argues, our current, globalized moment in history is characterized by a 
tendency toward themes of privatization and neoliberalism. Given this strong “tendency,” as 
Burke might call it, it is unsurprising that these texts, in particular the latter ones (+5 and +10), 
are structured, at least partially, by these comprehensive worldviews.15 To be fair, while the 
document strongly encourages more utilization of the private sector, it is also emphatic that 
private resources cannot be used to supplant the primary responsibilities of the public sector. 
Nevertheless, the structuring worldview, speaking through the text, represents a set of neoliberal 
tendencies. Thus, consistent with the neoliberal focus on individual, rather than community or 
governmental action, the document places significant emphasis on "enabling" and developing 
"self-reliance." The document encourages enabling women, men, countries, and adolescents to 
achieve their goals. The document also calls for actions that would provide an "enabling 
environment."16 In addition to the focus on enabling individuals and individual countries to act 
on their own, the document also encourages a focus on developing self-reliance. Though self-
reliance is only mentioned once in the document, it is referenced in the context of enabling as 
well: 
The international community and the private sector should also take the necessary 
measures, particularly in the transfer of technology, as appropriate, to enable 
countries, in particular developing countries, to produce, store and distribute safe 
                                                 
15 I choose “worldview,” rather than “ideology,” because of the baggage that the latter carries, as I discuss 
in Chapter 5 on my discussion of the hermeneutics of suspicion and critical, scholarly perspective. I do not envision 
“privatization” to be sufficiently comprehensive to be referred to as a “worldview,” but I do think that neoliberalism 
has become sufficiently developed to be labeled as “worldview.” 
16 "Key Actions," Para 16, 78. 
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and effective contraceptives and other supplies essential for reproductive health 
services in order to strengthen the self-reliance of those countries.17 
Though this is not new to this particular document, it does reflect both the attitude of the 
times and, potentially, the facing of the realities of consistent shortfalls of financial resources to 
implement the actions and recommendations of the Programme of Action. This to me, though not 
“falsifiable,” represents a more productive, less cynical read of motives for the calls toward 
privatization and neoliberalism: the persistent reality of underachievement in the financial 
commitments to implement population and development goals required a shift to strategies more 
likely to allow the goals to be met, despite the risks that such strategies incur. Though "self-
reliance" is only captured once in the text, a similar term, capacity/capacity-building, occurs in 
some variant 12 times. Some of the clusters associated with capacity include national capacity, 
capacity-building, institutional capacity, programme management capacity, and other uses of 
capacity.18 Rhetorically, the notion of capacity, along with self-reliance and enabling, function 
similarly to calls for individual action and responsibility within a country. Just as the "give a 
person a fish, feed them for a today, teach a person to fish, feed them for a lifetime" mantra 
guides thinking with regard to a domestic environment, the calls for "self-reliance," "enabling" 
(presumably enabling so that they can do it on their own), and building "capacity" all signal an 
analogue in which individual countries fulfill the role of individuals in a country, who must take 
responsibility for their own actions rather than depend on the institution (national government, 
or, in this case, international community) to take care of their well-being for them. In the next 
section, I chart the continuing transformation of the enunciated role for “communication” 
                                                 
17 "Key Actions," Para 60. 
18 "Key Actions," Paras 11, 54, 81; Paras 21, 23, 55; Paras 46, 83; Para 57, Subsection C; Paras 25, 38, 46. 
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(perhaps, but not necessarily, including rhetoric) and “participation,” in particular, with shifts 
toward “advocacy” and “civil society.” 
4.3.2.3 “Advocacy” and “Civil Society” 
"Key Actions," like its predecessors, assigns an important role for communication 
activities (which may, or may not, include rhetoric and deliberation). The 1999 document, in 
keeping with the vision of Cairo, continues to recognize the importance of engaging and 
“persuading” (again, as described in chapters 2 and 3, without ever using such terminology) all 
actors in order to meet conference objectives: "The Programme of Action recognized that greater 
public knowledge, understanding and commitment at all levels, from the individual to the 
international, are vital to the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Programme of 
Action" (36).19 The 1999 document also makes several references to the need for "advocacy" 
efforts. For instance, in a subsection on "Advocacy for gender equality and equity," the 
document suggests: 
Governments, parliamentarians, community and religious leaders, family 
members, media representatives, educators and other relevant groups should 
actively promote gender equality and equity. These groups should develop and 
strengthen their strategies to change negative and discriminatory attitudes and 
practices towards women and the girl child. All leaders at the highest levels of 
policy- and decision-making should speak out in support of gender equality and 
                                                 
19 "Key Actions." 
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equity, including empowerment of women and protection of the girl child and 
young women.20 
Similarly, the document notes, "Governments, civil society and the United Nations system 
should advocate for the human rights of women and the girl child."21 Advocacy is also paired 
with a popular phrase from the Cairo document, "information, education and communication":  
Advocacy and information, education and communication campaigns developed 
with communities and supported from the highest levels of Government should 
promote informed, responsible and safer sexual behaviour and practices, mutual 
respect and gender equity in sexual relationships.22 
While in chapter 2 I argued that “IEC” suggested a category mistake in knowledge between 
episteme and doxa (and education and propaganda), the notion of “advocacy,” with its legal and 
persuasive connotations, represents more of a turn to rhetoric and doxa, and begins to transcend 
the idea of population argument as mere “information” and “education” activities. Advocacy 
suggests that these issues (such as responsible sexual behavior and equity) are those that can only 
be “won” through the process of argumentation.   
The 1999 text also reflects an understanding of the extra-legislative role that politicians 
can play in advocating for the efforts of the Programme of Action: 
Parliamentarians/members of national legislatures are invited to ensure legislative 
reform and expanded awareness-raising necessary for implementing the 
Programme of Action. They are encouraged to be advocates for the 
implementation of the Programme of Action, including through the allocation, as 
                                                 
20 "Key Actions," Para 49. 
21 "Key Actions," Para 41. 
22 "Key Actions," Para 68. 
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appropriate, of financial resources. There should be regular exchanges of 
experiences among parliamentarians at the subregional, regional, interregional 
and international levels, where appropriate.23 
While Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo had all envisioned an important role for “awareness” 
or “awareness-raising,” it is only here in the “Key Actions” document that the international 
community goes one step farther by stressing the linkage between awareness and advocacy. We 
frequently associate a link between awareness and advocacy (and thus, of the realm of rhetoric) 
when, for instance, a health campaign aims to raise awareness and consciousness in order to 
generate public support, financial or otherwise.  
The text understands the link between public advocacy on behalf of the goals and 
objectives of the Programme of Action and increased financial and resource commitments 
toward meeting those goals as well: 
With full regard to their respective jurisdiction and mandates, legislators and other 
decision makers are encouraged to undertake measures to increase support for 
achieving the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action through 
legislation, advocacy and expanded awareness-raising and resource mobilization. 
Advocacy efforts should be increased at all levels, both national and international, 
to ensure that the resource goals are met.24 
Significantly, while all of the ICPD objectives are important and stressed, financial resource 
mobilization clearly represents the most immediately sought after rhetorical goal from the 
                                                 
23 "Key Actions," Para 87. 
24 "Key Actions," Para 96. 
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document, especially because many elements of the Programme of Action are largely 
uncontroversial, and only fail to be enacted because of a lack of funds.25  
While “advocacy” is one way in which the +5 text continues to complicate its concepts 
lurking around the rhetorical arena, the document also refines the role of non-governmental 
organizations, public participation, and, as emphasized in this text, “civil society.” 
Building on the ICPD Programme of Action's recognition of the need to involve the 
broadest range of possible actors in mobilizing around the issues of population and development, 
the ICPD+5 "Key Actions" document continually calls for the involvement and active interaction 
of "civil society" in implementing and pushing forward the agenda initiated at Cairo. Of all the 
conferences already examined (Bucharest, Mexico City, Cairo), ICPD+5 is the first to use this 
term. One might be tempted to associate this term as merely another synonym for "non-
governmental organizations," a phrase gradually increasing throughout each conference and 
achieving full potential in the 1994 Programme of Action. However, clues from "Key Actions" 
suggest that the definition includes but is broader than "non-governmental organizations": "civil 
society, including non governmental organizations, donors and the United Nations system" and 
"civil society, including non governmental organizations and the private sector."26 While the 
clusters suggest some lack of precision regarding what exactly constitutes "civil society," the 
only clear clustering scheme is that civil society is exclusive of Government. The document 
provides both descriptive statements about what civil society is doing in relation to the ICPD 
Programme of Action ("many civil society organizations are contributing to the formulation and 
                                                 
25 I recognize that this claim that many parts are uncontroversial may appear in tension with my other, 
previous claims about the role of controversy and doxa, for instance, in addressing the concerns. However, many 
parts, like reducing infant mortality and mother mortality are things that everyone can support at least in principle, 
even if they do not assist with the financial needs to help to reduce those problems.  
26 "Key Actions," Para 52; Para 22.    
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implementation of policies, programmes and projects on their own or in partnerships with 
governmental and intergovernmental organizations as well as the private sector") and normative 
claims about what the role of civil society should be: 
Governments, civil society at the national level and the United Nations system 
should work towards enhancing and strengthening their collaboration and 
cooperation with a view to fostering an enabling environment for partnerships for 
the implementation of the Programme of Action. Governments and civil society 
organizations should develop systems for greater transparency and information-
sharing so as to improve their accountability. Governments are encouraged to 
recognize and support the important and complementary role that civil society at 
the national level can play towards changing attitudes and actions for further 
implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on 
Population and Development. 27 
In this passage, the document suggests that, apart from the rhetorical opportunities held by 
national and local leaders, members of civil society too can rhetorically engage publics in 
“changing attitudes and actions,” thus decentralizing the space for rhetoric and expanding the 
range of viable rhetors. “Civil society” also suggests the problem, discussed in Chapter 2, with 
claiming too much “closure.” Recognizing a controversy as at least partially open allows 
deliberation and dialogue to get a better sense of the problem and potential solutions, while 
creating more of a feeling that people will “buy in” to the results, since they had ownership in the 
process. Conversely, though, if conference participants, or other leaders, declare and decree the 
                                                 
27 "Key Actions," Para 9; Paras 78-79. 
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full nature of the problems and the solutions, there is little impetus and motivation, or “buy in,” 
for society to participate in pursuit of goals.    
A second, related but distinct key term, is partner/partnership. However, in addition to 
calling for partnerships with civil society, the document also calls for other partnerships. In 
addition to the in-text references, one section is titled "Partnerships and collaborations." The 
document assigns an important role to partnerships: "Achieving the goals and objectives of the 
Programme of Action will require sufficient domestic and external resources, committed 
government action and effective, transparent partnerships."28 Partnerships also call for a broader 
range of actors than just traditional NGOs: "Governments should immediately develop, in full 
partnership with youth, parents, families, educators and health-care providers, youth-specific 
HIV education and treatment projects, with special emphasis on developing peer-education 
programmes," and both Governments and civil society organizations are urged to engage in 
partnerships with other parties beyond each other: 
Governments and civil society organizations, where appropriate, are encouraged 
to design innovative approaches and build partnerships with, among others, the 
media, the commercial sector, religious leaders, local community groups and 
leaders as well as youth, which can serve as effective advocates for the 
achievement of the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action.29 
                                                 
28 "Key Actions," Para 11. 
29 "Key Actions," Para 68; Para 82. 
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4.3.3 From ICPD+5 to ICPD+10 
In recommending the key actions contained in the present document, 
Governments affirm their renewed and sustained commitment to the principles, 
goals and objectives of the Programme of Action. Governments and civil society 
at the national level, in partnership with the international community, should join 
in efforts to ensure that the goals and objectives of the International Conference 
on Population and Development are accomplished as soon as possible, with 
special attention to those that should be met within the 20 year time-frame of the 
Programme of Action.30 
Beyond calls for increased commitment, financial and otherwise, the "Key Actions" document, 
as this passage suggests, is primarily a reaffirmation and restatement of the most important 
elements of the 1994 Programme of Action. Though continuing to make subtle changes and 
updates, one sees no major revision or change of course in this document. Without any 
fundamental alteration or revision, the Programme of Action was set to continue to be reviewed 
and revisited on a regular basis, and its next major review occurred in the lead-up to the tenth 
anniversary of Cairo in 2004. 
                                                 
30 "Key Actions," Para 14. 
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4.4 ICPD+10 (UN, 2004) 
Given that another 10 years had passed, one might ask why a global conference was not 
convened, since there had been one in 1974, 1984, and 1994. Unfortunately, this is an issue that 
cannot be resolved through exclusive recourse to the text itself. Fortunately, though, Singh’s 
insider status helps to provide a set of historical-contextual-geopolitical reasons for this change:  
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Cairo, the United Nations did not 
organize a global conference to review progress towards the implementation of 
the ICPD Programme of Action. The US administration had changed in 2001 and 
its representatives at various UN meetings began challenging several aspects of 
the consensus reached on reproductive health and reproductive rights at Cairo, 
particularly on the subject of abortion. In this attempt, it very often received the 
support of the Holy See and a few other countries. On the other side, there was 
very little desire on the part of a large group of countries (including those from 
Western Europe) to support the idea of holding a global conference where 
attempts could be made to reopen or redefine some of the major elements of the 
hard-won Cairo consensus. Some of the donor countries were also concerned 
about the possible allocation of millions of dollars for organizing such an event as 
also of the staff time and attention (including hiring of additional staff) needed 
over a period of two to three years.31 
                                                 
31 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 170. Again, much 
like with Intelligent Design and global warming, these concerns reflect the concern involved when settled agreement 
(“closure”) was re-opened for discussion and argument. 
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Singh chronicles a series of disagreements and complications that prevented more widespread 
agreement during this process. For instance, even a resolution to provide renewed support for the 
Millennium Development Goals, the Programme of Action, and Key Actions, “in order to satisfy 
those that had first expressed some reservations at Cairo and restated them at the meeting of the 
Commission [on Population and Development], refers to the reports of the ICPD and the Key 
Actions for Further Implementation ‘in their entirety’, the point being that these reports as issued 
by the United Nations contain all the statements and reservations made at the two events.”32 
 Nevertheless, despite a number of stumbling blocks, the commemoration and 
reaffirmation occurred:  
The General Assembly commemorated the tenth anniversary of the IPCD on 24 
October 2004. The Assembly heard around 70 statements, many of them 
delivered by ministers or deputy ministers on behalf of their governments. These 
reiterated the commitments of the governments concerned to the ICPD 
Programme of Action and the action taken by them to implement the Programme 
of Action in the context of their own situation and requirements.33 
As Singh notes, “In commemoration of the 10th anniversary of ICPD, the Assembly also adopted 
a commemorate resolution, but the resolution does not deal with any substantive themes or 
issues.”34 
                                                 
32 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 173. 
33 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 173. 
34 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 173. 
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 Armed with this historical-contextual work providing the scene for the ICPD+10 process, 
I turn next to a more internally, text-driven account of the ten-year review.  
4.5 ICPD AT TEN: THE WORLD REAFFIRMS CAIRO (2004) 
4.5.1 Key Features of the Text 
Though bearing a publication date of 2005, the text ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms 
Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review (2005) is the official publication 
representing the 2004 ICPD+10 efforts.35 The document is actually a compilation of, as noted in 
its title, "official outcomes" representing the ICPD+10 process. This includes meetings of the 
United Nations Commission on Population and Development, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia and League of Arab States. The official outcomes of 
those meetings, reproduced in the publication, were produced between 2002 and 2004, rather 
than in one grand conference. As noted in the Foreword: 
This collection of declarations, resolutions and agreements, adopted by regional 
and global inter-governmental bodies during 2002-2004, serves as a mid-point 
appraisal and a record of progress toward achieving the goals of the twenty-year 
                                                 
35 ICPD at Ten. 
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ICPD Programme of Action and the ICPD+5 Key Actions for the Further 
Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on 
Population and Development.36 
This organizational structure bears very little resemblance to the documents analyzed in chapter 
2, 3, and the beginning of this chapter. Instead of one overarching, programmatic statement, 
there are at least 12 discrete texts within a text. The length of these texts-within-texts also varies, 
ranging from under one page to approximately 21 pages. Also, while in chapter 2 I noted that the 
general criteria for textual inclusion required that it be an international, intergovernmental 
conference, this document ends up not matching such criteria very well. 
4.5.1.1 Why It Merits Inclusion as a “Text” 
Why, then, does this text (or, to be precise, compilation of texts), merit inclusion in the 
document? First, as a matter of necessity, since there have been no international, 
intergovernmental UN population conferences recently (since Cairo), analyzing efforts such as 
the ICPD+10 process is the only way to chart ongoing continuities and transformations of the 
public argument. Second, in some ways, understanding Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo as 
documents that were produced in one set of high-profile meetings is misleading. For example, a 
full draft of the Cairo Programme of Action existed long before delegations ever arrived in 
Egypt. Thus, in some ways, considering these conferences as "snapshot" events has always been 
a bit of a stretch.37 Third, the structure of "ICPD at Ten" is, in many ways, indicative of an 
                                                 
36 ICPD at Ten, V.  
37 Similarly, as the example of ICPD+5 suggests, each of these documents draws upon prior work by 
regional meetings and other international meetings:  
The present document draws on the results and findings of intergovernmental reviews under the 
auspices of the United Nations, including the annual and quinquennial review and appraisal by the 
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emerging and important trend with regard to United Nations conferences. As Schechter notes, 
especially because of the costs of hosting mega-conferences, the trend has been to move away 
from these large meetings in favor of more feasible alternatives. In this sense, a number of 
regional meetings, compiled for the international community and brought together by an official 
commemoration of the 10th anniversary in the United Nations General Assembly, may offer a 
glimpse into future international conferences and international action on pressing global issues. 
Having now introduced and justified the text(s) under consideration, I turn now to a rhetorical 
analysis of the ICPD+10 efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commission on Population and Development and meetings and reports of the United Nations 
regional commissions regarding progress made and constraints faced in the implementation of the 
Programme of Action.  
“Key Texts,” 13. 
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Table 10. Top 20* Terms, ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo (UN)38 
Top 20* Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number) 
1. Development 
2. Population 
3. Action 
4. International 
5. Health 
6. Programme 
7. Reproductive 
8. ICPD 
9. Implementation 
10. Economic 
11. Countries 
12. Conference 
13. Goals 
14. Page* 
15. Commission 
16. Including 
17. Social 
18. Cairo 
19. Policies 
20. Poverty 
21. Programmes 
 
4.5.2 Rhetorical Analysis 
There are many key terms that overlap with those from ICPD+5, the original Programme of 
Action, and even its predecessors, so instead of surveying all possibilities (and thus creating 
redundancy), I focus on three central thematic vectors of analysis: the document’s simultaneous 
movements toward diffusion while displaying powerful message discipline, the continuing 
                                                 
38 See comments after table 2 (chapter 2), for explanation of Wordle. This analysis was performed May 27, 
2009. When I manually moved text from the pdf version of the document to a word version, to facilitate analysis 
such as Wordle, I added the word “page” by page numbers in order to preserve original document pagination. 
Because of this addition on my part, “Page” comes in as #14 in the document’s frequency. Because of this 
distortion, I actually included the top 21, rather than just the top 20. For a visual representation, not only of the top 
21 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix E.  
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movement toward a neoliberal worldview/perspective, and a discussion of “strategy” in reference 
to Habermas’ characterization of rhetoric as strategic action.  
Table 11. Notable Terms & Phrases, ICPD + 10 (UN) 
Notable Term/Phrase Frequency 
Millennium Declaration, Millennium Development Goals, Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), millennium development goal, millennium development goals 
 
38 
Poverty 
   -poverty eradication/eradicate poverty 
   -extreme poverty 
   -poverty reduction/reduction of poverty 
67 
4 
5 
15 
Well-being 
Quality of life 
6 
6 
Access 42 
Enable, enables, enabling 
   -enabling environments 
14 
6 
Integration, reintegration, integrating, integrate39 
Incorporation, incorporating, incorporate 
Inclusion 
Linkages 
24 
8 
2 
3 
Human capital 3 
 
4.5.2.1 Message Control 
The ICPD+10 documents represent an increasing diffusion of actors, agreements, and 
actions to achieve the relevant goals. While the Programme of Action, the 1999 "Key Actions," 
and the "Millennium Development Goals" are the primary "precedents" upon which each 
"official outcomes" document rests and which each "official outcomes" document "reaffirms," 
there are a number of regional and other international efforts that are given recognition in the 
ICPD+10 efforts. Even Fréchette, in commemorating the ICPD, links it with other international, 
UN-based efforts: "our commemoration here today should contribute to preparations for the 
important events planned for the next year: the ten-year reviews of both the Beijing and 
                                                 
39 Some of these references are about integrating sectors (health, education, development, population, 
etc…), but in this case, integration and reintegration also at times refer to issues relating to migration.  
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Copenhagen conferences and the five-year review of the Millennium Declaration."40 The 
declaration of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa is both a review of the ICPD 
and the Dakar/Ngor Declaration of 1992.41 It also supports the "New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD)."42 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
also references regional population agreements such as the Latin American and Caribbean 
Consensus on Population of Development from 1993 and the "Latin American and Caribbean 
Regional Plan of Action on Population and Development" from 1994.43 The United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific examines the implementation of both 
the ICPD as well as the Bali Declaration on Population and Sustainable Development of 1992.44 
All of these linkages with other international and regional efforts indicate a diffusion of efforts 
and a decentralization from the international mega-conference to other, more regional and local 
efforts.  
Though ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo is actually a collection of documents, 
rather than one discrete text, the various texts do a generally strong job of staying "on message" 
with each other. For instance, they all attempt to send the message about the necessary 
connection between implementing the ICPD and achieving the MDGs. Similarly, each gives 
increased priority to poverty and HIV/AIDS, and continues to promote a strong role for 
partnerships of various sorts. Had this message coordination and discipline not occurred, we 
would most likely consider each document in complete isolation from the others, rather than as 
                                                 
40 ICPD at Ten, X. 
41 ICPD at Ten, 16. 
42 ICPD at Ten, 17. 
43 ICPD at Ten, 63. 
44 ICPD at Ten, 70. 
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texts within a larger text. Such a shift of perspective would have made the ICPD+10 effort, at 
least from a textual perspective, generally ineffective and incoherent. It would have also called 
into question whether or not there was a global issue anymore, and thus whether it merited UN 
action in the first place. I now turn to a more extended analysis of “message control” in relation 
to the MDGs, and the ways that the MDGs influence the foci of the +10 text. 
One of the most significant differences between the ICPD+5 document and the ICPD+10 
document (which are otherwise highly similar) relates to the presence of an event that occurred 
in between 1999 and 2004. In 2000, the United Nations held its Millennium Summit, out of 
which were produced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).45 Having these important 
international agreements as a backdrop, the 2004 conference had to both negotiate the 
relationship between the ICPD process and the MDGs as well as argue for the continued 
relevance of the ICPD in a world with the MDGs. The document ended up dealing with both of 
these issues by means of working through the second issue: why should we still concern 
ourselves with the Cairo Programme of Action now that the international community has set the 
agenda with the Millennium Development Goals? Despite the different locations of various 
regional meetings, the "message control" was on point with regard to the answer to this question. 
The Economic Commission for Africa's Declaration notes: 
[T]he Millennium Development Goals cannot be achieved unless further action is 
taken to ensure the full implementation of the Programme of Action of the 
International Conference on Population and Development and of the "Key 
                                                 
45 These events are so important that the 2005 publication includes, as its only appendix, a brief description 
of the Millennium Development Goals as they relate to the goals of the ICPD. 
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Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the 
International Conference on Population and Development."46 
Similarly, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean observes: "the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action and the Key 
Actions for Further Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action is essential for the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals."47 The Economic and Social Commission 
for Western Asia and League of Arab States' Declaration contains similar language: "the goals of 
the ICPD Programmed (sic) of Action and the Millennium Development Goals are 
complementary and interrelated, and . . . realization of the former is fundamental to achieving the 
latter."48 The Millennium Summit and Millennium Development goals are also clustered with a 
frequent passage—"internationally agreed development goals"—though, from the particular 
phrasing, this latter phrase seems to include but not be exhausted by the goals set at the 
Millennium Summit.49  
As a result of this linkage with the Millennium Development Goals, there is a sharp focus 
on efforts to reduce and eliminate poverty. There are approximately 65 references to "poverty" in 
the 2004 document (in comparison, there are 19 references in the 1999 ICPD+5 "Key Actions"). 
Many of these references are clustered around the idea of "poverty eradication," and a number of 
others make the reference to ending "extreme poverty." This makes sense in the context of the 
MDGs: "The overarching millennium development goal of the United Nations Millennium 
                                                 
46 ICPD at Ten, 18. 
47 ICPD at Ten, 45. 
48 ICPD at Ten, 93. 
49 ICPD at Ten. While the claim is continually asserted, there is little in the way of warrants about what 
specifically in the Programme of Action is vital to the MDGs and cannot be done exclusively through the MDG 
process as well or better than continuing both sets of efforts. 
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Declaration is the eradication of extreme poverty."50 Like many of these important terms, 
"poverty" was never absent in previous population texts such as Bucharest, Mexico City, and 
Cairo. Instead, the prominence afforded efforts to address and eliminate poverty are given 
greater priority in the 2004 document because of the recent Millennium Summit. Indeed, 
whereas the phrase "population and development" had, in the course of the conference texts, 
become more and more commonplace, in the 2004 document policies to address poverty appear 
to gain equal footing with these other pillars with such phrasing as " population, development 
and poverty reduction policies."51  
Though not at all new to +10, and in fact directly traceable to Bucharest, well-being and 
quality of life are championed in the document. These reflect a designation of importance to 
qualitative indicators of human happiness and well-being as critical goals for the Programme of 
Action and its implementation. The conclusion to the Foreword provides the importance of these 
goals: "As we look back over the past decade and look forward to the next ten years, the message 
of Cairo-putting people first and investing in people-remains a guide as we strive to reduce 
poverty and improve human well-being."52 Similarly, Fréchette, in a statement published as the 
Introduction to the text, concludes remarks with the message: "As we look ahead, I urge you to 
overcome your remaining differences on sensitive issues, reaffirm your full commitment to the 
ICPD Programme of Action, and intensify our common work towards a world of development 
and well-being for all."53 In each of these passages, the emphasis on well-being is critical to the 
                                                 
50 ICPD at Ten, 72. 
51 ICPD at Ten, 86. 
52 ICPD at Ten, VI. 
53 ICPD at Ten, X. Notably, in relation to my analysis on sanitizing controversy from Chapter 2, this is one 
of the only textual traces in which the author(s) recognize that some components of the ICPD are controversial and 
thus represent “sensitive issues” on which there continue to exist “differences.” 
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overall aim of the conference. In promoting "quality of life," there is, again, a link between well-
being, quality of life, and efforts to address and eliminate poverty: "Population, development and 
poverty are closely interrelated and achieving sustained economic growth and a balance between 
population, resources and the environment is essential for sustainable development, eradication 
of poverty and improving the quality of life of current and future generations."54 In addition to 
these primary terms, there are also subsets supporting the same theme, with claims about the 
need to improve "daily lives" and to allow for "upward social mobility."55  
4.5.2.2 Trending toward Neoliberalism 
Consistent with the neoliberal trend toward self-dependence and self-sufficiency, first 
addressed earlier this chapter, the document places significant emphasis on "access." There are 
42 references to some variant of "access" (access, accessibility, accessible) in the document. 
These references get clustered with "quality," both in the sense that people need access to high-
quality services and information, and that, in addition to access, quality is another important 
component. The references are also clustered with "comprehensive," in noting the need to have 
access to comprehensive services.56 Calls for access are also made particularly with regard to 
vulnerable and marginalized sub-groups in the population. While there is much to be appreciated 
and lauded in calls for enhancing access, the risk is that it becomes some correlate of the 
"equality of opportunity, not result" type of thinking endemic to present-day U.S. social policies. 
                                                 
54 ICPD at Ten, 71. 
55 ICPD at Ten, X; 20, 52. 
56 "Comprehensive" plays an important role throughout the document, including but not limited to its 
linkage with access, and could be considered a separate key term. 
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In this sense, a necessary component becomes mistaken for a sufficient component, risking a 
further disadvantaging of both individuals and sub-groups in a population. 
Carrying a similar emphasis toward promoting individual (self and country) 
responsibility and self-sufficiency, the document continues the trend from 1999 by promoting the 
idea of "enabling." The document contains 14 references to some variant of enabling, including 6 
that call for creating/supporting "enabling environments," 1 that calls for enabling governments, 
and 7 that call for enabling individuals, including in particular women and young people.57 
Again, the lure of all of these types of identifiers is that they create a sense of agency and choice. 
The danger is that, instead of providing services, goods, realized opportunities, they end up 
stopping at potential opportunities, access, and enabling situations that might potentially lead to 
services, goods, or realized opportunities.58  
Finally, in a move signaling the tendency of a neoliberal worldview to view everything, 
including humans, in terms of a monetary idiom, the 2004 text makes three references to the 
need to develop "human capital."59 Rhetorically, this is an interesting choice of terms, since 
capital is usually considered in terms of financial, monetary capital, or in terms of natural, 
resource-based capital. Though not an altogether new term, it reflects either an understanding of 
humans as resources or an attempt to put humans back into development (or perhaps some 
combination of both). The document links "human capital" with development and women:  
                                                 
57 ICPD at Ten, 17, 36, 52, 70, 86, 89; 95; 18, 31, 33, 33, 70, 108, 109; 108; 109. 
58 Much like the 1999 text, there are also many references to "capacity" and "capacity-building," consistent 
with the theme addressed here. 
59 Some environmentalists have attempted to use "human capital" in a positive deployment. For instance, 
see Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and L. Hunter Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial 
Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999). 
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Improvement of human capital is fundamental to development and women, who 
comprise half the population, remain disadvantaged and marginalized in accessing 
social and economic opportunities, participating in the development process and 
assuming political and administrative responsibilities.60 
It is also linked to decision-making ability: 
Emphasize human capital formation and infrastructural development as a strategy 
for promoting informed decision-making, paying special attention to inequalities 
and disparities in access to education, health, employment and microcredit.61 
4.5.2.3  “Strategy”: Revisiting Habermas 
In the +5 text, there is a shift to embracing “advocacy.” In +10, the role of “strategy” 
becomes enlarged. While, according to Habermas, rhetoric represents “strategic action,” in the 
context of this text, strategy is stripped of such pejorative attachments.62 Though “advocacy” 
represented a step forward in +5, a new phrase in the 2004 text, “behaviour change 
communication (BCC),” suggests a step back.63 For instance, on the positive side, the document 
explains, "Many countries in the region have introduced advocacy and communication as one of 
the integral components in their development programmes, by recognizing the importance of 
these components as a basis for creating awareness, generating participation, making informed 
                                                 
60 ICPD at Ten, 71. 
61 ICPD at Ten, 72-73. 
62 Similarly, the Dutch school of argumentation, pragma-dialectics, classifies rhetoric as “strategic 
maneuvering.”  
63 ICPD at Ten, 80. Also, while “advocacy” was a step forward, the language of “Information, education 
and communication activities” (IEC), in addition to appearing regularly in the Programme of Action, also occurred 
frequently in the +5 “Key Actions” document.  
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decisions and resolving conflict."64 However, on the flip side, the document is less promising, as 
it suggests: 
Governments, in cooperation with civil society organizations and the private 
sector, where appropriate, are urged to: 1. Strengthen population information, 
advocacy and BCC programmes at all levels to increase awareness of priority 
issues such as population, sustainable development, poverty reduction, migration, 
ageing, gender, reproductive health, including the needs of adolescents, 
HIV/AIDS and resource mobilization.65 
The clustering of BCC with "interventions" and the language above, while in some ways 
promising, still represent an awkward categorization of knowledge claims whose genesis, I 
argue, resides in the failure, and perhaps refusal, to engage in the consideration of, for the 
purposes of population advocacy, communication as rhetoric (as argued in Chapter 2). 
4.6  READING ICPD+5 AND ICPD+10 TOGETHER 
While much valuable analysis can be gleaned by discussing each text in isolation, since these 
documents represent very similar purposes, there are themes that stretch across the two 
documents. In particular, I examine four: a veering toward what G. Thomas Goodnight has 
articulated as the technical sphere, promising seeds of gender nuancing, a question of whether 
the document is reflexive in the thick sense of being “self-risking,” and an examination of the 
                                                 
64 ICPD at Ten, 85. 
65 ICPD at Ten, 86. 
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receding role of “sustainable development” while “demographics” and “the apocalypse” make 
subtle returns.  
4.6.1 Veering toward the Technical *Sphere* 
G. Thomas Goodnight proposed a threefold distinction of the public, private, and 
technical spheres of argument. In some ways, the borders linking these spheres have always been 
relatively porous. Nevertheless, the importance of distinguishing public sphere communication 
and argument from technical sphere communication remains important. If we consider this 
public-technical divide less from the perspective of separate spheres and more in terms of a 
continuum, we can understand the shift from the Cairo conference to the ICPD+5 and ICPD+10. 
From the perspective of "spheres," the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action may appear largely to 
follow technical sphere reasoning. However, it also stood out as a publicly produced and 
consumed document expressing the sentiments of large portions of the international community 
(as exemplified by the amount of attention it received, then and since then, from scholarly, NGO, 
and activist communities). From the perspective of a continuum, we might more fairly place the 
Programme of Action in some moderate location, neither wholly public nor wholly technical, but 
containing elements of both. In comparison to the Programme of Action's location on such a 
continuum, the 1999 ICPD+5 "Key Actions" falls more closely in the direction of the technical. 
In some ways this is understandable, since it did not set out to break new ground in the public 
argument, but rather to appraise and to recommend how to continue forward in the pursuit of 
already agreed-upon goals. There are a number of textual hints and clues that suggest a 
substantially technical orientation to the 1999 document, including the calls for developing and 
utilizing indicators to monitor progress, recommendations for improving data collection and 
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analysis and dissemination, numerous suggestions for additional research and study in order to 
improve understanding, calls for the documentation and exchange of positive experiences, and in 
general an orientation geared primarily toward information and implementation. As one extended 
anecdote of this focus, I turn to the document’s emphasis of “indicators.” 
As a document ostensibly created in order to gauge the progress (or lack thereof) in 
pursuit of the goals and actions of the ICPD Programme of Action, one of the primary areas of 
emphasis is in developing instruments to be able to measure such progress. One key term that 
appears repeatedly throughout the document is "indicator/indicators." That is, the document 
seeks to select and utilize indicators that will allow them to monitor the progress of the 
Programme of Action. In all, there are 15 references to indicator/indicators in the text, including 
one section titled "Data Systems, including Indicators." One strategy of promoting indicators is 
to be able to find out information about particular subsets of the population: in numerous 
references, the document seeks to develop and use indicators in order to break down pertinent 
information by age and by gender.66 In addition to utilizing already agreed upon and already 
existing indicators in order to produce new information, the document also endorses locating and 
agreeing upon new indicators. For instance, the document calls for developing indicators on 
reproductive health:  
Increased efforts are needed by the United Nations system, with support from the 
international community, to develop and agree on common key indicators on 
reproductive health programmes, including, inter alia, family planning, maternal 
health, sexual health, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and information, 
                                                 
66 For instance, see "Key Actions," Para 37. 
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education and communication for appropriate consideration in the relevant 
intergovernmental process.67 
In two places, the text references a clustering phrase: "benchmark indicator."68  
Similarly, the +10 text is also substantially geared toward technical argumentation and 
reasoning. The ninth most frequently used term in the text is "implementation," so it is 
understandable that the document's purpose is to ensure action rather than develop the rhetorical 
vision that will serve as the precursor to action. For instance, as with the "Key Actions" 
document, there is ample attention given to the need to improve data and systems for gathering 
and analyzing data. Also, the language surrounding utilizing and developing new indicators is 
likewise strong. In this document, there is also emphasis on using research and data in order to 
ground "evidence-based" action.69 The emphasis on capacity-building is also largely geared 
toward developing a data infrastructure. 
4.6.2 Gender 
Though, as I noted in reference to earlier conference documents, some elementary 
confusions, such as sex/gender conflation, enter into what otherwise might be considered gender-
progressive documents, the +5 and +10 texts each contribute nuances to the IR gender 
discussion. 
                                                 
67 "Key Actions," Para 55. 
68 "Key Actions," Paras 64, 70. 
69 Rhetoricians have critiqued this idea of “evidence-based” because it assumes that evidence itself makes 
an argument. This is similar to the broader problem in scientific communities when scientists make claims like “the 
data speaks for itself.” On the other hand, “evidence-based” can be encouraging insofar as it opens spot for 
deliberation, argumentation, reason-giving, and providing the opportunity for the best argument to be victorious, 
rather than making decisions based on blind appeal to expertise or authority, for instance. 
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Not unexpectedly, given the heightened focus at Cairo in 1994, "gender" remains a 
critical key term in the 1999 text. "Gender" is referenced 38 times in the document, including in 
three section headings: "Gender equality, equity and the empowerment of women," "Gender 
perspective in programmes and policies," and "Advocacy for gender equality and equity." The 
first phrase, "gender equality, equity, and the empowerment of women," is a much-repeated 
phrase in the document (much like "sustained economic growth and sustainable development” 
was for the 1994 Cairo document). Gender is also clustered with a number of other important 
terms and phrases, including gender gap, gender-sensitive, gender-based, gender perspective, and 
gender mainstreaming. Importantly, gender perspective and gender mainstreaming are new to the 
1999 document (though the concerns they embody were arguably an implicit element of the 1994 
Programme of Action): 
A gender perspective should be adopted in all processes of policy formulation and 
implementation and in the delivery of services, especially in sexual and 
reproductive health, including family planning. In this regard, the institutional 
capacity and expertise of staff in Government, civil society, including non 
governmental organizations, and the United Nations system should be 
strengthened in order to promote gender mainstreaming. This should be done by 
sharing tools, methodologies and lessons learned in order to develop and 
strengthen their capacity and institutionalize effective strategies for gender-based 
analysis and gender mainstreaming. This includes the development and 
availability of gender-disaggregated data and appropriate indicators for 
monitoring progress at the national level.70 
                                                 
70 "Key Actions," Para 46. 
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“Key terms” also provides an important discussion of men's roles and responsibilities. 
Consistent with the importance given to gender issues, especially at Cairo, there continues to be 
an awareness of the need to involve men in the gender approaches to population and 
development. In the "Key Actions" document, there are important recommendations relating to 
improvement of gender understandings for men: 
All leaders at all levels, as well as parents and educators, should promote positive 
male role models that facilitate boys to become gender-sensitive adults and enable 
men to support, promote and respect women's sexual and reproductive health and 
reproductive rights, recognizing the inherent dignity of all human beings. Men 
should take responsibility for their own reproductive and sexual behaviour and 
health. Research should be undertaken on men's sexuality, their masculinity and 
their reproductive behaviour.71 
In addition to these broad-based statements regarding developing more gender-sensitive, 
responsible men, the document also provides specific lists of "roles and responsibilities" to be 
emphasized: 
Promote men's understanding of their roles and responsibilities with regard to 
respecting the human rights of women; protecting women's health, including 
supporting their partners' access to sexual and reproductive health services; 
preventing unwanted pregnancy; reducing maternal mortality and morbidity; 
reducing transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS; 
sharing household and child-rearing responsibilities; and promoting the 
elimination of harmful practices, such as female genital mutilation, and sexual 
                                                 
71 "Key Actions," Para 50. 
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and other gender-based violence, ensuring that girls and women are free from 
coercion and violence.72 
While not new to this round of documents, it nevertheless remains an important marker showing 
the awareness of the multi-faceted nature of efforts to combat gender equity and equality.  
4.6.3 Reflexivity and Self-Risk  
To borrow an analogy from theater, when somebody decides to In updating a classic play, 
a playwright might choose to follow the original very closely, keeping it mostly the same, 
making only casting and, potentially, updates to reflect the current time and place. Alternately, 
she/he can modify some important element of the play that substantially or perhaps even 
fundamentally changes the play's meaning in its new form. Arguably, both Mexico City and 
Cairo chose the latter. Based on the analysis provided above, however, ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 
chose the former, providing only cosmetic updates and alterations to the text.73 Apart from the 
changed international context of the Millennium Summit and Millennium Development Goals, 
there is very little that has fundamentally changed from the 1994 Programme of Action to the 
2004 ICPD+10 efforts. In the absence of major changes, my synthetic read of these two moments 
                                                 
72 "Key Actions," Para 52, Subsection G. “Promote,” while not perfect, at least stands apart from 
“information” and “education” in its implicit suggestion that these things must be “promoted” up against less 
desirable worldviews.  However, awareness and understanding quickly return, for instance, in 62c: "Support public 
health education to create awareness of the risks of pregnancy, labour and delivery and to increase the understanding 
of the respective roles and responsibilities of family members, including men, as well as of civil society and 
Governments, in promoting and protecting maternal health." 
73 Another useful analogy, closer to the realm of communication studies, comes from debate practice. In 
debate, if a policy problem can be fixed without major action, the negative could, at least in the past, offer an 
argument of "minor repair." As Vance Trefethen explains: "A 'minor repair' is a Negative strategy that is simpler 
than offering a counterplan. It consists of a simple suggestion of a minor, insignificant improvement that could be 
made in the status quo, without adopting the proposition, that would solve the Affirmative harms." Strategic Debate: 
Reason, Argumentation, and Strategy for Winning Scholastic Debates (Monument, CO: Trading Minds Ministry 
Publications, 2004), 97. 
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in tandem generates two important discussions: the reflexivity (or lack thereof) of these 
documents in relation to the Programme of Action, and the continuing viability (or lack thereof) 
of "sustainable development" as a guiding marker in the follow-ups to Cairo. The following 
analysis considers how these topics frame understanding of popular discourse. 
First, as indicated above, the 1999 and 2004 texts are reflexive in terms of their 
connections with the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development. In fact, 
both of them exist expressly as follow-ups to the Cairo conference. The language of support, 
reaffirmation, and recommitment to the Programme of Action fills these two texts (much as 
Mexico City supported Bucharest and Cairo affirmed Bucharest and Mexico City). In one sense, 
then, these documents might appropriately be labeled "reflexive." In this reflexiveness, each 
document sensitively negotiates the rhetorical dilemmas incurred by assessing the progress 
toward the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action. As with the Cairo Programme of 
Action, the 1999 "Key Actions" document has to walk a fine line between overselling and 
underselling progress, so that it can acknowledge progress, shortcomings, and provide both hope 
and caution moving ahead. Therefore, in the preamble, the document sets out both a set of 
accomplishments and a set of setbacks/challenges to the implementation: 
The five-year review of progress shows that the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Programme of Action has shown positive results. Many 
countries have taken steps to integrate population concerns into their development 
strategies. . . The Conference’s broad-based definition of reproductive health is 
being accepted by an increasing number of countries. . . there is greater 
accessibility to family planning and that more and more couples and individuals 
are able to choose the number and spacing of their children. . . However, for some 
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countries and regions, progress has been limited, and in some cases setbacks have 
occurred. Women and the girl child continue to face discrimination. The human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) 
pandemic has led to rises in mortality in many countries. . . Adolescents remain 
particularly vulnerable to reproductive and sexual risks. Millions of couples and 
individuals still lack access to reproductive health information and services. . . 
The impact of the financial crises in countries of Asia and elsewhere . . . is 
affecting the health and well-being of individuals and limiting progress in 
implementing the Programme of Action.74 
The ICPD+10 efforts also must negotiate a difficult rhetorical task of promoting progress 
and urgency with regard to efforts remaining. Fréchette attempts to walk this fine line in a 
statement to the General Assembly on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Cairo 
conference:  
Today, countries throughout the world continue to use the ICPD Programme in 
forging the strategies and policies with which they hope to address population 
issues and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. And they are making 
substantial progress, building on the achievements of earlier decades. The world 
is beginning to see the end of rapid population growth . . . These and other gains 
are profound and far-reaching, as they involve some of the most basic and 
intimate human experiences . . . Yet any satisfaction we may feel at the expansion 
of rights and freedoms involving population issues must be tempered by an acute 
awareness of the unfinished agenda, the fact that parts of the world are not sharing 
                                                 
74 "Key Actions," Paras 9-10. 
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in this progress, and the daunting challenges that have emerged in the meantime.. 
. . And we have yet to achieve universal access to vitally needed reproductive 
health services and family planning . . . Instead, too many women and girls go 
without, leading to unplanned or mistimed births . . . It is only a little more than a 
generation since the international community collectively started addressing 
population and development issues. While much has been achieved and much has 
been learned, there have also been shortfalls and gaps. In the coming years and 
decades we can and must go much further.75 
By emphasizing tangible, specific points of progress and areas where progress has not 
been achieved, and by contextualizing the efforts in context—"it is only a little more than a 
generation since the international community collectively started addressing population and 
development issue" (another way of framing time and history)—the document is able to suggest 
both reasons for hope and reasons for urgency addressing "the unfinished agenda." Throughout 
the document, the most common language used to address this dilemma is to talk about 
"accelerating" or "intensifying" the implementation of the Programme of Action. 
While these efforts at unpacking time within the course of a text, as Michael Leff has 
suggested, is of great importance, a more fundamental question remains: to what degree does this 
reflexiveness entail a more basic element of “self-risking,” (in the sense that Brockriede uses it, 
in Chapter 2) that there could be significant, or even fundamental, errors in the approach of the 
ICPD process? There are no major admissions of error, shortsightedness, or any other indicators 
that would admit of any real error on the part of the 1994 Programme of Action. Even the 
creative and subtle language of Mexico City and Cairo, in trying to make some significant 
                                                 
75 ICPD at Ten, VIII-X. 
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modifications by noting how things have changed and time has passed do not really even appear. 
At most, the enhanced importance and priority accorded to HIV/AIDS is the closest thing to a 
significant shift in the documents. While some other issues are given relatively more or less 
priority and frequency than they possessed in the 1994 text, it would be hard to point to major 
points at which these 2 texts changed course in meaningful ways. In one sense, that would be 
unfair and unlikely, as both are expressly follow-up documents. On the other hand, Mexico City 
was seen as a follow-up to Bucharest yet still helped to change the emphasis in important ways 
that would eventually enable shifts at Cairo, and Cairo, as a follow-up to both Mexico City and 
Bucharest (despite its claim to having a "broader mandate") still made important adjustments and 
course corrections.  
4.6.4 Sustainability, Demography, and Apocalypticism  
While explicit shifts from Cairo to +5 to+10 are minimal, some foregrounding and 
background is critically significant. In particular, I trace three such changes: the receding of 
“sustainable development” as an ecologically-packed concept, the subtle reintroduction of logics 
of demography, and small but significant traces of apocalypticism in the texts (in particular, in 
the +10 text).  
It is pertinent to question the ongoing relevance, or lack thereof, of the phrase 
"sustainable development" in these follow-up efforts. In the 1994 Programme of Action, it was 
not unexpected or coincidental that the language of "sustainable development" was pervasive, 
given that the 1992 Rio conference, widely credited with popularizing the term, had occurred just 
two year earlier. However, with the passing of time, it remained an open question how vital the 
language of "sustainable development" would remain. In the ICPD+5 "Key Actions" document, 
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there are only 6 references to "sustainable development." In the ICPD+10 document, there are 13 
references, but two of those are proper nouns referring to a 1992 declaration. In the 2004 
document in particular, one sees some variance in the language of sustainability, one that is 
increasingly divorced from environmental concerns. For instance, references to variants such as 
"sustainable and equitable development," "sustainable growth and development, within the 
context of the Millennium Development Goals," "sustained economic growth and sustainable 
human development," and "sustained economic growth and social development."76 As a point of 
reference, the Cairo Programme of Action contained 80 references to "sustainable development" 
(of which 3 were proper nouns). Despite Peterson's claim about the potential offered by the 
inexact meanings of "sustainable development," the term's reference value appears to have 
waned, either because it has become readily accepted (or maybe readily rejected) or because 
alternatives have been sought and/or pursued.77 If it has receded, this seems to be yet another 
frame shift, following Greene, in which the question of population becomes detached from the 
question of the environment.  
Though relatively subtle, these texts also accelerate a set of logics of demography 
(though, as suggested in Chapter 2, the demographic logics have actually increased in presence 
from Bucharest to Mexico City to Cairo, rather than, as almost all of the political and scholarly 
“pundits” argue, falling away). The 1999 text shares important similarities with the Programme 
of Action in terms of its discussion of demographic projections and possibilities. It again 
discourages quotas to achieve demographic goals. It again suggests that "stabilization" of world 
population can assist in attaining the other goals of the Programme of Action. However, perhaps 
                                                 
76 ICPD at Ten, 17; 17; 31; 46. 
77 Tarla Rai Peterson, Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development (Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1997). 
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to a better degree than the previous documents, it notes the widely divergent demographic 
situations, not across time, but in space: "The majority of the world's countries are converging in 
a pattern of low birth and death rates, but since these countries are proceeding at different speeds, 
the emerging picture is that of a world facing increasingly diverse demographic situations."78 
This geopolitical awareness reflects the situation described in Chapter 1, in which public 
argument about population seems so disjointed because of the conflicting rhetoric of 
"dangerously low fertility rates" (in developed countries such as France), and "ever-rising global 
population" (not so much in terms of rates but in terms of absolute volume).  
Finally, these documents, and in particular, the +10 text, in a very subtle way, appear to 
reintroduce some of the apocalyptic envisioning present in earlier instantiations of population 
argument, though with a different focus. In the appendix, with its focus on the Millennium 
Development Goals, the very last appendix item reads as follows: 
Between 2000 and 2015 nearly 1.5 billion young men and women will join the 
20-24 age group. They, and hundreds of millions of teenagers, will be looking for 
work. If they have jobs they will drive economic growth; if not they will fuel 
political instability.79   
In some ways, this line of reasoning is substantially similar to the famous policy debate “card” 
by Walter Russell Mead, in 1992, that warns:  
But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates -- or even shrinks? In 
that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, 
rich against poor. Russia, China, India -- these countries with their billions of 
                                                 
78 "Key Actions," Para 8. 
79 ICPD at Ten, 110. In some ways, this prediction may be playing out in terms of movements like the Arab 
Spring. 
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people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world 
than Germany and Japan did in the 30's.80  
Though seemingly innocent enough, the threat is clear: either economic growth or international 
instability, especially in the global South. While not as strong or as eloquent as Ehrlich's Chicken 
Little claims (or this classic “Mead in ’92” passage), it does seem to reignite a certain strain of 
doomsaying in order to attempt to encourage progress on the ICPD. 
Having now considered these two texts in tandem, I finish by concluding this chapter and 
previewing chapter 5. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Like Tabbarah, Louise Fréchette, then Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
explained in a speech to the General Assembly on October 14, 2004 (included as the introduction 
to ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo) that ICPD+10's genealogy reaches back before 
Cairo to Mexico City and even Bucharest: 
Three decades ago in Bucharest, the World Population Conference overcame 
political differences to adopt a ground-breaking, comprehensive plan of action. 
That plan gave the world its first template for integrating population concerns into 
economic and social development, and established the basic principles guiding 
population programmes today. Ten years later in Mexico City, despite serious 
disagreements on some questions, the International Conference on Population 
                                                 
80 Walter Russell Mead, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 1992.  
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adopted additional recommendations that recognized the need for wider access to 
family planning, and underscored the importance of issues such as the needs of 
adolescents and the role of men. And then, of course, ten years ago, the world's 
efforts to address the intertwined challenges of population and development took 
another major step forward.81 
Therefore, in order to understand and chart the continuities and transformations of public 
argument regarding population, we must understand conferences both from a "snapshot" 
perspective that captures each document in its own right, as well as from a diachronic, 
longitudinal perspective that spans across history and across multiple snapshots (or, to follow the 
metaphor, perhaps more of a video reel) to give a richer perspective on rhetoric and public 
argument. It is in this spirit that I have examined ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 in this chapter, both as 
significant declarations of international agreement and commitment on their own, and as 
additional train stations in the long journey of international argument on population matters. 
While each document possesses important textual attributes, my primary claim is that, viewed in 
context, these documents end up largely reproducing the agreements of Cairo rather than 
charting significant new territory or changing course. Perhaps from this vertical, across time 
perspective, the most noteworthy moment surrounding these two conferences is actually an event 
external to both: the Millennium Summit, and its resulting Millennium Development Goals, 
which in their substantial overlap with the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action, 
required an argument for the ongoing relevance of the stream of public argument from Bucharest 
onward. 
                                                 
81 ICPD at Ten, VIII. Again, following my discussion of “sanitizing controversy” in Chapter 2, this passage 
indicates that Bucharest participants “overcame political differences,” and that Mexico City participants acted 
“despite serious disagreements on some questions.” These statements reflect the dissonance between an apparently 
uncontroversial argument as product and the clearly controversial argument as procedure and argument as process. 
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 Having now examined the five UN population texts spanning this thirty year period 
(1974-2004) I turn in Chapter 5 to a brief postscript and prediction of where international 
argument relating to population issues may be heading, then consider some of the theoretical 
issues, both those opened in Chapter 1 and those raised by the textual analysis in Chapters 2-4.
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5.0  POPULATION, RHETORIC, AND PUBLIC ARGUMENT: LOOKING BACK, 
LOOKING FORWARD 
In this chapter, I reflect on the findings of this project, especially with relation to the case studies 
examined in chapters 2-4. I am now in a position to trace the broad arc of UN population efforts 
across time, so I examine findings both diachronically from across the 30-year period, as well as 
synchronically in relation to each conference. After summarizing the key findings, I turn next to 
a postscript relating to the ICPD process and the future of "population" policy, rhetoric, and 
public argument. I ask what might be next for UN population efforts, for population advocacy 
more generally. In addition, I discuss some vectors for future research that can help to round out 
and provide additional breadth and depth to the current analysis. Finally, I speculate on some 
important theoretical reflections and insights generated by this study. Such reflections spread 
across methodological, topical, and critical terrains. I begin by summarizing the efforts of 
chapters 2-4.  
5.1 THREE DECADES OF UN POPULATION EFFORTS 
In chapter 2, I considered the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, 
held in Cairo. After charting out the basic argument of the text, that if given the opportunity and 
provided the appropriate resources, people throughout the world will make the right choices that 
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will provide for a better population future, I turned to rhetorical analysis of the text. I examined 
the ways in which the Programme of Action manages dialectics such as development-
demographics and universal-particular. I traced the ways in which particular framings of 
communication activities under-theorized the types of roles for communication that would be 
able to meet the stated goals of the document. I looked at the rhetorical quandary faced by 
participants, as they simultaneously attempted to present stable findings while also encouraging 
audiences to participate in social knowledge production and formulation of optimal policy 
choices. I also considered the tension between articulating the full complexity of the population 
problem, on one hand, and on the other, providing a clear “residual message” which would be 
capable of producing the change in the world that would meet the conference’s objectives.  
 In chapter 3, I examined the World Population Conference (Bucharest, 1974), and the 
International Conference on Population (Mexico City, 1984). The Bucharest Conference was 
notable in that it reversed the common sense of population discourse insofar as it suggested that 
development, not demographics, must be addressed first in order to achieve both. In a related 
move, the text was able to shift blame for the population problem from developing countries to 
developed countries, for instance, because of their control of the international economic order 
and because of colonialism. Rather paradoxically, the 1974 international document ultimately 
acted to restrain international action, and instead, to secure the space for sovereignty and for 
states to be the center of population policy activity. Following on the analysis from chapter 2, I 
analyzed how particular communication frames both enabled and constrained action toward 
achieving the conference’s goals. The Mexico City conference, despite its frequent reduction to 
the grandstanding of Ronald Reagan’s US presidential administration, both supported the 
Bucharest vision while adding significantly to it. The Mexico City text softened the 
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development-demographics divide by suggesting that both needed to be addressed 
simultaneously and in coordination, and also did more to balance the opportunities for national 
and international action. The 1984 conference also expanded the role for a wide range of actors, 
such as NGOs, while expanding the issues typically associated with “population” to include 
themes such as health and the environment. In many ways, this expansion of factors significantly 
previewed the complexity enshrined in the Cairo text. As before, I also looked toward the ways 
in which communication and deliberation were both supported and limited. 
 In chapter 4, I examined two follow-up efforts to the Cairo conference: ICPD+5 (1999) 
and ICPD+10 (2004). The 1999 document relied significantly on the strategic use of precedents 
to constitute its authority, and also actively memorialized the efforts of the Cairo conference. 
Potentially because of the limited success at achieving financial goals, ICPD+5 envisioned a 
bigger role for private, as opposed to public, institutions. While the focus on communication and 
participation retained some similarities with its predecessors, the 1999 text also added in new 
terms, advocacy and civil society, to continue to hone its approach for achieving the vision of the 
document. ICPD+10, as a decentralized set of findings from separate regional meetings, was able 
to coordinate message control well, unifying and expressing a continued rationale for the process 
initiated at Cairo (even in light of the newly created MDGs). Building on the tendency toward 
privatization suggested by the 1999 text, ICPD+10 created a vision that could be described as 
neoliberal in nature. Also, in contrast to the typically negative connotations of “strategy” (for 
instance, in argumentation theory), the 2004 text uses strategy to articulate an understanding of 
communication that resonates with some aspects of a rhetorical approach to communication. 
Both the 1999 and 2004 texts largely just reaffirmed the message of Cairo. Instead of breaking 
new ground, they focused on data collection and implementation, representing what Goodnight 
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has termed the technical sphere. As with terms used to indicate communication, the vision of sex 
and gender in these two texts both provided more sophistication than their predecessors while 
still suffering from important shortcomings. In agreeing with the Cairo vision, these texts made 
much less of a change than Mexico City did after Bucharest or Cairo did after Mexico City. 
Finally, I looked at the changing role of sustainability in these texts, the upswing of demographic 
rhetoric, following Cairo, in ICPD+5 and ICPD+10, and the subtle return of apocalyptic rhetoric 
in these texts. 
Having now provided a brief summary of the major findings in chapters 2-4, I turn next a 
short postscript relating to the future of the ICPD and international public argument over 
population, along with suggestions for future research, then turn to some preliminary theoretical 
findings from this project. 
5.2 POSTSCRIPT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As established in the Cairo Programme of Action and emphasized in ICPD+5 and ICPD+10, the 
Programme of Action was designed to cover a 20 year period, from 1994 to 2014. Thus, in the 
summer of 2009, there was another review of the progress and implementation, known as 
"ICPD+15: Accelerating Implementation of the Cairo Consensus."1 Like its predecessors, this 
conference occured at a moment in history with several other significant events running parallel, 
including one of the worst economic crises in recent history, as well as several other important 
political issues. All of these events both strained and provided opportunities for revisiting the 
                                                 
1 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/15/index.cfm (Accessed June 8, 
2009). 
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agenda set at Cairo, as well as for examining the rhetorical strategies of international efforts, and 
especially those of the United Nations. Though it is beyond the scope of this current project, 
examining the ongoing continuities and transformations in rhetoric and public argument, as 
manifested in the ICPD+15 process, constitutes a valuable vector for additional research. 
Beyond the 2009 efforts to examine the progress and implementation of the ICPD, it 
remains an open question what will happen in 2014 when the 20-year window closes. Similarly, 
the Millennium Development Goals have a target date of 2015 for achievement. Another critical 
trajectory for research will be to watch how rhetorical strategies and public arguments are 
negotiated in the lead up to and in the 2014-2015 period. Barring some significant global 
economic turnaround with a companion major investment in the ICPD and MDG efforts, the 
goals of Cairo and the Millennium Summit are unlikely to be met, even if progress has been 
made. Moreover, as Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, Executive Director of the United Nations Population 
Fund, notes, the current economic climate provides severe risks of backsliding in commitments 
and progress toward these goals, potentially wiping out the gains that have been made since 1994 
and 2000, respectively.2 Moreover, as Jyoti Shankar Singh notes, another global population 
conference is unlikely, especially in the current international economic climate.3 Even with the 
possibility of another conference being unclear, and probably unlikely, Singh expresses the 
urgency of continuing the focus on the work at hand:  
I believe that while we must push towards accomplishing as much of the ICPD 
and MDG agenda as we can by 2015, we should already begin to work at 
                                                 
2 Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, March 30, 2009, http://www.unfpa.org/public/News/pid/2371 (Accessed July 1, 
2009). 
3 Singh, Creating a New Consensus, 2009, 217.  
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international, regional and national levels on renewing and strengthening the 
international consensus on population beyond 2015.4  
Apart from the very specific efforts at the United Nations to address these issues, what 
does the future hold for "population" as a vector of public argument? Even tentative answers to 
this question are integrally connected to the definition one provides for what "population" means 
as public argument. There will always be Malthusians and Hardins and Ehrlichs, who continue to 
see (over)population in terms of quantitative, demographic topoi. However, because of the many 
troublesome historic connections that such rhetoric opens, it is unlikely to attain great 
prominence, especially with an international audience. Nevertheless, apart from the Garrett 
Hardins of the world, there are likely to continue to be overtures about global population 
numbers. In fact, this link is now featured most prominently in the intersection of population and 
global warming. There is, as of now, a groundswell of popular press-oriented books which frame 
overpopulation in quantitative, crisis terms. For instance, Thomas Friedman, in a recent popular 
press book, Hot, Flat, and Crowded, suggests that the combination of high population numbers, 
high consumption, and finite resources necessitates significant action. Similarly, Jeffrey Sachs, 
in another recent popular press book, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet, 
revitalizes the topos of "crowded" that shares ties with the neo-Malthusianism of Ehrlich's 
Population Bomb. 
Apart from this narrow view of population, the future of population conceived somewhat 
more broadly is virtually guaranteed. The need for family planning, sexual and reproductive 
health, more respect for and investment in girls and women is unlikely to fade, despite each 
                                                 
4 Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, 
Reproductive Rights and Women’s Empowerment, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 217-218. 
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being charged with a significant degree of controversy. The degree to which these essential 
activities need to be framed under the category “population” as an umbrella term is much less 
clear. It seems that, now that we have so many sectors and vectors associated with population, 
that it might be completely possible to act in those areas (with, for instance, the goals laid out by 
the MDGs), without any reference to “population” as such whatsoever. Thus the question as to 
whether we are over population, in the sense of being finished with that framing as a useful way 
of addressing the most pressing concerns for the global community is an open one.  
In terms of future research trajectories, in addition to tracing the continuing unfolding of 
the ICPD process and the MDGs, and following the popular resurgence of population rhetoric 
(by authors such as Friedman and Sachs), another valuable area for research would be to go back 
and evaluate these 5 historical moments with an eye toward more external, rather than internal, 
concerns. Though it was beyond the scope of the current project, future research could explore 
the reception of these conferences and their documents, in the media and elsewhere. Combining 
the present “close reading,” internalist account with a more externalist account would help to 
round out conclusions about the rhetoric and public argument surrounding population. Just as 
Burke provided both a grammar of motives and a rhetoric of motives, in which the former was 
primarily internal and textually-driven, and the latter was more externally conscious, so too 
would the next stage of this process be to add depth to these readings by, at a minimum, 
enriching the historical-contextual framing of each case study. 
In the next section, I provide a set of theoretical reflections and insights provided by this 
project. 
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5.3 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS AND INSIGHTS 
In the sections that follow, I provide a series of reflections, including about the way in which I 
engaged this project, as well as what might study can tell us about population rhetoric and the 
practice of rhetorical criticism. First, I reflect on the artifacts I studied and on the modes of 
investigation that I utilized. Second, I suggest the implications of the current study for 
international relations theory and practice. Third, I provide a critical judgment and evaluation of 
the texts that collectively represent 30 years of UN population rhetoric. Fourth, I draw on Burke 
to consider the ambiguity of incipience and the role of UN conference documents. Fifth, I 
provide a rebuttal to Gaonkar, and argue for the importance of rhetoric gone global. Sixth, I 
consider the notion of biomimicry, and how some environmental texts can assume/perform the 
form that mirrors the content of their arguments, while in other cases, an attempt at biomimicry 
is likely to fail. Seventh, I evaluate the claims that memorialize Cairo as a paradigm changer. 
Eighth, I suggest the need for a greater amount of “close reading” in order to challenge the 
prevalence, in population literature as well as more broadly, of unwarranted foils and 
problematic fallacies. Finally, I make an appeal, both to those engaged in population rhetoric and 
policy, as well as to rhetoricians, to shift and re-think our critical perspective so that our insights 
and praxis can extend beyond demonization and debunking. 
5.3.1 Reflections on Artifacts and Modes of Investigation 
First, especially in the scholarly communities dedicated to rhetoric, public address, and 
public argument, texts from the United Nations (as well as other international diplomatic 
artifacts) remain drastically understudied. Apart from the Security Council and human rights 
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disputes, the only two areas covered with any frequency in these literature bases, there is hardly 
any discussion of this vital area. Especially in this highly globalized and interconnected world, 
we need to expand our repertoire of texts beyond those that are uttered by high-profile United 
States citizens and/or in the United States.5 Perhaps to a greater degree than other areas of study, 
rhetoricians have, on the whole, been slower to expand their scholarly attention beyond the U.S. 
borders.  
Second, after utilizing Burke's cluster-agon analysis as a primary reading strategy in this 
project, I believe that, in reflection, there are both benefits and drawbacks for this approach for 
rhetorical critics. In particular, I see two major benefits. First, cluster-agon's similarities with 
some versions of content analysis are significant in that they help to collapse largely artificial 
distinctions between quantitative and interpretive analysis/scholarship. While these two strands 
are clearly modes of investigation whose tendency leans in different directions, they can also be 
mutually reinforcing. In this project, I was able to both investigate and dissect each text with an 
anchor in the quantitative data underlying each text, and then combine such data with a 
qualitative and interpretive approach in order to fortify conclusions when the two pointed in the 
same direction and round out my analysis when they differed. A second major benefit of cluster-
agon as a strategy of approaching rhetorical criticism is that it helps to break apart and 
understand large documents in a way that a more open-ended reading may not. Though Burke's 
own use of cluster-agon was largely limited to short poems and stories, and while most of those 
who have used the approach have similarly focused on relatively short documents, the promise 
of cluster-agon suggests its utility for large documents, from scientific and governmental reports 
                                                 
5 One excellent resource that rhetoricians have is www.americanrhetoric.com. However, we lack an 
appropriate global counterpart, thereby further encouraging the trend to focus our efforts on studying great US 
speakers, past and present. 
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to conference texts to books. While open-ended reading approaches can be excellent for 3-4 page 
speeches, 70-100 page documents require a more structured approach. Especially in an age 
where information accessibility is leading to enormous quantities of textual material, rhetorical 
critics should seek whatever tools help to provide initial signs and clues that can then be 
investigated without strict recourse to any particular method.  
While there are important benefits to this approach, my experience in this project also 
leads me to point out at least two important drawbacks. First, counting and charting words, 
frequencies, their clusters, and related critical tasks can quickly overshadow interpretive analysis. 
At some points, my more quantitatively-driven assessment of some aspects of these texts made 
me feel like I was counting my way through, rather than bringing the true interpretive tools of 
humanistic inquiry to bear upon, the texts. In some ways, this is just an issue for which additional 
practice and honing of critical approach can shore up, but it is a constant temptation when 
straddling quantitative and interpretive frameworks as a critic. The second major drawback of 
cluster-agon may be aptly captured by the commonplace "appearances may be deceiving." Just 
because a term occurs with great frequency in a text does not mean that it is the most telling 
"key" to unlocking the text's rhetorical magic, and vice versa, a term or phrase may appear only 
once but be the turning point that best reveals the rhetorical savvy of the text. Again, both 
practice in the use of this method, and more importantly, combining it with other lines of 
analysis helps to serve as a corrective against such a risk. 
Third, while my uses of stasis theory ultimately ended up being rather limited, I have 
some reflections on its use in rhetorical criticism. Originally, I had intended to utilize stasis 
theory as the centerpiece of my analysis of these texts. However, as I continued to consider each 
text, I noticed that the fundamental similarities, in terms of the points of stasis, made this tool 
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much less decisive. For instance, as conference texts, the documents all suggest that there is a 
problem, immediately making the “is it?” line of stasis reasoning moot. The decision to 
ultimately move stasis theory to the background is very much in the spirit of the close reading 
school of rhetorical criticism, where a central tenet is that theory and approach should be found 
that fits and helps us to understand the text, rather than imposed uncritically on any range of 
texts. Despite its limited utility for my project, I have three initial insights about its role and 
utility. First, scholars who study rhetoric and public argument need to continue the project of 
recovery and expansion for the utility of stasis theory. On the whole, stasis theory has been too 
tied, and in many ways reduced, to the arena of forensic rhetoric. While it has generated 
important insights for forensic rhetoric, the utility of stasis theory for deliberative rhetoric is also 
exciting and understudied. Second, we need to continue to work to develop a more robust 
vocabulary for discussing points of stasis. As Robert Newman points out in his critique of "stock 
issues" as a synonym for stasis points, he suggests that it is so straightforward that it does not 
really tell us anything new.6 While Lawrence Prelli's charting of every possible permutation of 
stasis may be going overboard by overly schematizing the issue, most of the language we 
currently have for describing stasis is relatively thin. 7 In this project, I attempted to begin this 
process by proposing a division between procedural and substantive points of stasis, but much 
more work remains to be done in this area. Third, stasis theory should be more readily accepted 
as a valuable heuristic, especially in IR, for both scholars and practitioners. Finding such "stock 
issues" can help to break controversies into their component parts in order to allow scholars to 
                                                 
6 Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues—a Study of Doctrine," in Readings in Argumentation, edited by 
Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J. Dovre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 166-181. 
7 Lawrence Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication: The Case of Spousal 
Violence Research," in Rhetoric and Incommensurability, edited by Randy Allen Harris (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor 
Press, 2005). 
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develop better understanding and, possibly, also open the doors of rhetorical invention for parties 
actively engaged in these controversies. Such argumentative labor holds the potential to 
intervene against claims that major international disputes are intractable, or, more broadly, 
incommensurable. Finally, stasis theory provides the most “value added” in situations in which 
the procedural and substantive points of stasis are shifting, rather than relatively continuous (or 
even static). One of the main reasons why the stasis analysis was not more prominent in each 
chapter was that, consistent with the “memorializing” argument I make throughout this 
document, the substantive shifts were quite minimal, and the procedural shifts were nearly non-
existent. For this genre of rhetoric, then, stasis may not be the optimal entry point for analysis, 
though in my own case, it helped to serve as a precursor for the analysis that I would later 
formalize, much as cluster-agon analysis did as well. Neither held the central roles as reading 
strategies that I had originally foreseen and intended, but both served as prerequisites for 
successful rhetorical criticism.  
5.3.2 Re-Considering International Relations Theory and Practice  
In recent years (intensifying, in particular, in the 1990s), international relations (IR) 
theory has been increasingly challenged by postmodern and poststructural critiques. Instead of 
challenging from that angle, this project provides a number of challenges, both for IR scholars, 
as well as practitioners of IR, borne out of classical considerations, stretching back to the 
Sophists, for such fundamental notions as rhetoric.   
In particular, I suggest at least four preliminary lessons for IR scholarship. First, IR 
literature would be strengthened by putting an end to the artificial and limiting distinction 
between argument and rhetoric. Though many IR scholars have been quick to appreciate the 
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essentially argument-driven and deliberative nature of international politics, their residual 
distrust for the realms of rhetoric ends up limiting the insights that they can provide. Second, this 
project carries important insights, positive and negative, for efforts to import gender analysis and 
feminist analysis into IR. On the positive end, one sees in these conference texts an ever-greater 
awareness and sense of responsibility for integrating concerns relating to gender issues, as well 
as providing special attention to particular issues facing women and girls. In fact, in the most 
recent texts, one sees them even drawing on IR scholarly terms such as "gender mainstreaming" 
and "gender perspective" as significant parts of their reviews and calls for implementation. This 
suggests that, even in a topic arena that had formerly been, at least arguably, hostile to women's 
interests and gender analysis, there are possibilities for change. On the negative end, despite the 
calls for attention to gender and sex in these documents, there are repeated, elementary 
confusions and conflations between sex and gender. Given that the efforts to resist such 
conflation have been ongoing for many years now, this suggests that more attention and 
advocacy must be made to differentiate the two. Third, unlike Security Council actions or human 
rights case studies, documents like those examined in the current study may be the best venue for 
rethinking the relationship between lack of sovereign authority and rhetorical force. Beyond very 
limited situations, no international organization, and especially the United Nations, has the 
ability to take action in a way that interferes with or impedes state sovereignty. Therefore, to the 
extent that any action is taken based on UN recommendations or calls, it is due to the rhetorical 
effectiveness of their calls to action and the marshalling of the better argument in favor of their 
position. Again, such reflection also draws attention back to the importance of the value of such 
documents for analysis by rhetoricians and public argument scholars. Fourth, for all of the many 
criticisms of the United Nations, and in particular its charged ineffectiveness, the current project 
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helps to suggest an important, if underappreciated, benefit that it provides. Ramesh Thakur and 
Thomas G. Weiss suggest that the United Nations may in fact have an important role in policy 
that usually goes unacknowledged: 
[T]he universal UN system has made solid use of its unique legitimacy and helped 
initiate steps toward the formulation of coherent global policies. While the policy 
glass is more than half full, when key member states turn recalcitrant, clearly the 
implementation one is close to empty. That remains the fundamental reality of 
global governance in a statecentric world.8 
This statement by Thakur and Weiss is supported by the current project, and helps to provide a 
more proportional evaluation of the importance of the United Nations. While they do not naively 
or idealistically place the importance of the UN on a pedestal, they also avoid the realist trap of 
assigning minimal value to all international actors outside of states. Especially in the context of 
the ICPD process, it would be hard to miss out on the importance of NGOs in helping to set the 
global agenda.9 While Thankur and Weiss are clear that states have the ability to undermine 
important aspects of UN governance, they also demonstrate an appreciate for the important roles 
that the United Nations can play in shifting global opinion and supporting particular sets of 
policies.  
                                                 
8 Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, "United Nations 'Policy': An Argument with Three Illustrations," 
International Studies Perspectives (2009), 33. 
9 With regard to the NGO role in terms of ICPD specifically, see Jutta M. Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, 
and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007). 
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5.3.3 Judging 30 Years of UN Population Rhetoric 
Rhetoricians typically are engaged in at least one of two tasks: attempting to interpret a text 
better, to understand how it works and share that knowledge, as well as providing a judgment 
about the quality of the rhetoric. As noted in Chapter 1, in the passage by Zarefsky, this does not 
require amassing polling data from after a speech occurs. However, as Edwin Black notes, in 
Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, the act of judgment is critical to the performance of an 
act of rhetorical criticism. Thus, while I have largely attempted to describe, interpret, and unpack 
these documents, to understand their key rhetorical features as public argument, in this section I 
more aggressively put forth a judgment on the rhetorical savvy, or lack thereof, of these texts. 
Notably, any judgment, like all rhetoric, must be situational and contextual. Therefore, I 
approach this judgment with the understanding, as described in chapter 3, that these texts 
constitute a different genre, and thus it would be unreasonable to apply the standards to these 
texts that one might apply, for instance, to Abraham Lincoln or John F. Kennedy.  
5.3.3.1  The Ambiguity of Incipience 
As Kenneth Burke explained in both A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives, 
"the notion of an attitude or incipient act is ambiguous; an attitude of sympathy, for instance, 
may either lead into an overt act of kindness, or it may serve 'liberally' as the substitute for an act 
of kindness."10 Without wishing to reproduce the millenia-old rhetoric-action dichotomy, this 
essential ambiguity of attitudes as incipient action bears importance on the importance of 
international conference documents considered as rhetorical artifacts. One may very well argue, 
                                                 
10 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 90. 
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following Schechter's claim about the ability for UN conferences to carry an agenda-setting, 
issue-definition-type "soft" function, that these conference texts are incipient actions insofar as 
they raise awareness and consciousness about these issues and open the opportunity for 
meaningful action to be taken to address the issues.11 However, Burke's passage also raises the 
alternate possibility. It may be the case that these conferences, and their resulting documents, 
represent the substitute for action, particularly when those with the most resources to devote to 
these issues (including developed countries and donor organizations) can feel that they have 
accomplished something simply by making a verbal commitment and scoring a high-reward, 
low-risk public relations victory in the process. In some ways, this is a question that will best be 
born out in the unfolding of history, as action on behalf of these goals, whether material, 
rhetorical, or some combination, may help to judge the quality of "incipience" in this instance. 
However, as noted above, providing awareness and consciousness and the right arguments in 
favor of a position is no guarantee of success, especially given the extremely complicated 
intersection of events that constitute international relations as well as domestic activities.  
5.3.3.2 Hopeful Possibilities for Rhetoric, IR, and Global Governance 
In his now (in)famous piece challenging the rhetoric of science, “The Idea of Rhetoric in 
the Rhetoric of Science,” Dilip Gaonkar posed a series of vexing questions for rhetoricians 
generally, and rhetoricians of science in particular. Amongst other challenges, Gaonkar 
questioned whether there was any “value added” in acts of criticism that were apparently from a 
“rhetorical” perspective, or if the ‘R’ word, and its related vocabulary, could be omitted entirely 
without any value lost. While many challenges and refutations were offered, rhetoricians often 
                                                 
11 Michael G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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seem on the defensive when attempting to interpret artifacts that are outside the traditional 
domains of oratory and public address instead of embracing the opportunity. The current project 
enables criticism that provides benefits for both those inside and outside the academic realm of 
rhetoric. For rhetoricians, the study of UN conference texts provides a new body of texts to 
study, with new genre considerations to formalize. For IR theorists and practitioners, the value 
added of a rhetorical approach to these texts generates new depth to terms like “communication” 
and illuminates tensions and quandaries that provide both challenges and opportunities for the 
construction of future conference texts and, more generally, international diplomatic texts. 
Gaonkar’s insights seem to suggest that we are going where we are not wanted, and thus 
ignoring “No Trespassing” signs. However, the work of scholars such as Risse, and of IR 
practitioners such as Singh, suggests that the doors are open and a diverse range of voices are 
welcome and encouraged. As long as we avoid merely reducing their study and practice to a 
projection of our own disciplinary concerns, we can produce insights that contain value beyond 
the walls of our discipline. Rather than lamenting the dangers caused by globalizing rhetoric, I 
argue that it is more productive to consider the possibilities and opportunities of cross-pollinating 
scholarship whose value goes in both directions, helping IR, global governance, as rhetorical 
theory and criticism.  
5.3.3.3 Biomimicry and Rhetorical Form 
 In some situations, successful pro-environmental rhetoric is simultaneously capable of 
mimicking the processes of nature (to perform its message) and be most instrumentally 
successful while doing it (as opposed merely to expressing oneself or constituting a community). 
For instance, Alison Aurelia Fisher argues persuasively that eco-comedy, and the use of the 
comic, rather than tragic or melodramatic frame (with its emphasis on guilt and sacrifice), is both 
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more sustainable, and better mirrors the process of nature itself.12 In this situation, then, the 
rhetor who would adopt the form of nature as the form of their rhetoric would be simultaneously 
successful. In this case, the paths of the two forms are convergent. However, are there situations 
in which a rhetor (or, more generally, a piece of rhetoric) might mirror the form of nature (again, 
to perform the message), but as a result of that biomimicry, end up resulting in instrumental 
rhetorical failure?  
In a column for the New York Times in August of 2009, Thomas L. Friedman argued, 
following the title of his piece, that we needed to start “Connecting Nature’s Dots”:  
We’re trying to deal with a whole array of integrated problems—climate change, 
energy, biodiversity loss, poverty alleviation and the need to grow enough food to 
feed the planet—separately. The poverty fighters resent the climate-change folks; 
climate folks hold summits without reference to biodiversity; the food advocates 
resist the biodiversity protectors. They all need to go on safari together. . . . In 
short . . . we need to make sure that our policy solutions are as integrated as nature 
itself. Today, they are not. 
Friedman’s passage is fascinating, not only in the advice that it provides for environmentalists 
and policymakers, but also in the ways in which the form of argument is related to the substance 
being advanced by the argument. That is, our policy should mirror, or mimic, the ways of nature. 
Such an insight is reflected in the burgeoning literature on biomimicry, which suggests a broad 
range of human experience in which we as humans would be better served mirroring the 
processes of nature as opposed to being negligent of or resistant against them.  
                                                 
12Alison Aurelia Fisher, “Roasting on Earth: A Rhetorical Analysis of Eco-Comedy” (PhD diss., Southern 
Illinois University Carbondale, 2009).   
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Beyond the insights offered by Fisher and Friedman, I wonder if there is another possible 
combination between substance and form, one that might combine to be rhetorically ineffective? 
For instance, in the five documents that I analyzed in this dissertation, the length varied from 
between 10,000 to 40,000 words. Of that text, most of it is dry, technical reporting (in the way in 
which a scientific report or government report might be). Furthermore, expressed especially well 
at Cairo, the “solution” to understanding “population” is to understand that it is linked with, well, 
everything. Integration, connection, and systems-level approaches guide this vision. Indeed, 
trying to suggest one master variable, or one major chain of causality, or anything that might 
otherwise allow the casual (or even committed) reader to hone in on the most important point, is, 
it seems, not possible, and even if it were, counter-productive to the message of complexity, or in 
the current technological parlance, “the cloud” of relevant factors. Clearly, nature itself (if it can 
even be spoken of singularly) resists and defies any easy explanations, and continues to prove 
more complex than we have previously calculated. Thus, the rhetorical message, that complexity 
demands complexity of response, mirrors nature well, where attempts to produce even “simple” 
changes both require and result in a complex network of factors, influences, and consequences. 
Insofar as the form of these documents, then, represent bewildering complexity, and find 
their counterpart in the complexity of nature itself, does that necessarily suggest that they are 
likely to be rhetorically effective? Or does our embrace of “the cloud” come at too high a price, 
of making our vision and our advocacy cloudy? At a bare minimum, this project would suggest 
that there is no guarantee or sure bet that rhetorical biomimicry is likely to be successful. 
However, this dissertation’s analysis suggests that the prospects for success may be even more 
dubious. My arguments about a lack of “residual message,” or of a conflict with the “economics 
of attention,” suggest that texts and arguments that are this complicated and nuanced are likely to 
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be ineffective, as most readers are unlikely to even try to read them, and if they do, there is no 
guarantee that the reader will take the toll of performing “close reads.” Thus, it is hard to judge 
the rhetoric of these conference texts, even with a modified set of genre standards, as any kind of 
a success. However, in their performance of nature’s interconnections, they are arguably very 
laudable. This suggests that, rather hoping that rhetorical biomimicry will be successful or 
unsuccessful across the board, we need to be sensitive to what particular aspects of nature are 
being mirrored, and in that analysis, will be better to judge the situation and context to determine 
the likely rhetorical effectiveness of the message.   
5.3.4 Memorializing Cairo 
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the rhetoric surrounding these conferences, such as 
the passages from scholars, activists, and others from Chapter 1, is the way that Cairo in 
particular is memorialized. Most recollections of the value of the conference memorialize it for 
two major accomplishments: being a sharp break from previous arguments about population 
(ostensibly, this would include Bucharest and Mexico City), and being a sharp break from the 
quantitative/demographic logic that has largely guided analyses and arguments surrounding 
(over)population.13 Without intending merely to "debunk" or "demystify" such accounts, they 
both deserve additional scrutiny, particularly in light of the observations afforded by this project. 
First, does the Cairo Programme of Action actually represent a sharp break from previous 
                                                 
13 As John Muckelbauer explains (in trying to negotiate classical rhetorical concepts like invention in light 
of postmodern theory), such a frame of memorializing, in its representation of the “relationship between the twin 
concepts of tradition and innovation,” offers a false dichotomy, either of which force an essentially “negative” move 
by the critic: “The two most prevalent models of this relation [between tradition and innovation] are 1) invention as 
an absolute break from the past and 2) invention as necessarily complicit with the past.” John Muckelbauer, The 
Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2008), xv.   
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population arguments? Especially insofar as the history of UN conferences on population in 
particular is concerned, this appears to be an unwarranted claim. While some of the themes are 
more heavily emphasized or framed in updated ways, the seeds of most all of the arguments in 
the Cairo Programme of Action can be located in the Bucharest and Mexico City documents.14 
Second, is the Cairo Programme of Action in fact a sharp break from quantitative/demographic 
logics of population? Again, to be a "break," the previous arguments would have had to have 
embraced such logics, and again, at least as far as UN conferences go, neither Bucharest and 
Mexico City did. Even more interestingly, in some ways the Programme of Action represents the 
most demographically-inclined of the three documents. The preamble opens by charting potential 
global "demographic futures," and notes throughout the additional problems and strains resulting 
from global population growth and overpopulation. At a minimum, this puts it in line with 
Bucharest and Mexico City, as both of them had some degree of these similar attributes, but they 
were also, on the whole, decidedly more suspicious of an agenda that placed population ahead of 
(or even on equal footing with) development and social concerns. 
                                                 
14 While I have concerns about the claimed "novelty" of Cairo, in support of the notion of dissoi logoi, I 
also want to sketch a brief possible response that would at least partially validate the claims to novelty. For more on 
the notion of dissoi logoi, see, for instance, Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social 
Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). First, even if many of the themes were already 
substantially pre-figured, the people at the negotiating table were different. To a greater degree than previous 
conferences, even Bucharest and Mexico City, non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors were 
welcome participants in the ICPD process. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Creating a New Consensus on Population: The 
International Conference on Population and Development (London: Earthscan, 1998). Second, while the themes 
may have already been in place, there may be an argument that the unique tapestry of involving all the issues in 
particular *new* proportions may be worthy of a claim to novelty. In this vein, even the ongoing demographic 
discussion in Cairo may not be a negation of its possible novelty: 
A motive, when genuinely transcended, is not dropped, but transformed. It is redeemed not by 
subtraction, but by inclusion in a new fellowship. It is thus not repressed, but expressed, yet 
expressed with a difference: for its "nature" has been "graced."  
Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 314. 
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If indeed the memorializing, constructed by a wide range of actors, from scholars to 
participants to activists, among others, cannot be sustained in reference to the textual 
components of these conferences, who cares? What possible problems arise from what might at 
most be categorized as a minor historical inaccuracy? While some might minimize the impact of 
this slippage, I believe that there a re a number of problematic implications that follow from this 
framing error.  
First, by circumventing the role and rhetorical development of Bucharest and Mexico 
City (and by allowing attention to be distracted by, for instance, Reagan’s efforts at Mexico City, 
rather than on the textual outcomes of the conference), we lose out on valuable lessons from 
those conferences generally but more particularly to their textual, rhetorical outcomes. For 
instance, if it is true that there are extensive similarities between the earlier texts and the text of 
the Programme of Action, and if the effectiveness of those texts has been limited, as suggested 
even in the Cairo text, then understanding the limits of the predecessors might offer information 
that could help Cairo participants and advocates, and their successors, in achieving more success 
than that achieved by Bucharest and Mexico City. If, for instance, the dense nature of the earlier 
conference texts, offering so many recommendations that they become too diffuse to have one 
coherent message, and Cairo advocates, in seeking to be “new,” and thus glazing over rather than 
carefully studying the primary historical antecedents, did the same, then we could see why the 
rhetorical limitations in the earlier texts might have been transferred, largely unreflectively, to 
the later text(s).  
Second, suggestions of new hope created by a new vision and plan of action for 
population have the function of condemning previous population efforts. This is because, 
rhetorically, in advocating for “new” over “old,” the implication is that there had to be either 
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some serious problems with the old, or at best, it no longer fit with the current times. Otherwise, 
there would be no need to chart a new path. John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, in writing on 
the policy and donor problems created by the Cairo Programme of Action, note that the degree of 
demonization of pre-Cairo efforts has become troublesome:  
The past decade has been a destabilizing time for supporters of international 
population assistance. Western feminists and advocacy-oriented non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have harshly criticized the legitimacy of pre-
Cairo family planning programs. While these criticisms have certainly not been 
wholly unjustified, they have also tended to project unfair characterizations of 
much pre-Cairo family planning effort.15 
These “unfair characterizations,” in addition to distorting the historical record, also complicate 
efforts at creating a profitable conversation between population advocates and environmentalists. 
I offer one short story to illustrate this problem. At my current institution, there is an active 
network of student environmental advocacy efforts. I had the good fortune to hear from one of 
our more active students recently. Talking with him, as well as some of my colleagues, he related 
to us how shocked and saddened he was that one of the major national/international 
environmental organizations was moving toward taking an official advocacy position with regard 
to population. He detailed his efforts at sending an angry letter warning of the problematic 
implications of such a move. As he did not know that my dissertation was about population, I 
stayed quiet and listened to his criticisms of “population” as an object for advocacy. He talked 
about the implications for developed and developing countries, how race, sex, and gender are 
                                                 
15 John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and 
Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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targeted in population efforts, and continued on with the standard topoi of those who oppose the 
idea that we should advocate for addressing (over)population. Every time we continue to dwell 
on a narrative that marks out an “evil” history behind population efforts, we make it more 
difficult to make proportional responses that can reject some but not all parts of population 
advocacy and thus potentially accept other parts. And, as this student’s narrative suggests, now 
that almost 20 years have passed, for those who oppose population advocacy, Cairo is as much 
the problem as Bucharest and eugenics. By oversimplifying, and just outright mis-reading, the 
history of population advocacy efforts, especially those of the last 40 years, we forget, as 
indicated in Chapter 1, that population advocacy, like rhetoric itself, is capable, as Aristotle 
notes, of being otherwise and thus able to be modified, improved, and changed.  
 Third, and very similar to the previous point, proclamations of novelty, with the 
implication that everything that came before was flawed, functions rhetorically to infer that 
either “there is no debate” or “the time for debate is over” about whether historical figures and 
actions acted in progressive or evil ways, with good or ill intentions, and with positive or 
negative outcomes. Rather than opening the past, a rhetorically constructed object, in order to 
read carefully into particular episodes and actors, these claims sweep a wide range of efforts and 
moments under the rug as all representing ineffective and/or dangerous efforts. Thus, to suggest 
that particular groups, individuals, or campaigns, achieved positive outcomes, or at least had the 
best of intentions, is to invite criticism because the weight of these claims of novelty appear to 
contradict what appears to be an official, authoritative history, and thus deemed to fall outside 
the realm of legitimate debate by scholars, policy analysts, and activists, for instance.  
Fourth, while these claims “close the debate” in some ways, they also (re-)open debates 
that are potentially problematic. For instance, in claiming that things like “reproductive rights,” 
 243 
“reproductive health,” and “sexual health,” are new to UN population advocacy, rather than 
based strongly on precedent from prior conference, such advocates allow opponents, not only of 
those efforts, but of all population advocacy, to wreak havoc. For instance, representatives from 
the Vatican, and social and religious conservatives from around the world, turned international 
public perception of the Cairo conference into being about “reproductive rights” as a Trojan 
horse for abortion rights. Needless to say, any close reading of Bucharest and Mexico City made 
it clear that a) reproductive rights were a natural outgrowth of already agreed upon, consensus 
documents, and that b) abortion rights had not been advocated before in the texts and were not 
being advocated here. By clamoring for a claim to novelty, however, population advocates 
opened the door for efforts to block the Cairo proceedings. Similarly, as Singh notes, though the 
phrase “couples and individuals,” in regard to right to and access to birth control, among other 
things, had already been debated and had already “won” the day, Cairo became an opportunity to 
re-open the debate and to attempt to roll back precedent and consensus. While not fully because 
of the framing of novelty, the rhetorical exigence of justifying the “new” approach ended up at 
loggerheads with the defense of already achieved and still relevant goals.  
Fifth, while the idea of “close reading” is used in this project primarily as a mode of 
investigation, I also believe that “close reading” stands as a normative principle by which we can 
judge texts that attempt to “read” or make use of other texts. Just as I earlier pointed to the way 
in which the Tea Party’s refusal to engage in close reading of the Declaration of Independence 
and Constitution creates basic confusions that ultimately inhibit democratic participation and 
advocacy, I believe that too much in the relatively recent (at least 40 years) history of population 
advocacy has been limited by a refusal to engage the relevant texts closely. With the sheer 
quantity of documents produced, even at the UN alone, the temptation for scholars, 
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policymakers, NGO activists, and others, is to focus on press releases and executive summaries 
rather than to engage the core of the texts. While such an approach is at some degree inevitable, 
when the short hand being used to make authoritative claims about the history of an entire branch 
of advocacy comes into direct tension with the results of a close reading of the primary texts, we 
should demand, not only from scholars, but also from pundits and commentators, a return to the 
text in order to prevent such errors. One type of error created relates to the problem of analysts 
and observers creating a phantom foil against which to build up the novelty of Cairo, as I discuss 
in the next section.  
5.3.5 Guarding Against Foils and Fallacies 
 The image of the ghost/spectre is increasingly deployed, in popular culture and in 
scholarship, leading some to refer to a new branch of study called “hauntology” (following 
partially on the lead of Jacques Derrida in Spectres of Marx). More specifically, this project in 
particular includes many intersections with the spectre. Greene argues that Malthus still “haunts” 
us, while Nicholas Eberstadt, writing for the American Enterprise Institute, argues, “A 
demographic spectre is haunting authoritative and influential circles in both the United States 
and the international community. This spectre is the supposed imperative to ‘stabilise human 
population.”16 My argument about the presence of the spectre is different. I claim that, to the 
degree that there is a spectre, it is because we are jousting with a phantom foil. That is, in order 
to justify the novelty of the entire UN approach to population, and more specifically, the Cairo 
International Conference on Population Development’s Programme of Action approach, three 
                                                 
16 Nicholas Eberstadt, Too Many People? (London: International Policy Network, July 2007), 3, 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070712_Too_Many_People.pdf (accessed July 25, 2010).  
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phantoms must be continually resurrected: first, the image of the evil, plotting eugenicists (see, 
for instance, Connelly), Malthus and his neo-Malthusian enforcers (see Greene), and narratives 
of coercion, sterilization, and sinister motives, ranging in circumference from the local to the 
global.17  
In addition to this area of constantly reinvoking the phantom, an implicit ghost lurks with 
regard to pre-Cairo international population rhetoric and policy. The most recent international 
population rhetoric and policy prior to Cairo, of any major prominence, came in the form of the 
1974 Bucharest conference and the 1984 Mexico City conference, so every time that someone 
pronounces Cairo as starting a “new paradigm” or “redefining” population, the argument by 
implication is that Bucharest and Mexico City enshrined old, Malthusian forms of population 
apocalypticism. However, such an argument is only tenable in light of a refusal to engage in a 
close read of either the WPPA or the “Recommendations for Further Implementation” 
documents themselves. 18 
 Instead of being so concerned about setting up a harsh foil, so that an activist or scholar 
can attempt to make a forced choice between that foil and the activist or scholar’s own preferred 
                                                 
17 While some of my analysis opens the possibility that opponents of population advocacy, at least in terms 
of its problematic history, are using Malthus/Malthusiansim/Neo-Malthusianism as their foil, not prior UN 
conferences. However, as I suggest here, and earlier in the dissertation, this distinction, if correct, requires massively 
better explanation by those who adopt it. What we have, time after time, are indications that Cairo is “new,” and 
presuming that the writer knows of the UN efforts (and in some cases, the UN, or official representatives at UN 
conferences are the authors), the most reasonable interpretation is that they see Cairo as new, not only in relation to 
Malthus, but in relation to Bucharest and Mexico City as well. If that is not the intent, they have an analytical and 
political task to fulfill in making those distinctions clearer, as it impacts a number of important types of audiences. 
18 Such foils end up routinely violating the most basic argument fallacies. For instance, and especially in 
relation to the history of (over)population, foils quickly resemble little more than ad hominem attacks, and foils tend 
toward creating straw person and reductio ad absurdums. When these tendencies do not bear out, we see false 
dichotomies in which only 2 and exactly 2 choices are forced upon readers. While this relates to public arguments 
such as (over)population, it also recurs far too frequently in our scholarly discourse. For instance, in maintaining 
forced choices, we talk about rhetoric either as epistemology or as aesthetics, as ideological or material, as 
(Neo)Aristotlean or not, and on and on. In most of those scholarly debates, a reasonable third party is likely to find 
value in both perspectives and see that one can even embrace both positions simultaneously.  
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rhetoric or program or philosophy, we would do much better following a Burkean approach that 
allows for proportionality of motives rather than a simplistic essentializing of motives:  
As for the glosses of the interpretive strategy in general, they would be of this 
sort: For one thing, they would concern a distinction between what I should call 
an essentializing mode of interpretation and a mode that stresses proportion of 
ingredients. . . . This essentializing strategy is linked with a normal ideal of 
science: to ‘explain the complex in terms of the simple.’ This ideal almost vows 
one to select one or another motive from a cluster and interpret the others in terms 
of it. . . . Now, I don’t see how you can possibly explain the complex in terms of 
the simple without having your very success used as a charge against you. When 
you get through, all that your opponent need say is: ‘But you have explained the 
complex in terms of the simple—and the simple is precisely what the complex is 
not.’19 
Especially in light of the substance of the Cairo texts, and its predecessors and successors, that 
we need an orientation that embraces complexity and interrelations, rather than linear causality 
and singular lines of focus, support by “advocates” of Cairo for an essentializing reading strategy 
of motives seems ironic, to say the least. Besides, though, the ideological hurdle that must be 
cleared to convince a critic, or even a deliberating citizen or NGO activist, to engage in 
proportional readings of motives, rather than essentializing ones, there is the additional demand 
of “close reading,” which, sadly, appears to have gotten lost in creating talking points about “pre-
                                                 
19 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1973), 261-262.  
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Cairo population rhetoric/policy.” In this sense, the “close reading” argument within rhetorical 
criticism may actually serve as a microcosm of a well-needed societal debate.  
 While biomimicry, or attempting to achieve mimesis by harmonizing one’s rhetorical 
strategy with the strategies of nature may be unsuccessful on this specific set of issues 
(population), the complexity and interrelations in nature may serve perfectly as a metaphor for 
approaching criticism, whether as an academic or citizen or concerned political activist. 
Moreover, this holistic approach to criticism can also help to counteract dominant tendencies in 
scholarship on rhetoric and public argument generally, and scholarship and popular discourse on 
population specifically. In this next section, I argue for re-thinking critical perspective from a 
rhetorical point of view. Such a mode of scholarship would require a willingness to transcend 
demystification, debunking, and the hermeneutics of suspicion as the primary engines for critical 
telos, and replace such “negative” impulses with a more neutral, or even rehabilitating critical 
perspective, following in the footsteps of scholars like Kenneth Burke.  
5.3.6 Re-Thinking Critical Perspective 
We need to rethink critical perspective. If the individuals most affected by historically 
problematic ideas such as "development" and "population control" are willing to invest in and 
attempt to re-chart the paths of such rhetoric, rather than simply abandon and condemn it, should 
not rhetoricians be willing to do the same in analyzing the rhetoric of subjects generally looked 
down upon? Surveying some of the landmark works on population, for instance, from Ron 
Greene to Matthew Connelly to many others pursuing similar arguments, there is an ongoing 
effort to vilify and crucify the rhetoric (and the individuals creating such rhetoric), rather than to 
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provide a more proportional response.20 Indeed, the critical challenge offered up by Kenneth 
Burke, in relation to the toxic rhetoric of Adolf Hitler, appears unthinkable in the present 
moment: 
The appearance of Mein Kampf in unexpurgated translation has called forth far 
too many vandalistic comments. There are other ways of burning books than on 
the pyre—and the favorite method of the hasty reviewer is to deprive himself and 
his readers by inattention. I maintain that it is thoroughly vandalistic for the 
reviewer to content himself with the mere inflicting of a few symbolic wounds 
upon this book and its author, of an intensity varying with the resources of the 
reviewer and the time at his disposal. Hitler's "Battle" is exasperating, even 
nauseating; yet the fact remains: If the reviewer but knocks off a few adverse 
attitudinizings and calls it a day, with a guaranty in advance that his article will 
have a favorable reception among the decent members of our population, he is 
contributing more to our gratification than to our enlightenment.21 
Unlike the situation Burke describes, what is at stake is not a single text by a single 
author, but rather an entire collection of rhetoric united by issue, and to a lesser degree, stance on 
that issue. Also, I do not wish to insinuate that Greene, Connelly, or any other critics who have 
                                                 
20 The examples of polemic by those who are suspicious of or completely opposed to population advocacy 
are numerous. Without cataloging such examples in any exhaustive way, one example stands out clearly as an 
attempt at vilification and crucifixion, and it comes from Greene: “The intersection of Malthus with biological forms 
of state racism contributed to the conceptual work necessary for modernity to build the railroad tracks to Auschwitz. 
Malthusian Worlds, 50. Such hyperbole adds little, as one could easily imagine Nazi genocide without ever having 
had any kind of Malthusianism in Western intellectual history, but instead functions more as an ad hominem attack 
on Malthus and (neo-)Malthusians. Such sloppy polemic mirrors Ben Stein, in his movie advocating for Intelligent 
Design, where he visits the camps at Dachau and reflects on how the seeds for that terrible moment in human history 
could be traced back to the writings of Charles Darwin. In both cases, the claims are far-fetched and difficult to 
sustain, and both have the additional effect of blocking debate (people do not generally like to engage in debate with 
others when they are pre-emptively accused of advocating genocidal philosophies).  
21 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1973), 191. 
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condemned the rhetoric of population control or overpopulation have been hasty or inattentive to 
their task at hand. To the contrary, each work is thoroughly researched and well composed and 
argued. Instead, what I find to be "substantially" (following another strain of Burke) the same 
between the "reviewers" challenged by Burke and these anti-population authors is that they do 
tend to focus on the "inflicting" of "symbolic wounds" and "adverse attitudinizings" on the side 
of the topic that now, overwhelmingly on the left and right, "will have a favorable reception." 
Insofar as this occurs, we end up learning more about the attitudes of the authors writing such 
texts than we do about the rhetoric, artifacts, and texts supposedly under study by such authors. 
While critics can and should be on the lookout for ideologically problematic arguments and 
rhetoric, if this becomes the sole or primary task, a disservice has been done, as the internal 
dynamics of the texts themselves disappear. Especially for arguments with long historical 
trajectories, there is something in the (as Burke calls it) "word magic" that makes such lines of 
reasoning appealing and sustainable across time. Even with a more activist bent, by spending 
more time engaging and learning from the texts from within, rather than distancing ourselves 
from without, we stand a better chance of suggesting remedies or defenses against such claims, 
and potentially find ways to reclaim or shift the rhetoric in a new, more hopeful, direction. 
 Not only is this an opportunity, and perhaps even an imperative, for rhetoricians, it is also 
vital for those studying and practicing population policy and rhetoric, as Nicholas Kristof 
explains in his review of Connelly’s Fatal Misconception:  
In “Fatal Misconception,” Matthew Connelly . . . carefully assembles a century’s 
worth of mistakes, arrogance, racism, sexism and incompetence in what the jacket 
copy calls a “withering critique” of “a humanitarian movement gone terribly 
awry.” . . . Critics of family planning programs will seize gleefully upon this 
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book, and that’s unfortunate, because two propositions are both correct: first, 
population planners have made grievous mistakes and were inexcusably quiet for 
too long about forced sterilization in countries like India and China; and second, 
those same planners have learned from past mistakes and today are fighting 
poverty and saving vast numbers of lives in developing countries. “Fatal 
Misconception” is to population policy what William Easterly’s “White Man’s 
Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So 
Little Good” (2006) was to foreign aid: a useful, important but ultimately 
unbalanced corrective to smug self-satisfaction among humanitarians. Connelly 
scrupulously displays a hundred years of family planners’ dirty laundry, but 
without adequately emphasizing that we are far better off for their efforts. One 
could write a withering history of medicine, focusing on doctors’ infecting 
patients when they weren’t bleeding them, but doctors are pretty handy people to 
have around today. And so are family planners. . . . It’s certainly fair of Connelly 
to dredge up the forced sterilizations, the casual disregard for injuries caused by 
IUDs, the racism and sexism and all the rest—but we also need to remember that 
all that is history. The family planning movement has corrected itself, and today it 
saves the lives of women in poor countries and is central to efforts to reduce 
poverty worldwide. If we allow that past to tarnish today’s efforts by family 
planning organizations, women in poor countries will be doubly hurt.  
Based on my read of the history of population efforts, as well as the texts that I have examined in 
this study, I fully agree with Kristof’s arguments here about the content, but he is also pointing to 
an important issue with regard to critical perspective. In one sense, for population specifically, 
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we need to adopt more of what Burke has termed a “proportional” reading, as opposed to an 
“essentializing” read, in order to account for the depth and complexity of different actors and 
their purposes. More generally, though, the scholarly problem to which Kristof points is one that 
is a major focus of this entire project. Moreover, just as family planning is over-critiqued for its 
negatives, and systematically under-appreciated for its benefits, so too is “rhetoric,” in the 
vernacular, and in scholarly circles, attacked for all the ways that it can go wrong (the constant 
classroom discussion where asking students to think of places where rhetoric has been used 
toward dangerous ends invariably leads to a discussion of Hitler’s instrumentally powerful but 
offensive, unethical rhetoric), but not always given credit for the fact that, while rhetoric can be a 
curse, it can also be a cure. It is in this sense that the invitational rhetoric people get it wrong.22 It 
is not that rhetoric cannot be used toward destructive ends, or that it cannot operate in 
mischievous ways (a review of the Encomium to Helen demonstrates that such an argument far 
pre-dated the proposal for an invitational rhetoric), but what gets under-appreciated is the ways 
in which rhetoric has been a primary liberating mechanism for much of progressive social 
activism throughout human history, and without the resources of rhetoric, there are no ways to 
counter those who would use rhetoric for the worst of ends. Therefore, if our engagement is 
serious, we need to embrace a critical voice that seeks to understand, rather than, in the words of 
Kenneth Burke, to “waylay” with a “brickbat,” for we have too many bats out being swung and 
the room is small enough that someone will get hurt. 
 
 
                                                 
22 For an introduction to invitational rhetoric, see, for instance, Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, 
“Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,” Communication Monographs 62 (1995): 2-18. 
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APPENDIX A 
WORDLE OF PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (CAIRO, 1994)23
 
Figure 1: Cairo, 1994 
                                                 
23 Created May 14, 2009, on www.wordle.net. 
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APPENDIX B 
WORDLE OF WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (BUCHAREST, 1974)24
 
Figure 2: Bucharest, 1974 
 
                                                 
24 Created November 15, 2008, on www.wordle.net.  
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APPENDIX C 
WORDLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (MEXICO CITY, 1984)25
 
Figure 3: Mexico City, 1984 
 
                                                 
25 Created November 15, 2008, on www.wordle.net. 
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APPENDIX D 
WORDLE OF KEY ACTIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1999)26
 
Figure 4: ICPD+5, 1999 
                                                 
26 Created May 25, 2009, on www.wordle.net. 
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APPENDIX E 
WORDLE OF IPCD AT 10: THE WORLD REAFFIRMS CAIRO (2004)27
 
Figure 5: ICPD+10, 2004 
                                                 
27 Created May 27, 2009, on www.wordle.net. 
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